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Introduction  
There is a plausible view according to which scientific knowledge consists primarily of explanations, 
whereupon with the development of new theories our knowledge both broadens and deepens (as 
fundamental theories explain more and become more general). One might claim that science is, 
then, aiming at an integrated understanding of reality that consists “not only of reductionist 
ingredients such as space, time and subatomic particles, but also, for example, of life, thought and 
computation” (D. Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality, 1997).   
Historically, it has been quantum theory (early 20th century), or initially quantum mechanics, that 
finally undermined the supposed runaway success of reductionist mechanistic philosophy (modulo 
Maxwellian updating), re-opening the door for scepticism about the explanatory aims of science 
(2nd half of the 20th century). However, recent years have seen a revival of the belief in some 
version of quantum theory, as part of a fundamental complete theory, as well as (alternatively) its 
‘reinvention’ as a non-realist (in some instances non-physical) theory that delineates the constraints 
of information gathering about the underlying unobservable ontology of the physical world (end of 
20th and early 21st century).  
Aside from numerous philosophical perplexities associated with interpretations and re-formulations 
of the theoretical framework behind the empirical success of quantum mechanics, the recent 
developments named are also interesting for their approaches to scientific explanation of the 
physical phenomena. Due to the potential status of quantum mechanics as a fundamental theory, it 
is important, for any scientific explanation, to investigate the constraints it imposes on the 
explanatory aim of science, as well as any departure it requires from the basic explanatory construct 
of matter evolving on the space and time stage. In this thesis, two broad perspectives on the 
integrated understating of reality will be delineated: a principle and a constructive one, and these 
will be applied as criteria in a comparative analysis of specific interpretations of contemporary 
quantum theory. 
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The ‘principle’ and ‘constructive’ perspectives are formed on the basis of the following (broad) 
criteria: methodological approach to the development of new theories about segments of physical 
reality (principle vs. constructive in the narrow sense), metaphysical attitude towards existence of 
the unobservable theoretical entities (agnostic anti-realism vs. simple realism), and the method of 
providing an explanation (unification-type vs. causal).  
In the narrow, methodological sense (from which the two theoretical perspectives draw their 
names) constructive theories attempt to build a picture of the more complex phenomena out of the 
relatively simple ontology from which they conceptually start out. Principle theories, on the other 
hand, employ the analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements that form their basis and 
conceptual starting point are not hypothetically constructed, but empirically discovered ones, 
general characteristics of natural processes. The fundamental theoretical task in the latter case is the 
analysis of principles, with the aim of arriving at certain necessary conditions or constraints on 
observed phenomena; the phenomena that underwrite and reconcile these empirical principles. On 
the other hand, it has long been received knowledge in the philosophy of physics that when we say 
we have succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes, we invariably mean that a 
constructive theory has been found which covers the processes in question.  
As for the second criterion, the metaphysical attitude towards existence of the unobservable 
theoretical entities (this needn’t be just the dimensionally ‘small’ things) a basic realist account 
accepts that some mind-independent referents, or tokens, of most currently observable common-
sense and physical types (constituting our known world) objectively exist independently of the 
mental. The general anti-realist stance claims that the independent reality is beyond the reach of our 
knowledge and language (but not that it doesn’t exist), and that the known world is partly 
constructed by the human imposition of concepts. All the worlds defined by such concepts differ 
according to the social group that introduced them, and thus exist only relative to the (mental) 
imposition of concepts. The thesis investigates the concurrence of the metaphysical commitments of 
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either account with the simple transcendental strategy for realism. Namely, that the concepts 
employed in an account of everyday experience can have a philosophical foundation in the physical 
constraints imposed by quantum theory.  
Finally, in terms of explanation, explanations aiming at the unification conception of understanding 
primarily focus on the uncovering unity that underlies the apparent diversity of the observed 
phenomena, without particular reliance on causality. Explanations in the manner of the causal 
conception of understanding highlight the structural mechanisms that cause the observed 
phenomena. In that they can be seen as a subset of the unification-type if the causal picture is 
presented as the unity behind diverse phenomena, but needn’t in those cases where the structural 
mechanisms, characterised as fundamental for other reasons, break the unity and only partially 
account for the set of diverse phenomena. It is generally thought that unification-type explanations 
lag behind the causal ones in stopping the regress of explanation, since with the causal explanation 
(as with realist metaphysics) the explanatory regress stops with the bare fact of how things are in 
the world. Historical analysis though places the unification-type explanations as a starting point for 
the development of causal ones (as a specifically motivated special case), possibly justifying the 
viewing of explanatory success (of any workable kind) as more fundamental than causal relatedness.   
The opening chapter outlines the details of the proposed methodological instrument and justifies its 
construction, as well as its application to theories and associated world-views from the history of 
science. It draws conclusions for the proposed instrument from a deeper analysis of the research 
context (including contemporary analyses of the history of science) and most notably the proposal of 
the simple transcendental strategy for realism. The latter suggests that it is most rational to assume 
the validity of the conceptual scheme that contains objects existing independently from us in an 
objective framework of space and time, a simple unpacking of the conceptual commitments of the 
everyday language.  
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Chapter 2 introduces the main variants of the principle approach and apply the principle side of the 
methodological instrument to it. The motivation for the principle approach, the nature of 
explanation it is able to provide, as well as the extent of its metaphysical commitment, is distilled in 
the conclusion to this chapter. In the following chapter (Chapter 3) the constructive side of the 
methodological instrument is aligned with the case-study instance of contemporary Bohmian theory. 
Following those, metaphysical (though still constructive) expansion and alteration of the simple 
constructive scheme, as through introduction of primitive laws of temporal evolution, is explored as 
the desired connection between the requirements of the quantum paradoxes and construction of 
explanatory narratives along the realist lines.   
In the final, fourth, chapter, principle and constructive perspectives as instantiated in the case-study 
instances are brought face to face in comparative analysis, against the theoretical accounts of 
deeper explanatory narratives. As a result, suggestions for an altered view of primary qualities and 
immediate objects of experience, with respect to the entrenched nature of the basic physical 
concepts of most human languages and the fundamental scientific role of quantum mechanics, is 
offered. It is argued that constructive approaches along the Bohmian lines, even with the 
modifications of the everyday conceptual framework, offer a deeper explanation of the paradoxical 
phenomena, whilst still respecting the simple transcendental strategy for preferring the realist 
worldview.  
 
8 
 
1. Spatial extension, nonlocality, explanation   
Thus science seems to be at war with itself: when it most 
means to be objective, it finds itself plunged into 
subjectivity against its will. Naive realism leads to 
physics, and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is 
false. Therefore naive realism, if true, is false; therefore 
it is false. (Russell, 1940, p. 15)  
1.1 Understanding the material world  
Philosophy and a physical problem  
In the simplest of terms, this thesis takes it as given that contemporary physics is at an impasse 
concerning the empirical equivalence of formalised quantum theories. In other words, science has 
come up against the wall of empirical equivalence of different formal approaches to the problems to 
be elaborated below, but these approaches carry widely differing associated metaphysics. Empirical 
investigations cannot decide between them. This might immediately suggest that we are dealing 
with a pseudo-problem, something to be rejected altogether and replaced by a fresh perspective 
(such examples have been known in the history of science). Scientifically, no such perspective has 
been offered so far, at least not sufficiently overarching so as not to be just another pseudo-solution 
for the pseudo-problem. This, on the other hand, might suggest that we need to at least look at the 
problem more closely using the existing paradigms only in ‘new hands’. The ‘new hands’ are to be 
provided by philosophy. The aim is to help science explain.  
So many people today – and even professional scientists 
– seem to me like somebody who has seen thousands of 
trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the 
historic and philosophical background gives that kind of 
independence from prejudices of his generation from 
which most scientists are suffering. (Einstein to 
Thornton, 7th December 1944, indexed in the Einstein 
Archive as 61-574; as quoted in (Howard, 2004))  
Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things 
easily achieve such an authority over us that we forget 
their earthly origins and accept them as unalterable 
givens. Thus they come to be stamped as "necessities of 
thought," "a priori givens," etc. The path of scientific 
advance is often made impassable for a long time 
through such errors. For that reason, it is by no means 
an idle game if we become practiced in analyzing the 
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long commonplace concepts and exhibiting those 
circumstances upon which their justification and 
usefulness depend, how they have grown up, 
individually, out of the givens of experience. By this 
means, their all-too-great authority will be broken. They 
will be removed if they cannot be properly legitimated, 
corrected if their correlation with given things be far too 
superfluous, replaced by others if a new system can be 
established that we prefer for whatever reason. 
((Einstein, 1916, p. 102); as cited in (Howard, 2004)) 
At the beginning of the 20th century Pierre Duhem famously claimed that physics and science were 
not expected to provide explanations, but merely descriptions. However, explanations remained in 
the domain of philosophy (which, concerning quantum theory, was not expected to be separated 
from physics before 20th century). A simple illustration from Hitchcock (2004) will help us set the 
stage for the type of explanation we are concerned with (as opposed to those that we are not, 
though will be often skirting them).  
This banishment of explanation from science seems to 
rest on a confusion, however. If we ask “Why did the 
space shuttle Challenger explode?”, we might mean 
something like “Why do such horrible things happen to 
such brave and noble individuals?”. That is certainly a 
question for religion or philosophy, rather than science. 
But we might instead mean “What were the events 
leading up to the explosion, and the scientific principles 
connecting those events with the explosion?”. It seems 
entirely appropriate that science [and, by extension also 
philosophy of science] should attempt to answer that 
sort of question. (Hitchcock, 2004, p. 8)  
But one might object that all the effort expended over the following three chapters in comparing the 
depth and width of proposed explanations is a consequence of a stubborn refusal to accept Kuhn’s 
view of scientific paradigms. Briefly, in such view what we are dealing with here are two paradigms, 
concerning the same scientific project, and depending on which paradigm wins over the physics 
community (given the empirical equivalence), we will have our problem resolved one way or 
another. Though frivolously sketched here, this issue can be easily dismissed by pointing out that we 
are dealing with a problem that has to be fitted into a larger framework (cf. separability violations), 
and that therefore paradigm shifts would involve more than just the narrow community of 
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specialists. An even simpler, but as effective, answer is that we are dealing with a philosophical 
question of general preferability for structures of explanation, and that the community decisions in 
one historical instance do not bear on such matters however powerful they may appear in a given 
social setting or historical context.   
In terms of explanatory ontology, our central problem is whether “there is a genuine nonlocality in 
the workings of nature, however we attempt to describe it” (Albert, 1992 , p. 70, my bold script), or 
not. To answer the question affirmatively is to be committed to ‘hardcore’ ontological scientific 
realism and whatever theoretical models it has to carry in tow (only one of which we shall 
investigate as a case study instance). To answer it negatively is to seek an explanatory model based 
on weaker realism (cf. section 1.4. below). But crucially we must bear in mind that the latter position 
is not to be agnostic about nonlocality, on the contrary it is to strongly deny it. Yet, to position the 
debate in terms of nonlocality rather than specific physical entities, is to move to a different level of 
the realism debate. It is to rise away from peculiarities of the details of different ontological 
postulates to the issue of overall conceptualisation of the world through physical theory (the task of 
‘descrying the world in physics’).  
Given empirical equivalence of the theoretical, physical1 approaches to the supposedly locality-
violating phenomena (i.e. lack of prediction of empirical observable difference between the 
phenomena as predicted by one or the other physical formalisation) what is expected from the more 
general philosophical considerations of explanation? Philosophy, done in the wake of Wittgenstein, 
teaches us is to look again, and look hard, at the most obvious aspects of the problem before us, 
because the real solution is hidden behind the simplicity and familiarity. The phenomena of 
teleportation, EPR-style correlations and the like are hardly familiar to many people, but their 
problem-generating aspects such as spatial separation, propagation of causal influences, 
individuation of objects etc. are. It is those familiar aspects, such as the conceptualisation of the 
                                                             
1
 In the spirit of the opening paragraphs we might say ‘scientific’ here, although the distinction between 
scientific and philosophical aspects of the discussion will increasingly be blurred below.  
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world founded on geometrical permanence of primary qualities at every level of detail, i.e. the 
conceptual ontological foundation of all of the material world on primary qualities, that we need to 
keep an eye on, most notably when describing the unfamiliar phenomena in a language employing a 
pre-existing conceptual scheme.  
As will become very clear from the exposition below, and will be explicitly addressed in several more 
technical instances in what follows, this thesis proposes to look at the explanatory structure as it can 
be distilled from some quantum theories with a slant on its ontological characteristics. Some might 
object that explanations are essentially epistemic constructions and that any ontology tied with their 
particular instances is added at a later stage or stems from some requirements that are extraneous 
to explanation itself. In considering a possible realist strategy of response to numerous (for our 
purposes collected and simplified here) ontology-agnostic or explicitly anti-realist philosophies 
garnered by postmodernist movements in general philosophy, it will be of importance to focus in the 
analysis that follows on those explanations that are taken to be of the ontological, or the ontic type, 
and then finally the specific ontological characteristics they display. That this should not be 
impossible strategy even from the general philosophical perspective can be glimpsed from e.g. 
recurrent theme in Ruben (1990) that explanation is an epistemological concept, that requires a 
general metaphysical (and this includes a more specific ontological) backing. Our transcendental 
strategy, to be introduced in section 1. 4 below, explicitly requires that we look into the 
commitments that stand behind (as a ‘backing’) of the concepts we employ even in everyday 
communication.  
In general it might be assumed, though, that through focus on ontological features of explanations 
we are giving precedence to a particular type of explanation, and with it a general scientific world-
view, and thus prejudicing the question to be settled through a more detailed consideration of the 
case-study instances of quantum theories below. The supposedly preferred type of explanation is 
the causal-mechanical type (see section 1. 6 below for a more detailed exposition), as suggested by 
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Salmon (1984, p. 81): “to explain an event is to exhibit it as a occupying its (nomologically necessary) 
place in the discernible pattern of the world”. But we shall be interested in leaving an option of ontic 
explanations more widely accessible, as generally requiring of an explanation that it is about some 
real worldly feature or, relation or something else (cf. Ruben (1993, p. 5)). Such further relevant 
concepts might be given by Kim’s (1974) considerations of various determinative or dependency 
relations, of which causal relations are only a smaller sub-kind. This opens up other determinative 
relations (e.g. ‘Cambridge dependency’, supervenience, relation between actions, relation between 
a disposition and its structural basis and the like) that pertain to essential links within the observed 
general conditions and the phenomena to be explained, but are short of identity, to be used in ontic 
explanations by our case-study instances. Whatever the general conclusion of these metaphysical 
considerations it lays sufficient ground for our considerations of the ontological characteristics of 
explanations.  
Explanations in the philosophy of science from a historical perspective    
We shall try to make at least a partial break away from the tradition in the 20th -century-philosophy-
of-science analyses of scientific explanations. Though perhaps the most natural reading of the 
problem we are addressing in terms of explanation would be to consider all approaches to the 
‘troublesome’ phenomena from the deductive-nomological paradigm (Hempel, 1965) with some 
aspects of inductive-statistical model2 thrown in, we shall not go down that route. The primary 
reason is that it does not provide enough ground to distinguish between the two approaches in our 
case-study instances below. Furthermore, such models by and large tend to be anti-metaphysical 
(Bird, 2005) trying not to squabble over the details of ontology behind the phenomena at all, but to 
merely present the syntactic deduction of the formal description of the phenomena as resulting 
from the formal description of the initially observed conditions and the codification of laws. They are 
                                                             
2 Basically, we could deduce the phenomena from the formalism of the theory, allowing for the statistical 
aspects in where the predictions are chancy and our ontology (if we specify it in enough detail) permits the 
introduction of objective statistical elements.  
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thus not suited for investigating the ontological characteristics of different accounts and their 
agreement with an overall worldview.  
When viewing explanations in a different way, more suited to scientific realism, classifications of 
explanations that differentiate between our two case-study approaches open up. This different way 
connects the phenomenon and the background theory through semantic entailment (thus saving it 
from obvious problems faced by the traditional models, such as the flagpole-shadow example; for  
further examples cf. Bromberger (1966)). It is too early to get into more detail concerning models of 
explanation at this stage, but we ought to make a note that the search for an explanation with 
satisfactory ontological characteristics will have to take into account more than mere deducibility of 
phenomena from the theory, it will have to show what such deduction would mean for the real 
world. This will of course be of importance when considering the acceptability of the violations of 
separability, through the phenomena exhibiting nonlocal characteristics.  
Most recently (from the historical perspective of this section) Woodward and Hitchcock (2003) 
develop a model of explanation from an argument that to explain why some phenomenon occurs is 
to show what (e.g. other phenomena, presence or not of entities etc.) that phenomenon depends 
upon. Showing the latter satisfactorily is not to play with general counterfactual situations based on 
the phenomenon to be explained, but only with those that consider variations in what would 
happen under interventions on the ‘system at hand’. Thus on their account the choice of basic 
ontology precedes the attempts of explanations, but explanations will be more or less successful 
based on the success of this prior choice. Of course, identifying the system at hand may not be so 
difficult when dealing with macroscopic objects, so that may be a good place to start for both our 
approaches, though in the end some sort of reduction to less obvious ontology may be required.  
It is worth adding a warning though, even before we properly discuss the various possible 
ontological aspects of the problem in the case-study instances, that the success of explanatory 
models will not only depend on the choice of ontology, but also on its epistemic accessibility. Though 
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subscribing to the overall realist perspective, our approaches are empirically equivalent and we have 
no recourse to the all-knowing arbiter to tell us which of them gets closer to the truth. So it is 
important to limit the explanatory ‘buck-passing’ that is characteristic of the hidden structure 
strategy (Woodward, 2003), and thus limit the pitfalls of excessively speculative metaphysics. 
Genuine candidates for explanation will have to identify epistemically accessible, non-hidden 
features in virtue of which they are explanatory.  
On the basis of this some say that explanation in general is impossible in quantum theory (Salmon, 
2002), whilst others take comfort in the fact that quantum theory can be formulated on the basis of 
a small number of highly general principles, and that it is universally applicable as a theory of 
material phenomena (the essence of the principle approach to be outlined in 1. 6. and Chapter 2). 
For the latter, it is acceptable that quantum theory provides unification/type explanations, whilst 
not providing those of the causal-mechanical sort.3 On the other hand, Chapter 3 will illustrate that 
the causal, even mechanical, explanations can be constructed, at the price of giving up on locality. 
The deadlock situation brings quantum theory, and with it fundamental physics, close to the more 
contestable special sciences where we can also provide functional explanations of the phenomena 
without the possibility of constructing the causal mechanism behind them. This is why some of our 
considerations will apply more generally, beyond the narrow scope of a few ‘troublesome’ 
phenomena in contemporary physics. We shall return to the issues of use and depth of explanation 
in the final chapter.   
1. 2 Historical background of explanatory conceptualisation of the world  
Quantum theory and everyday intuitions  
We can thus expect the possibility of theoretical justification for locating the explanatory power in 
physical sciences in ontology, i.e. the primary entities assumed to exist in the domain under 
investigation and producing the observable phenomena through the specificities of their interaction 
(Cao, 2004). As Cao says, “primary entities are those from which all appearances (other entities, 
                                                             
3 For the differences between these types cf. section 1.6. below.  
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events, processes, and regularities) are derivable as consequences of their properties and behaviour; 
these primary entities display regularities and obey laws, the so-called fundamental laws in the 
domain covered” (Cao, 2004, p. 175). Yet it is precisely this common-sensically sound view that runs 
into trouble in providing explanations based on quantum theory.  
Why should quantum theory be special, as opposed to genetics or meteorology? After all, Cao 
(2004) does not advocate a simple reduction of the observable phenomena to the primary entities 
(as if zooming in with a microscope), nor does he seem to warrant the possibility of explanation of all 
phenomena solely in terms of the entities open to direct observation and experimental experience. 
What he in fact advocates is the reliance on metaphor, a metaphor that allows for change of the 
primary actors with the adherence to the overall structure. To understand the meaning of a 
phenomenon as presented through an explanation in a specific scientific domain, we must provide a 
chain of metaphors from such fundamental explanation to everyday life reliant on the structural 
similarity possessed by each link of the chain. And a great number of these metaphors are 
historically developed, not created on the spot for the purposes of explaining away troublesome 
phenomena.  
What Cao in (2004) seems to advocate then is to start up with seemingly intuitive understanding of 
the most basic mechanics of the directly observable phenomena, motion of human sized objects in 
the Euclidian space of our visual field and from it link up structurally sound metaphors to the 
supposed existents in the less accessible domains. Yet the less accessible domains should also 
contain entities with properties whose structure of interaction we can link (though the chain of 
metaphors) to our intuitive understanding of the macroscopic world around us. Even if we were to 
accept the existence of such intuitive understanding, quantum mechanics is still capable of denying 
the tenability of this strategy.  
This is because such quantum existents seem to resist consistent ascription of a factual property 
before its status has been measured. This applies also to the processes following the measurement 
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of such property that involve further interactions between existents, they in a way lose the firm 
property until we can establish it by measurement again. Furthermore, this instability of property 
ascription can be taken to the very existence of the entities (i.e. treating existence as a property), 
especially if the latter is characterised by continuous occupation of the space-time points (i.e. 
something like a space-time trajectory). This furthermore threatens the construction of a continuous 
causal process, where the power of the cause reaches from one end to the other of the causal chain. 
Finally, there appears to be an inherent randomness in the evolution of causal processes threatening 
the account of singular causality. What we effectively have is the abstract mathematical formalism 
that expresses general laws and principles such that they cannot be taken as representing physical 
processes visualizable in spatial-temporal terms.  
Brief history of primary qualities: how we got where we are now  
Again, there is no room here to properly lay out the historical role played by space and primary 
qualities (susceptible to mechanical treatment) in development of scientific explanations, but a brief 
outline of the general idea is in order. This can prove illuminating due to the importance of 
something like the primary qualities view in the common sense contemporary conceptualisation of 
the world, as well the preference for causal-mechanical explanation in contemporary philosophy of 
science. Some criticisms of historical development of the view popular today may help us open 
doors to their revision that at first glance appeared too radical to muster.  
Ontology  
In classical times two major explanatory worldviews can be contrasted. The perversely compounded4 
Aristotelian-Platonic view construed the everyday world as a confused reflection of an underlying 
reality. In Aristotle’s view this reality is given by the necessary relation between the universals, of 
which the observed individuals were combined instantiations. Explicating the universals instantiated 
in them is the necessary step in understanding the world, for once a given universal is highlighted 
                                                             
4 I am not aware of literature that provides such unification of the two dominant classical views. I do not even 
wish to claim that such unification can get far off the ground as a theory in history of philosophy. My main 
purpose is to contrast it with the atomist view.  
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the understanding follows. In the Platonic view, the true reality is merely more perfect, but not 
structurally radically different from the one we observe. In fact, a relationship between a universal 
and individual could be shown to be of importance here as well. But in both we have reality and 
common-sense (and scientific) conception of it as an original and its imperfect copy (similar in every 
respect, only of poorer quality).  
A radical discontinuity between the observed and the real is suggested by the atomists Democritus 
and Leucippus (Losee, 1993), because we can no longer view the everyday and the real as the 
original and an imperfect copy. The reality was for them different in kind from the world known by 
the senses. It consisted of the motion of atoms through void (space), and these motions and various 
combinations resulting from them gave rise to the experiences such as colours, odours and tastes. 
But the real existents, the atoms, only bore the properties of size, shape, impenetrability and the 
propensity to enter into various associations. Thus they did not themselves bear all the properties 
they gave rise to, such as colour.  
What is crucial here for explanatory methodology is the notion that observed changes can be 
explained by reference to systematically fundamental processes occurring at a more elementary 
level of organization (Losee, 1993). Seventeenth century philosopher-scientists readily adopted this 
view. In itself this was not a result of fashion or revolutionary feeling, but of observation that it is in 
fact impossible to adequately explain the qualities and processes at one level by the same qualities 
and processes at a deeper level.5 The worry is, though, whether this replacement of properties can 
go too far. Before considering that question, let us see a further strength of the atomistic 
explanation. Namely, the atomists suggested the replacement of qualitative changes at the level of 
observation by the quantitative (i.e. mathematically formalizable) changes at the atomic 
(fundamental) level. This was in line with the Pythagorean notion that scientific explanations ought 
to be given in terms of geometrical and numerical relationships (Losee, 1993).  
                                                             
5
 It can be argued that development of optics, particularly rudimentary microscopy, opened the door to 
radically new structures behind the everyday observable phenomena.  
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Yet one difficulty of the atomistic explanations was apparent from the outset: they could not be 
verified by direct observation. Moreover, from the outset they were plagued by some ad-hoc 
replacements for the lack of contemporary experimental and observational precision. As Losee 
(1993) illustrates, the atomists could not explain why salt dissolves in water whereas sand doesn’t, 
other than stating that the salt atoms are such as to produce the phenomenon of dissolution 
whereas the sand ones aren’t.  
Descartes (and his immediate predecessors and contemporaries also, to a varying degree) took the 
atomistic worldview further, and linked it inextricably to space in proclaiming spatial extension as a 
necessary characteristic of any fundamental physical ontology. To do this Descartes sought to 
extricate what is ‘clear and distinct’ about all physical objects, and deduced that it must be spatial 
extension (coupled with impenetrability). Thus he distinguished between the primary qualities that 
all bodies must possess in order to be material bodies, and secondary qualities that exist only in the 
perceptual experience of those bodies and phenomena that they are a part of.6  
In summation, primary qualities were those that really belonged to the material objects, whilst the 
secondary qualities were derived from (i.e. explained by) the state of the objects' primary qualities. 
The primary caused and explained the secondary (Shapin, 1996, p. 53).  Yet as the corpuscular 
explanations of the phenomena became more technical the gap between the philosophically 
legitimate account and common sense widened, so that increasingly the sensory experience offered 
no reliable guide to how the world really was. Economising on an extended debate over the details 
of this picture, it suffices to say that the corpuscular mechanical explanations were providing a 
successful alternative to the Aristotelian doctrine of “substantial forms” (i.e. abstract and non-
                                                             
6 Though, of course Descartes was not the first to introduce the distinction, its elements can be traced back to 
the early atomists, and its first clear seventeenth century articulation is attributed to Galileo (Shapin, 1996, p. 
52).  But more interestingly for us, Descartes’ approach seems to follow the principle paradigm in that he did 
not speculate (in deriving the primacy of extension as a quality) about the detailed structure of the 
construction of material existents, but followed a general rule seeking ‘clear and distinct’ perceptions of 
properties. Moreover, he directly diverged from the atomists over the existence of empty space: in principle 
for him all space had to be filled by matter, i.e. effectively equated with matter. Yet, it can be argued, his 
physics contained manifestations of practical commitment to vacuum and absolute space (Losee, 1993), 
(Huggett, 1999).   
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quantitative real qualities). The “substantial forms” were a product of rational examination of 
relationships in reality, and were ostensively as inaccessible as the atomic corpuscles. But the 
‘mechanical philosophers’ (Shapin, 1996) claimed their explanations were more intelligible, or in our 
terms had greater explanatory power. In Lipton’s (2004) terms they embody a powerful combination 
of unification and causation (by reducing the phenomena to mechanical processes) styles of 
explanation, and avoid the need to introduce a gratuitous multiplicity of explanatory principles 
(Della Rocca, 2002).  
Though unification is undoubtedly their great strength, such reductions to supposed underlying 
mechanism have been known to be pushed too far in an attempt to explain all encountered physical 
phenomena. Thus objections to their historical success have recently been raised, suggesting that 
they may not have universally relied on greater intelligibility, but on philosopher-scientists’ 
agreement that this simply is the right explanatory paradigm to follow (Shapin, 1996, p. 57). We 
come to notice a ‘circle’ in that the phenomena to be explained were caused by the entities whose 
structure was such that they caused the phenomena (Gabbey, 1985). It has been suggested that the 
reasons for success of the mechanical explanations ought to be sought as much in historical 
circumstances (such as increasing practical success of mechanical machinery (Marsden, 2004)) as in 
their philosophical plausibility.  
Space  
Though the investigation of space has perhaps been the most fruitful interaction between physics 
and philosophy historically, its main debate concentrated on the metaphysical status of space: 
whether it is something absolute (endowed with existence independent of all things material7) or a 
construct of relations between other existents (namely, material bodies). Though we will primarily 
be concerned with the explanations that rely on the reduction to the microscopic, we can assume, as 
is generally done in contemporary physics, that ‘space’ is the same concept presupposed by motion 
                                                             
7 We can, for the purposes of the discussion that is to develop subsequently, ignore the relativistic (i.e. 
pertaining to Relativity Theory) interaction between matter and space. The characteristics of space that 
concern us will not be affected by its ‘bending’ by mass of material existents.  
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(spatial change) of all bodies, from tiniest particles, through human-sized bodies to the whole 
universe. The main debate between the absolute and relative views of space will not be our concern 
here. What is of interest to us is the nature of influences, or the forming of correlations, between 
the changes in objects that are not spatially contiguous. Whether there is absolute space between 
them, or instance of formal relation functionally indistinguishable from absolute space, will not 
influence the outcome of our discussion.  
This is because, despite being omnipresent, space in physics (and even relativistic space can be 
shown to fall into this category)8 is exceptionally inert. It does not even have the indirect causal 
effect such as we attribute to the supposed unobservable material existents. As shall be explained in 
more detail later, for our purposes, space acts as a barrier, a constriction on the proposed 
explanatory models. The problem is that without this barrier we are unable to do structured physics 
the way we have been used to doing even from classical antiquity. Abandoning space, thus, may be 
too high a price to pay, one we shall not be risking here. Yet, we will expect of our barrier to not act 
in a haphazard way: standing up or falling down randomly. This consistency is something easily 
visualisable from everyday life: separations are sturdy and we do not expect them to expand, shrink 
or disappear at whim. This does not make them impenetrable, but merely penetrable according to 
consistent ‘laws’: separated things can influence each other, but they have to do so by transmitting 
‘the influence’ through every bit of space between them. This can be formalised even if ‘space’ does 
not exist, but is a mere relation between the bodies. This relation is consistently systematic.  
But we cannot completely ignore issues of space in the history of physics, because somewhat like 
unobservable microscopic entities, space has been employed in physics to provide better 
explanations. And this use was then backed up by metaphysical speculations about its nature. So we 
                                                             
8 There have been suggestions to exploit extreme bends, shortcuts in space-time, known as wormholes, to 
explain the apparent connection between otherwise spatially separated objects in quantum mechanics. But as 
Maudlin (2002) elucidates, this is not a promising route to take, as the wormholes would have to have strange 
choice of appearance, as well as allowing the hypothesised ‘information’ to pass between the objects, but not 
the objects themselves, or their radiation or massive parts. Most importantly, if wormholes are indeed a part 
of the game, then one ought to be able to use them to send superluminal signals, which is not the case in the 
‘troublesome’ situations we are dealing with.  
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have to be aware of the ground the concept stands on physically, when employing it in the 
discussion to come. The other reason is that in the metaphysical model founded on primary qualities 
as measurable, and thus real and firm, properties of the foundational physical ontology, space plays 
an undeniable role. It shares the same essence with all matter (according to some interpretations, it 
is a part of the essence of matter): extension. On the other hand, in the very formalism of quantum 
mechanics, space does not appear as a fundamental element of the theory or a fundamental 
observable. But, when combined with macroscopically observable phenomena it has to be 
accounted for, as space is an essential part of the conceptual scheme at that level. Effectively, we 
want macroscopically spatially separated objects not to be conjoined, contiguous or interwoven at 
the microscopic level as that produces problems in the structural isomorphism between the 
observable phenomena and their explanatory reduction. And the isomorphism, easily formalisable 
through geometry, was one of the strong reasons for choosing this particular aspect to be 
fundamental (rather than, say, colour, scent or rate of vibration). Einstein can be interpreted as 
saying as much (cf. (Born, 1971) and quotes below) when claiming that the whole of physics as we 
know it depends on it.  
Method   
The ways to deal with the problem then, require ontology of explanations that either does not need 
space such as it had been historically presented (including the properties of matter that are 
associated with it: namely the fundamental role of the primary qualities) or that introduces 
ontological elements that are independent of space. Historically, that calls for the mystical substance 
of mind, but we shall not go down that route. We can introduce completely new ontologies that do 
not rest on extension. The interesting issue, of course, is to see how those figments of imagination 
can be made to fit with the rest of the standard conceptual scheme so as to save most of our 
appearances and not call for a single-sweep and all-pervading replacement of the world-view. What 
we need is a change of paradigm, such that it replaces the problematic parts, whilst keeping the rest 
of the picture as much like the old one as possible. The question is whether the explanations based 
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on primary qualities can be simply augmented, or whether we will, in the end, be forced to abandon 
them. If the latter is the case what can come to replace them, given their deep entrenchment in the 
ordinary conceptual scheme?  
But there are historical precursors to our predicament, in for example Kepler’s approach to the 
empirical equivalence of the contemporary competing ‘astronomical hypotheses’. Predictive success 
of either could not help choose between them, and Kepler had to resort to other means to achieve, 
as he termed it ‘change of syllogistic context’.9 Kepler terms all the problems that result from 
empirical equivalence pseudo-problems, and advocates changing the syllogistic context so that the 
competing hypotheses no longer display empirical equivalence and thus the impasse of the pseudo-
problem is overcome. So far, this is what most science textbooks advocate also, one must find the 
means by which to falsify some hypotheses and corroborate others. But of course, there are real 
experimental situations in physics in which this can’t easily be done. And, history teaches us, this is 
where we step outside the realm of pure physics, into philosophical, even aesthetical, speculation. 
What Kepler did was to look into physical plausibility (above mere calculational adequacy) of a 
mechanical model that was to support the observed phenomena on either hypothesis. Nothing 
revolutionary by today’s standards (e.g. choose the simplest hypothesis), but an important historical 
precursor nonetheless, because it indicates that in search for a better explanation we must consider 
the wider picture (without prejudicing the choice between causal and unificatory explanation-types 
here, cf. section 1.6. below, both can provide the fitting into the wider picture). But in Kepler’s case 
there is a much more elaborate justification for an appeal to simplicity, namely as an understandable 
geometrical order underlying apparently diverse phenomena. This was not a mere appeal for a 
search for the grand unifying theory no matter how crazy it may be (for example a numerological 
explanation of the planetary distances), but also a call for further-reaching testing opportunities10, 
and avoidance of ad hoc modifications (Martens, 1999). And the unification in Kepler’s style, as 
                                                             
9 I am indebted to Rhonda Martens for useful pointers on this issue.  
10
 As testing on isolated samples affects the understanding of the whole, requiring a single cause for all the 
diverse phenomena, or at least a single principle behind the causes of the diverse phenomena.  
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Martens argues, leads to a wider explanation of the very different phenomena, i.e. points to the 
truly fundamental elements of explanation, including the ontological ones. The second example of 
the escape from impasse based on the simple foundational principles is the famous one of Einstein’ s 
Special Theory of Relativity, which is to be recounted in greater detail below (section 1.3. and 
Chapter 2).   
Quantum theory in the historical narrative  
The twentieth century produced two radical revisions of 
the physical worldview – relativity and quantum 
mechanics. Although it is the theory of relativity that has 
more deeply pervaded the public consciousness, in many 
ways quantum mechanics represented the more radical 
change. Relativity required its own accommodations, but 
at least it still allowed the retention of classical views of 
determinism and local causality, as well as the 
conceptual separation of the experimental object from 
the measuring apparatus. (Evans, 2007, p. 1) 
This supposed rejection of the classical worldview was received with different attitudes amongst the 
developers of the theory in the first part of the twentieth century. Whilst some, most notably 
Werner Heisenberg welcomed it, others, such as Albert Einstein, Erwin Schrödinger and Louis de 
Broglie worried about its implications, with Einstein steadfastly rejecting their metaphysical side. 
Niels Bohr seemed to make peace with a necessary cut between the classical conceptualisation of 
our everyday physical experience, that of the macroscopic objects, and the novel, strange but 
orderly non-classicality of the microscopic entities described by quantum mechanics. As Evans 
(2007) points out, this divide between the microscopic and the macroscopic along the lines of 
quantum and classical was (or is) no less drastic than the Aristotelian separation between the 
celestial and sublunar realm, or Descartes’ division between the substances of matter and spirit.  
By and large, the ‘troublesome’ aspects of the theory hinge on the notion of entanglement:  
When two systems, of which we know the states by their 
respective representatives, enter into temporary 
physical interaction due to known forces between them, 
and when after a time of mutual influence the systems 
separate again, then they can no longer be described in 
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the same way as before, viz. by endowing each of them 
with a representative of its own. I would not call that 
one but rather the characteristic trait of quantum 
mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure 
from classical lines of thought. By the interaction the 
two representatives [the quantum states] have become 
entangled. (Schrödinger, 1935, p. 555) (my bold 
typeface)  
Soon enough further, formally justifiable, conceptual problems had arisen out of this, most notably 
with the EPR situation. Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen claimed as early as 1935 (Einstein, Podolsky, & 
Rosen, 1935) that the theoretical formalism predicts the occurrence of certain phenomena that go 
against the grain of both common sense and classical-physical conception of reality, and thus the 
formalism must be incomplete and in need of further development (i.e. better alignment with what 
is really going on in the physical world). Einstein saw the realistic interpretation of the quantum 
formalism to be attacking the important principle of separabilty, the one he claimed the whole of 
physics (and we might project even further: the whole of common sense conceptual scheme) rested 
on.  
His argument rests on the situation in which a pair physical systems A and B, jointly described in the 
language of quantum theoretical formalism by an entangled (joint quantum) state, which does not 
tell us anything about the individual properties of the systems become functionally spatially separate 
(i.e. become operationally distinct). When a measurement of a certain property is performed on the 
system A, the outcome of the measurement together with the laws of the formalism, immediately 
assigns a new state to the distant system B. Subsequent measurement can confirm the correctness 
of this ascription in accordance with the standard rule for ascription of states in quantum formalism. 
As our conceptual framework, and the description of this hypothetical situation, makes the system 
sufficiently separated to bar physical influence propagating between them11, we must conclude that 
no physical change has occurred with the ascription of the new state to the system B. But if there 
had been no change, that means that the system B already had the contested property at the outset, 
                                                             
11
 Or at least, the separation is such to make any known physical influence (such as an electromagnetic signal 
or alteration in potential energy in the relationship of the pair) at least detectable if not downright impossible.  
25 
 
before the measurement on system A. This leads Einstein et al. to conclude that the quantum 
theoretic descriptions of the world (most commonly those that hinge on entangled states, but not 
necessarily cf. Horodecki et al. (1999)) are just not complete.  
For some time the foundational problems had been swept under the proverbial carpet, due, in part, 
to great practical success of the theory, but also the belief that the divide is benign. Though the 
quantum world of the small was conceptually threatening it seemed to remain contained (pace 
Schrödingers’ cat’s ill fate) behind the said divide, not endangering tables, chairs and cannon balls. In 
the 1960s, influenced by the work of John Bell, even physicists began to take the foundational issues, 
those of the theory’s place in the overall worldview, seriously once again. Most of the ‘troublesome’ 
phenomena (such as macroscopic exploitations of the supposed entanglement of the microscopic 
objects, or the demonstration of their teleportation) that will be the focus of so much of the 
discussion to come are the recent theoretical and experimental breakthrough stemming from that 
reawakening.12  
Subsequently, this led to the advances in what is today an independent field of research, the 
Quantum Information Theory. The work in that field that is of interest to us because the occurrence 
of some of the ‘troublesome’ phenomena rests on the technologically exploitable non-local 
correlations among macroscopically observed phenomena: theoretical formalism predicts that in 
certain situations the outcomes of interactions with matter conducted very far from each other are 
coordinated, and this is empirically confirmed and cannot be explained by any local theory. Cushing 
(1991) says that in the realm of quantum phenomena the “apparently nonlocal nature of the 
effects” goes over and above the irreducible mystery (the regress of the ‘why’ question) contained in 
any explanation. He claims that the importance of locality for explanations is that local interactions 
allow one to follow the time evolution of the physical processes ‘in the mind’s eye’, which again 
follow from  the deep-seated  (though, possibly unjustified) expectations we have of the physical 
                                                             
12 For a more detailed timeline, for which there is no room here, cf. (Evans, 2007, pp. 2-7).  
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world. The problem arises when nonlocal phenomena clash with those expectations (cf. sections 1.4. 
and 1.5.).   
It is suggested that nonlocal phenomena, even before the appearance of those resulting from the 
Quantum Information Theory, mandate the modification of at least some of the assumptions that 
are part and parcel of the core of traditional scientific metaphysics. Yet, one might say, we have 
been here before, action-at-a-distance (or at least passion-at-a-distance) has always been a problem 
in scientific metaphysics, the best known example being one of Newton’s gravitational interaction. 
Yet, there are differences between the two situations taken as indicative of further complications in 
the case of quantum theory. In the quantum case, unlike the one of gravitation, the mysterious 
interaction is fully instantaneous and does not weaken with spatial distance; it in fact exhibits a 
complete disregard for the ‘quantity of space’. Also, it is limited only to the physical systems from 
the initial pre-separation set-up (as if a private connection of its own), regardless of how many 
systems of the same type there are in the surrounding space (Maudlin, 2002).  
At the expense of repeating the central tenet of this thesis, two ways out of this predicament take 
centre stage in our case studies (Chapters 2 and 3). One is to attempt to sever the ‘metaphysical’ link 
between the underlying structure of reality and the interpretation of the phenomena as currently 
available to us: principle approaches holding firm to the epistemic interpretation of the elements of 
quantum formalism that give rise to the ‘troublesome’ phenomena. The other, to hold fast to the 
‘metaphysical’ link and claim that the phenomena are an empirical proof that our hitherto 
(traditional, standard, classical, everyday) conception of reality is mistaken. The mysterious 
connection is real and must be accounted for in explanation.  
1. 3 The research instrument: principle and constructive approaches  
What is a principle theory?  
There are probably as many motivations for the principle approach as there are different adherents 
of it, or at least as many as different versions of the approach, but the drop that started the overflow 
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seems to be the exploitation of the theoretical notion of entanglement in Quantum Information 
Theory. Once entanglement came to be viewed as a tool in technologically valuable processes a new 
perspective on its ‘troublesome’ consequences developed.  
After decades in which everyone talked about 
entanglement but no one did anything about it, 
physicists have begun to do things with entanglement. 
(Popescu & Rohrlich, 1998, p. introduction)   
Though the principle/constructive theories distinction appeared before Einstein (Howard, 2004) he 
brought it into a sharper focus in his philosophy of science, particularly his justifications of the 
methodology used in the derivation of the Special Theory of Relativity. Most theories in physics are 
constructive theories, theories that go hand-in-hand with reductive explanations of observed 
phenomena in terms of causal interactions between foundational entities. In Einstein’s own words, 
constructive theories attempt to “build up a picture of the more complex phenomena out of the 
materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from which they start out” (Einstein, 1954, p. 228). 
Einstein calls upon a model of kinetic theory of gases which reduces the mechanical, thermal and 
heat-diffusion processes to movements of molecules, i.e. reconstructs those processes on the 
hypothesis of motion of the constituents of the gases described.  
Principle theories, on the other hand, use the analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements that 
form their starting point are general characteristics of the observed phenomena, formulated as 
mathematical criteria (constrictions) which the phenomena or their theoretical representations have 
to satisfy. The example Einstein uses here is thermodynamics which seeks to describe (explain) the 
behaviour of gases without speculating about their constituent elements, but by simply constraining 
it by the universal principles derived from the experienced fact that perpetual motion is impossible.  
Bub (2000) summarises the difference thus. A constructive theory begins with certain hypothetical 
elements, the elementary entities in terms of which it attempts to construct models of more 
complex processes representing the phenomena that we directly observe. The fundamental problem 
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for such a theory is how to synthesize the complex processes out of the hypothesized fundamental 
entities, i.e. how to reduce the complex phenomena to the properties and interactions of those 
entities. The starting point of a principle theory is a set of empirical ‘laws’ or principles which provide 
unexceptionable generalizations of the directly observable properties of the experienced 
phenomena. The fundamental theoretical task for such theories is to derive a set of formally 
expressed necessary conditions or constraints on events (events covered by the theoretical 
framework) that can be seen as fundamental laws behind the observed empirical generalizations. It 
aims to explain what the world must be like, what the necessary constraints on events must be, if 
certain empirical laws are to hold (i.e. if observed generalizations are to be recognised as ‘laws of 
nature’).  
There are a number of problems with the clear cut division presented above, and it is to be used as a 
guiding model, but one that we needn’t adhere to literally at every step. First of all, as later 
discussions will show there is a clear popular preference for constructive theories in the philosophy 
of science. We could, in fact, view the foundations of modern science as shaped in terms of 
constructive theories based on material existents endowed with primary qualities. Einstein himself 
states that in terms of explanation nothing beats constructive theories:  
When we say we have succeeded in understanding a 
group of natural processes, we invariably mean that a 
constructive theory has been found which covers the 
processes in question. (Einstein, 1954, p. 228) 
Yet he is also reported to have added (Howard, 2004) that progress in theory construction (and 
subsequent explanation provision) is often impeded by premature attempts to develop constructive 
theories in the absence of sufficient constraints. That is, we get wildly speculative about the nature 
of the elementary entities running into the danger of ‘creating’ entities with no more reality than a 
disposition to fit into the explanatory models we have constructed for them top down, eventually 
sliding into the danger of the so-called generalization of secondary qualities (cf. Chapters 3 and 4 ). 
Howard interprets Einstein as advocating reliance on principle theories as a first step in progress to 
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complete understanding of the phenomena in question. Ergo, his derivation of the Special Theory of 
Relativity as an intermediate step towards the General Theory. In a situation characterised by long-
standing lack of explanation (cf. (Cushing, 1991), (Reutsche, 2002), (Maudlin, 2002), (Putnam, 2005)) 
straightforwardly unifiable with the common sense conception of the material world, and the 
explanatory constructions of other physical theories, this need not be seen as an unnecessarily 
complicated strategy.  
There is however a further objection that such an idealisation into a  two-step conceptually clear 
process will simply not work. That is, Brown and Pooley (2001) claim that Einstein’s own derivation 
of Special Theory of Relativity does not adhere sufficiently to the principle theory model. Namely, 
they show that in the said derivation Einstein makes implicit assumptions about the dynamical 
behaviour of the rods and clocks (material objects) used to define the reference frames in relative 
motion. Even though he claims to make no assumptions about the nature of the underlying entities 
out of which material objects in motion are constructed, his second application of the Principle of 
Relativity in derivation of kinematical transformations rests on the assumption that motion has no 
absolute effect on the microstructure of the objects used to define the reference frames. This is 
certainly not an explicit description of the elementary entities out of which the observable 
measuring rods and clocks are constructed, but is a step towards listing their properties that is not 
explicated as the universal constraint from empirical generalisation.13 Though Einstein nowhere 
exhibits awareness of this non-principle step he is clearly uneasy about the special status accorded 
to measuring rods and clocks in the Special Theory (Brown & Pooley, 2001).  
*…+ strictly speaking measuring rods and clocks would 
have to be represented as solutions of the basic 
equations (objects consisting of moving atomic 
configurations), not as it were, as theoretically self-
sufficient entities. (Einstein, 1951, pp. 59, 61)  
                                                             
13 It is important to bear in mind the difference between dynamics and kinematics here. Einstein’s derivations 
concern kinematical transformations, observable macroscopic effects of motion, but make no explicit claims 
(and indicate no interest in making them) about dynamics, about forces acting on or within the moving bodies.   
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Yet, it is also obvious that although a deviation from the principle theory ideal, this is by no means its 
utter falsification. The measuring rods and clocks hold a special status, but only as ‘special’ entities 
anyway as they are used to conceptualise the reference frames not provide real-life measurements. 
The assumption about absence of effects of motion on the microstructure is seen as even less 
worrying once we adopt Einstein’s denigration of the absolute rest frame (aether, absolute space or 
some such) as then the rods and clocks are properly speaking ‘at rest’ in their rest-frame and in the 
absence of the dynamical interaction between rest frames in relative motion there is no reason to 
suppose anything but the principle of relativity holds for their microstructure as well. Nonetheless, it 
is a deviation from the principle ideal that makes no speculations about the microstructure except 
for the explicitly stated constraining principles.  
Finally, it is worth briefly surveying the objection that principles in ‘principle theories’ should have 
the status of axioms and should not be derivable from the completed formal expression of the 
theory. If the latter were the case they would be theorems not foundational principles (axioms) 
upon which the theory is built. Hilgevoord and Uffink (2006) argue that though this is a fine logical 
requirement, it fails to be satisfied even by Einstein’s exemplary principle theory: thermodynamics. 
Namely, once the theory of thermodynamics is formalised (or at least formulated as clearly as 
possible), one can derive the impossibility of various kinds of perpetual motion (from the violation of 
the laws of energy conservation and entropy increase). Likewise, once we have the formal apparatus 
of Special Theory of Relativity, we can prove the validity of the light postulate and the Principle of 
Relativity in formal notation. But this does not deny them the status of the foundational principles 
because in their non-formal expression they did not rely on the theoretical concepts (such as 
entropy and energy) for their meaning. That is, the ‘rule of thumb’ says that foundational principles 
ought to be understood without the introduction of any new special concepts inimical to the theory 
being developed, i.e. the concepts assigned hypothetical status such as the entities and their 
properties bear in the constructive theories.  
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It may seem a lot of concern is placed here on the principle theories, without additional discussions 
concerning the constructive ones. The reason for this is that constructive theories are more familiar, 
more common, whilst principle theories are rare, problematic in the sense of explanatory models 
offered above, and certainly mysterious about the characteristics of ontology they rely on. At first 
glance they actually say nothing about the ontology behind the phenomena, but it would be a 
mistake to assume them to be purely instrumentalist. They merely refrain from the speculations 
about the various details of the entities, even about their most essential (in some cases we might 
call these ‘primary’) qualities, over and above what can be gleaned from the constraints imposed by 
the natural understanding of the foundational principles. But we shall discover more about the 
principle/constructive distinction as we work through the case-study instances in the subsequent 
chapters.  
Non-methodological aspects of the principle-constructive dichotomy  
Before introducing those instances, something more has to be said about the goggles through which 
they will be viewed and, finally, compared; the so-called research instrument. The primary 
dichotomy in the research instrument is one of the principle or constructive approach and follows 
closely the methodological dichotomy outlined above. It is not freely selected here, but is adopted 
from the authors of the case-study instance formulations of quantum theory (introduced in the 
subsequent chapters). Yet, for the purposes of comparing them along the lines of explanation, our 
research instrument has to explicate divisions between the two approaches that go beyond 
methodology of theory-construction. We need to glance at most natural explanatory models to 
associate with the given methodology, as well as the metaphysical status of the theoretical 
concepts, or more precisely the ontological entities assumed to be the building blocks of the objects 
participating in the processes the phenomena to be explained consist of.  
Chapter 2 presents the principle approach to the phenomena to be explained. Methodologically it 
relies on the formal expression and subsequent formalised theory construction of the general 
constraints observed in the phenomena. It is not anti-realist in the sense of making the theory a 
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mere instrument for outcome prediction, as that would not lay sufficient grounds for physical 
explanation of the phenomena. It is anti-realist though in the sense of being agnostic about the 
nature and mechanical construction of the unobservable entities supposed to produce the 
phenomena. Its own version of realism gains strong foothold in adherence to separability as the 
crucial criterion for reality of all physical entities including the possible microstructure behind the 
phenomena. Real individual entities must for certain experimental purposes be isolated from the 
rest of the physical universe, or sufficiently isolated so that the effects of their connection to the rest 
of the universe can be ignored. Hypothetical entities that cannot satisfy this requirement cannot, on 
this view, be considered real. Through this insistence on separability (to be reviewed in more detail 
further in the subsequent section of this chapter) the principle approach of Chapter 2 subscribes to 
the unification model of explanation, as the separability foothold provides for the explanatory terms 
sufficiently clear from other physical theories and the common-sense worldview. They basically say 
they don’t know the detailed structure that brings about the phenomena, but they know what the 
real elements of the structure must carry.  
The constructive approach, presented in Chapter 3, poses explicit hypotheses about the nature of 
the entities out of which the explanation of the phenomena can be built. It is realist in the strong 
sense of taking the unobservable entities as true constituents of the material reality, with properties 
such that they can give rise to the observed phenomena. They are unashamed of the potential 
conflict the entities with such properties may have with the common-sense view, most notably the 
requirement for separability. In their view if explanation of phenomena requires entities that violate 
separability then we must get used to living in the world in which the fundamental entities are not 
separable in a way required by Einstein (in (Born, 1971, pp. 170-171)). Obviously this kind of 
explanation is closer to the causal-mechanical model in which the understanding is provided by 
detailing the causal interactions between the structural elements. As such, it adheres to the 
preferred model of theory construction and explanation at the possible expense of having to revise 
much of the common-sense worldview and the unification of physical explanations.  
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Modulo potential overlaps between the given idealisations, about which we shall aim to be as 
explicit as possible, our stage is set to search for the preferred approach to satisfy our explanatory 
hunger, given the starting point of common-sense conceptualisation of the material world in terms 
of primary qualities. Our research task is to lay pointers for preferring either approach with a 
minimal expense to what we already take as understood, most notably the status traditional primary 
qualities have in the conceptualisation of the isomorphism between the explanatory ontology and 
the observable characteristics of the phenomena. However, the approaches provision of explanation 
that we shall survey all rest on the work-in-progress advances in physical sciences and will in some 
cases not be able to present definitive conclusions as yet. In that case we shall have to do with 
having pointed out the problems clearly enough.  
1. 4 Philosophy and the two approaches   
In connecting the explanatory strategies of the case-study instances with the wider philosophical 
world-views concerning status of knowledge, truth and reality in science and scientific practice two 
philosophical traditions most readily stand out. Even though the principle and constructive 
approaches presented above will focus on a narrow specialised issue, in a highly theoretical domain 
of physics, if the conclusions reached are to have a wider application they will touch upon the issues 
of epistemological status of science as a whole. That is, issues of scientific explanation, whichever 
narrow domain of science they may originate from, will come across the postmodernist anti-realist 
criticism. In that respect it is worth positioning the key players in that overarching debate, as well as 
be aware of the points of contact between any of the overarching schools and the case-study 
instances of explanatory frameworks presented in the following chapters (primarily, Chapters 2 and 
3).  
Thus we have scientific realism (for more see below), a doctrine that spans the empiricist and 
rationalist epistemologies, and maintains that there is an absolute reality beyond the experimenters’ 
consciousness and interpretative alteration. Such reality is translatable and explainable under the 
employment of prearranged (most notably, objective) method of investigation. The much more 
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heterogeneous doctrine of postmodernism, roughly a continuant of the historical philosophical 
doctrines of idealism and nominalism, denies it is possible to ever ground knowledge in some 
absolutist or naturalistic view of reality, guaranteed by firm methodological procedures of 
investigation. All knowledge, whatever its content and however it may have been arrived at, is 
forever mediated by language and interpretation (Ward, 1996). The third possible doctrine, though 
some may see it as part of the overall postmodern critique, social realism, will not be further 
elaborated on here, as it more properly belongs to sociological analysis of science in the footsteps of 
Thomas Kuhn, and as stated above there is no room here for a sociological analysis.14  
The ‘postmodernists’ (henceforth addressed as antirealists, focusing on that aspect of their position, 
as broadly illustrated in the positions of (Rorty, 1980); (Putnam, 1981); more recently (Pettit, Realism 
and Resposnse-Dependence, 1991); (Pettit, 1998)) may raise a challenge that both case-study 
approaches have little or nothing to do with reality (especially as they deal with such a fringe 
segment of contemporary physics) and that we are, again, deciding between two world-views 
preferred by two social groups (perhaps directly competing for power). In the least case, antirealists 
may claim that neither approach can guarantee the access to the “cosmic register of truths”  
(Luntley, 1995) which would demonstrate that one worldview, however myopic due to limitations of 
human perception and conceptualization, is on the right track (i.e. closer to truth than the others). 
Though aiming to respect (as far as that is possible in the details of individual theoretical 
speculations) the abolishment of the dichotomy between the reality and the conceptual framework 
we describe it in, “giving up dependence on the concept of uninterrupted reality, something outside 
all schemes and science” (Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, 1974), most of the 
work done here will precisely concern the modifications of the overall conceptual framework so that 
it may exemplify greater internal coherence in the absence of the precise empirical reference 
                                                             
14
 As our conceptual frameworks shape our record of observations as well, the observable (empirical) aspects 
of the two approaches have to largely agree on conceptual frameworks in order to be comparable at all.  
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fixing.15 The latter is not a consequence of the ‘metaphysical’ holism, such as is advocated by 
Davidson and Quine ( (Davidson, 1977); (Quine, 1969)), though it falls under their general theoretical 
framework, but of the scientifically ascertainable empirical adequacy of both case-study instances 
under consideration. It is the leitmotif of this entire work to evaluate under explanation what cannot 
be adjudicated between with respect to truth (usual standard of comparison of holistic frameworks), 
with the hope that some overarching conclusions can be drawn as lessons useful even for the ‘bigger 
picture’.  
The general discussion concerning scientific realism (cf. (Gutting, 1982); (Boyd, 2002)) suggests the 
following starting point for a minimal realist ontological requirement. Both the ‘hardcore’ realist and 
the constructive empiricist (a softer version of our antirealists above) agree on the coarse 
ontological requirements of the everyday conceptual framework (tables and chairs, Sellars’ 
“manifest image” (Sellars, 1963)). The stronger realist sees the need to go beyond that in describing 
and explaining real phenomena. The weaker (i.e. closer to constructive empiricist) denies this need, 
i.e. claims that anything beyond this common ground is speculation. Useful speculation, but 
speculation nonetheless. Manifest image, and more importantly only its coarse version,16 is the 
minimal requirement both will agree on.  
It is easily acceptable that from a historical perspective science has made an enormous progress in 
explanation, prediction and subsequent control of the material reality we find ourselves a part of. In 
this case we shall focus only on the explanation aspect, thus circumnavigating the objections to the 
consequences of its other two interactions with material reality as given above, cf. (Luntley, 1995, 
pp. 45-47) . In terms of explanations we expect science to rely on the conceptual framework that is 
capable of describing the world independently of the dispositional aspects that we find peculiar to 
                                                             
15
 And this, on the face of it, seems to be pushing towards the unificatory model of explanation, but a more 
explicit argument is needed to labour that point. On the other hand it should not be seen as pushing for a 
specific type of realist argument based on internal coherence of a realist world-view alone.   
16
 Coarse because there are details of the manifest image itself which are unobservable, such as unobservable 
properties of observable entities.  
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our particular position (be it ‘human’ position, the vaguely ‘macroscopic’ position, a ‘provincial’ 
galactic position, or some such). This is another way of requiring objectivity in the explanatory 
reports, i.e. excluding from them all aspects dependent on the peculiarities of individual viewpoints. 
It is very tempting therefore to argue in the modernist fashion that the scientific explanatory 
conceptual framework rests on the privileged link to what Luntely (1995) terms the ‘cosmic register 
of truths’. Such conception immediately brings with it the notion of a language, as a system of 
concepts, that can be understood by any creature regardless of how it was constructed or what its 
spatio-temporal relation to the rest of the universe was, what kind of mind or perception it had or 
what its history and culture was (Luntley, 1995, p. 48). And we standardly assume that the language 
of mathematical physics provides just such foundation and it therefore affords us the most 
fundamental explanations of the world as it is independent of our individual perception of it, as well 
as the explanation of how our individual perception arises.  
Several problems arise for this picture that are relevant for this thesis, but we cannot go into all of 
them to the same degree. We have to take as more or less given that the postmodern criticism is 
capable of challenging the above presupposition of the primacy of link between the scientific 
conceptualisaton of the world and the ‘cosmic register of truths’ in general. Luntley (1995) can be 
taken to provide a good introductory summary of the postmodern arguments in this vein, for more 
detailed accounts and different strategies (cf. for example (Ward, 1996); and (Goldman, 1999)). 
What is particularly interesting in our case, and something that we shall dedicate more time to is 
that the case-study instances of quantum theory that we consider in this thesis seem to add grist to 
the post-modernist mill though both are well versed in the vagaries of mathematical physics and 
contain elaborate formal accounts of how to address the phenomena we deem ‘troublesome’. This 
is because we take them to be formally equally empirically adequate with respect to providing 
predictive accounts of what takes place in the ‘troublesome’ phenomena. Now antirealists have 
something to point to and claim that mathematical physics itself has through the ‘troublesome’ 
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phenomena in quantum theory hit the wall of relativism of metaphysical explanations and cannot 
employ its own supposedly superior methods to get out of the dire predicament.  
The antirealist points out that the history of science shows that no set of agreed observations can of 
its own accord falsify a theoretical conceptual framework, that all of the latter can always be made 
observationally compatible with the agreed upon set of data. Such sloppiness is defended against in 
the philosophy of science by abhorrence of the ad hoc additions to a theory and general pursuit of 
both unification and simplicity. Yet, the antirealists may challenge, even with rigour imposed by the 
philosophy of science in the case of quantum theories you have a clear case in point, rigorous and 
formally well supported interpretations are to a large extent conceptually at odds with each other 
concerning what the minimal metaphysical requirements of the world-interpretation (or explanation 
of the material processes we encounter or engender) are. They conclude that there is no purely 
rational procedure (even when enshrined in the theoretical formalism) that can take us from an 
account of experience to a decision as to which of the two competing theoretical frameworks is true 
(Luntley, 1995, p. 80).  
They can then generalize this to a conclusion that given that all experience is based on interpretation 
(as presumably the competing conceptual frameworks differ precisely in interpretation, and cannot 
rest on concepts rooted in experience that would be guaranteed to be free from it), and that there 
are no other more secure foundations of knowledge (such as Descartes found in the epistemological 
protection provided by the benevolent deity), there can be no single conceptual framework suitable 
for reporting majority of what we say about the world (Luntley, 1995). So, from the perspective of 
explanation there is no need to even burden ourselves with the heavy conceptual framework of the 
contemporary science, as that is explanatorily as valid as any other ‘wish-wash’ narrative one cares 
to produce, provided it can account for the experience of the human subjects (the explainee). This 
conclusion can be reached by other anti-realist routes (cf. (van Fraassen B. C., The Scientific Image , 
1980) on the pragmatic, not epistemic utility of explanations), but this is a particularly interesting 
38 
 
one for our purposes. Precipitating a more detailed exposition in Chapter 3 such arguments suggest 
that “everything we say about an object is of the form: it is such as to affect us in such-and-such way. 
Nothing at all we say about any object describes the objects as it is in itself, independently of its 
effects on us” (Putnam, 1981, p. 61). This, however, is a highly impractical position to take, the one 
that does not allow any realist background against which details of competing explanations can be 
checked, whilst still asking for some hint of an explanation as to why a particular account is one way 
and not the other. Even though there is no direct answer to such scepticism, there is a simple 
strategy that we shall follow below: to ask for a minimal set of ‘typings of objects’ (Devitt, Realism 
and Truth, 1997) that are not dependent on human conceptualisation to explain the experiences 
they produce. An anti-realist position such as Putnam advocates above has not got such a minimal 
set to even begin to explain anything.   
This is a strategy similar to Descartes’ original search for the escape from doubt (though without the 
role for the deity). Namely, a bit of a transcendental argument and some common sense can help 
anyone who wants to be helped to escape the antirealist doubt. What even the staunch  and 
antirealists have to agree to is that there are external limitations to what we can and cannot do in 
life, to what it is and is not sensible to believe (cf. (Devitt, 2006) and section 3. 2 below). Even the 
antirealists don’t go jumping off buildings expecting to defy gravity nor do they tend to stop eating 
upon discovering the underdetermination of the theories of nourishment.  
Now this is not to argue that all worries about the reliability and utility of our conceptual framework 
and the accompanying explanations are just academic exercises, in positing worries as much as in 
refuting them. What we are counting on, following Luntley (1995, pp. 110-115) is the fact that 
acceptance of even those basic limitations to our acting and thinking commits us to the sensibility of 
the notion of things as they are independently of our thinking about them. That is we seem to hold 
some elements of the conceptual framework to be non-dispositional. As the experience of and 
interactions with the material objects form one of our most basic such non-phantasmal experiences 
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(i.e. experiences characterized by seemingly externally imposed limitations), Luntley proposes a 
transcendental argument17 that it is most rational to assume the conceptual scheme that contains 
objects existing independently from us in an objective framework of space and time ( (Luntley, 1995, 
p. 111).18 Yet to differentiate it from philosophically burdened traditional form of transcendental 
argument that proposes as necessary condition in the transcendental step, whereas all we require is 
the unpacking of conceptual commitments, a conceptual background of acceptance of some starting 
position, we shall henceforth call it the transcendental strategy. That is, given that even the 
antirealists (of the ‘postmodern kind’ as suggested above) are committed to thoughts about such 
objects, Luntley argues that it is more rationally prudent to take them to be originating in some way 
from the objects themselves, rather than just seeming to us that they do. In a similar vein one might 
put it to the antirealist that he does not doubt the reality of past events, even though they are not 
directly empirically accessible, but can be reasonably reconstructed from the present evidence. This 
of course is a summary of the age old argument for simple realism, but toned here to serve a 
particular purpose. A very strong argument for accepting the given conceptual scheme, the 
conceptual scheme of objects in space-time, in just such a way is that it plays a vital role in almost 
every language known to us and is capable of generating an extensively rich set of beliefs about the 
                                                             
17 Though it may be objected that the ‘transcendental argument’ is a misnomer in this case from the 
perspective of the more famous forms of such arguments, we shall adhere to using the terms for the following 
reasons. ‘Inference to best explanation’ is a much used term in philosophy of science and carries a lot of 
philosophical baggage which there is no room to get into here. Though our transcendental argument could be 
seen as an instance of inference to best explanation, for reasons of generality the former term is preferred. It 
is also not a form of the general transcendental argument that relies on necessity of some step to push for the 
conclusion. We merely aim to argue, following Luntley and Devitt, for the sensibility of application of the 
transcendental step: it is not necessary to see the common-sense conceptual framework as originating in the 
realist ontology, but it is sensible to do so when explanations of the experienced phenomena are sought. As 
Luntley puts it, an understanding of the concepts of experience commits us to a belief in the external world, 
rather than showing the external world to be a necessary condition for the possibility of experience. As to the 
related objection that transcendental steps are not fully justified and can still lead to errors, this is acceptable 
from the simple realist position that Luntley (1995) advocates. For the rest of the discussion to make sense we 
do not require that inferences based on the transcendental step be certain beyond all doubt, but merely that 
they be seen as sensible enough in search for an explanation. Again, if this brings us back to the ‘inference to 
best explanation’, so be it, but it is illuminating to arrive at it via a different route which does not presuppose 
the familiarity with much of the existing debate in the philosophy of science, a fresh approach of sorts.  
18 We have to be careful to note here that requiring the conceptual foundation of explanation routed in the 
unambiguous description of definite objects with definite properties is not identical to Bohrian demands for 
necessary use of classical concepts in providing objective descriptions of all physical phenomena. We shall 
delve more into the Bohrian world-view in the following chapter (Chapter 2).  
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world. It is so wide-spread and strong that even the antirealists use it when they go about their daily 
activities. Luntley argues that they must accept it even at an academically more serious level, and 
even proposes ways for them to accommodate it deeper into their own particular modifications of 
the worldview.  
Yet, we shall soon (and more extensively in Chapter 4) be forced to argue that science forces us to 
accepts modifications of the said conceptual scheme, both in adding to and in changing some of its 
more central aspects, and that may seem to jeopardize its validity in this thesis again. The saving 
grace is to make (along with the ancient atomists, and in modern times Descartes and Locke for 
example) some aspects of it more foundational and unchallengeable and other subject to gradual 
change under the increase of empirical knowledge. As the changes potentially go astray it is always 
possible to fall back on the foundational elements. The foundational element is provided, loosely 
speaking, by the geometrical isomorphism of extension as essential constituent of all material 
objects, regardless of how large or small they are compared to us. This is the well known story of the 
primacy of extension, of considering extension and its modes as primary qualities of everything 
material. With particular reference to our case-study instances, this seems to be the aspect of 
material reality that neither of them can deny. What is more they must find a way to include it in the 
construction of their explanations of the troublesome phenomena.  
And this is where we come to the final problem for the primacy of the scientific explanatory 
framework of material world, as suggested above. Quantum theory introduces some phenomena 
that require a careful selection of the agreed upon set of characteristics so as to construct 
explanations that respect the essential elements of the common-sense conceptual framework. For, 
at first glance, and we shall look into this in more detail below, these very phenomena seem to again 
provide the postmodern-style critic with material to claim the whole scientific conceptual framework 
has run into serious conceptual difficulties and not only can it not find a way out of an impasse of 
the empirical equivalence of different interpretations of the formalism (that, we might argue is very 
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specific and academic), but calls for explanatory conceptualizations that do not share the 
widespread and foundationally firm minimal conceptual framework of objects in space and time. 
And they do this by supposedly violating separability.  
Briefly (as we shall look into this in more detail in section 1. 5 and Chapter 4), violations of 
separability threaten to knock-down the whole house of cards defence from postmodernism as 
given above by denying the sensibility of the foundations of the common-sense conceptual scheme. 
As the following section shows, the idea of physical things existing and arranged into “a space-time 
continuum” (Einstein, 1948, p. 321) requires that they can “claim an existence independent of one 
another, insofar as these things “lie in different parts of space”” (Einstein, 1948, p. 321). In other 
words these objects arranged in space, as required by the core elements of our foundational 
conceptual scheme, ought to have an intrinsic thisness19, i.e. whether they are interacting or not 
they should have separate intrinsic states (Howard, 1994, p. 206).  The states can change as a result 
of interactions, but those interactions can be accounted for again in terms of the extension through 
the space-time continuum and, and provided that the interaction is epistemically accessible in the 
given small region of space the object occupies, it is always to be separately definable. Furthermore, 
all composite objects acquire all their properties from the constituents’ intrinsic states and locally 
intrinsic interactions.  
And, as our troublesome phenomena will purport to illustrate, quantum formalism seems to deny 
this property to the objects in its domain. The fundamental formal difference is that classical 
formalism allows for the lack of definite separable (formally factorizable) descriptions of the 
phenomena as ignorance, i.e. enables us to claim that the participating objects are properly 
                                                             
19 This should not be confounded with the notion of primitive thisness and identity as championed most 
notably in the works of R. M Adams. It allocates a foundational identity, for want of a better term an ‘itness’ 
(as suggested by D. Lehmkuhl in private correspondence), to the elements of reality but not one they retain 
independent of their potential for interaction with other elements of reality. At this stage we have to contend 
with an intuitive understanding of this term, given the proviso that it is not the technical terms as advocated 
by Adams. For our purposes it suffices at this stage to allocate intrinsic states to elements of reality that are 
not wholly dependent on their ocurrent interactions with other such elements, i.e. not requiring an ontological 
holism in accounts of the material constituents of reality.  
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separable only we don’t have enough information to formally represent that; whereas quantum 
theory formally precludes such interpretation of the situation (by precluding the aforementioned 
factorizability).20  This means that either quantum theory is not a fundamental physical theory and is 
not concerned with fundamental scientific explanatory ontology, or that we have to find some way 
of explaining how such separability violations are either benign (to our fundamental conceptual 
scheme) or just an illusion that does not actually affect the fundamental common sense explanatory 
conceptualization based on the notion of primary qualities (as sketched above). We have to bear in 
mind that at least for some properties (and the crucial question is whether for those we are most 
interested in: the traditional primary qualities) separability allows us to say that this definite object 
possesses this definite property (Howard, 1994, p. 209), and also to account for the changes of that 
property through the processes that foundationally rely on the primacy of extension in material 
world. The depth of explanation accounts (cf. Chapter 4) tend to require conceptualization of 
manipulations of definite object properties. It will then be our task to investigate what that provision 
does for the construction of explanatory accounts of the material processes, especially those 
involved in the troublesome phenomena themselves. Before that we will have to see just how each 
of our case-study instances proposes to deal with possible separability violations, as well as whether 
we can find a way of understanding separability so that the proposed violations are not damaging to 
the foundational aspects of the conceptual scheme.  
So what remains of our conceptual scheme and the transcendental strategy, if separability is 
violated? Howard (1989) interprets Einstein as claiming that separability is the only conceivable 
objective criterion for ascription of intrinsic ‘thisness’ to elements of reality, to their objective (and 
this is important in our transcendental strategy) individuation. This rests on an even deeper 
                                                             
20 Winsberg and Fine (2003) argue that metaphysical separability does not imply the factorizability of the 
formal functions associated with the phenomena, but their argument poses further difficulties for the aims of 
our transcendental argument. We shall return to those issues in more detail in the middle sections of Chapter 
4.  
43 
 
metaphysical assumption that spatio-temporal separation is the only conceivable21 objective 
criterion of individuation and definition of the foundational ontology. Philosophically this is not an 
entirely pedestrian observation, as Strawson’s (1959) theory of the role of the concept of material 
object in the conceptual scheme in terms of which we think (and talk) about particulars illustrates. 
The particulars, along the lines of ‘local beables’ above and historically exemplified by the 
macroscopic objects in space and time, form the foundation of our most universal conceptual 
scheme. In other words they form the core element of every conceptual scheme as they are 
particulars that can be identified and re-identified without reference to the particulars of a different 
sort; they are ontologically foundational.  
We might wonder what the role of the space and time is then. The objective particulars (the ‘local 
beables’) serve as our empirical access point to the conception of space and time, as they are three-
dimensional (or spatially extended in our terminology above) and enduring through time (allowing 
not only for identification, but also for re-identification). At the bottom of this conceptual scheme 
lies a conception of separable (i.e. locally completely definable) space (or space-time) providing for 
unique objective relations between material particulars and all conscious (and this presumes: 
linguistically capable) agents. An important aspect of Strawson’s ontological foundation for the 
conceptual scheme must be noted, especially in the light of the forthcoming ‘troublesome’ 
phenomena22: the elements of ontology (the particulars) that provide the foundation of the 
conceptual framework must be taken to exist continuously through changes of place and time, so 
that we could re-identify them and thus rely on unique conceptualization for all conscious agents. 
The question arises what happens if the assumption of the continous existence is threatened, not 
haphazardly but in a formal and systematic way. Can we still maintain the necessary re-identification 
                                                             
21 But, Howard (1989, p. 243) notes, we must distinguish this from possible in the sense of either logical or 
physical as expressed though theory formalisms. In fact, ‘conceivable’ here marks out precisely what our 
transcendental argument needs so as to work on the postmodernist as well: that which is conditioned by 
objective and historical factors, the models with which “we have been outfitted”.  
22 What we shall be concerned with in the following chapters is the possibility of granting the existence of the 
spatially extended basic particulars, but not necessarily their continuous endurance, i.e. we might have to try 
to contend with them making ‘jumps’ in identity, if possible.  
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and thus a simple rational assumption of the independent existence of the said ‘particulars’ when no 
conscious agent is performing the identification, nor is even suitably disposed to in-principle perform 
it? 
1. 5 Conceptual problems and quantum ‘troublesome’ phenomena  
Separability is the principle behind classical physical explanations of the world, and states that 
material (include fields here as well) occupants of any two parts of space sufficiently distant from 
one another23 must be considered separate in a sense that they each have their own definite set of 
qualities and that their joint set of qualities is wholly determined by these separate sets (Maudlin, 
2002, p. 97). An immediate dynamical consequence of such an assumption is known as the principle 
of locality: an event sufficiently separated (spacelike separated in the language of Special Theory of 
Relativity) from a given small region cannot influence the physical state assigned to that region. But 
Bell’s theorem shows that quantum theory cannot conform to this picture ( (Bell, On the Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen Paradox, 1964); (Bell, 1987); (Maudlin, 2002)). It accounts for the occurrence of 
phenomena in which some behaviour of separated pairs of objects (physical systems) cannot be 
explained by any local physical theory (be it current quantum theory or some general theory that 
might replace it) without including some non-local interaction between the objects.  
Yet, it must be stressed that the nonlocality as implied by the quantum theory is subtle, and despite 
providing for some further interesting phenomena in the Quantum Information Theory, it does not 
allow for unpalatable science-fiction-style phenomena akin to telepathy (distant communication 
without use of classical communication channels) or ‘quantum’ jumps (non-classically-assisted 
modifications of properties of distant objects). In summary the said nonlocality (Maudlin, 2002) does 
not require nor mandate:  
1. superluminal exchange of matter or energy,   
                                                             
23 Of course, this needs in fact to be supplemented with a more complete account of physical isolation, 
including isolating/individuating effects achieved in some other way, e.g. boxes or other barriers. But even 
those are describable in terms of properties based on extension.  
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2. superluminal signalling,   
but does require:  
3. superluminal causal connections,  or 
4. superluminal information transmission.24  
Nonethless, from the simple explanatory perspective, separability cannot be upheld, as despite of 
what probablisitc predictions we can make about the distant objects, the explanation of the changes 
they undergo will require some account of the characteristics of the situation which arises 
holistically over and above what we know about each separated object individually. Moreover, some 
of these characteristics will only be available to some experimenters in special circumstances (i.e. 
will not seem to objective relations established between objects and available to every investigator). 
We get a feeling that given the connections established between distant objects, perhaps they are 
not distinct objects or do not really occupy the different regions of space. But this options should not 
be so lightly accepted for we shall investigate below whether Einstein’s expectations of a stable 
reality arise from their ‘thisness’ being fully independently specifiable (Maudlin, 1998, p. 54)).   
The discussion about the subtle nature of these phenomena is wide ranging, but for the time being it 
suffices to illustrate how it clashes with the standard explanatory world-view, without committing to 
the technical details. Namely, traditional folk (everyday) and physical (technical, scientific) 
conceptual construction of the material world couples the assumption of individual ‘thisness’ with 
the principle of separability, to provide an account of individuation (as a basis for interaction) of 
material objects (our physical systems). Howard (1989, p. 244) says that separability is the physical 
necessity for any account of extension (understood as a sufficient criterion of metaphysical 
                                                             
24
 This does not contradict the above anti-telepathy claim, unless one takes information to be necessarily 
exchanged between human sender and receiver. But in parts of this thesis information transfer is a necessary 
prerequisite of superluminal causal connections and does not necessarily involve human subjects, but can be 
assumed exchanged between inanimate physical systems. Though, how much this characterization will help us 
with the final explanatory project remains to be seen.  
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individuation, cf. also (Howard, 1994)), as to make explanatory sense of it we need the extension to 
come in discrete individuated packets (this is not a claim for necessity of atoms, but for a necessity 
of provisionally individuatable parcels of matter smaller than the totality of the matter in the 
universe; in fact small enough to fit on the table top and be susceptible to experiments). A theory 
that denies separability, such as quantum theory, jeopardises explanations built on this scheme by 
making the properties of some parcel of the extended stuff depend on something other than the 
properties of (surrounding) local extension (shape, position, motion or field-based local interactions) 
alone. The mysterious holistic connection provides for changes in the separated, thus individuated, 
parcels of the extended stuff, such that they cannot in principle be accounted for by the (known) 
physical interaction (i.e. by energy, signals or matter; arising from the locally constructed account of 
the extended stuff) and the properties of the individual parcels themselves. In formal terms: classical 
phase space built on the notion of extension as primary is expressed in terms of position and 
momentum. The quantum phase space is different, and it seems that this will need to be reflected in 
the metaphysics and the explanation of the phenomena.  
The separability principle is, according to Howard (1989), tacitly behind the ascription of primary 
qualities as the only objective qualities of material existents in Newtonian physics, and their further 
gradual reduction to position as the sole objective criterion in distinguishing elements of material 
reality subject to formal theoretical description. This is of course supplemented by the divisibility of 
material objects along the lines of extension down to point particles, and finally with the need to 
explain interaction between the fundamental existents by spatial influences other than perfectly 
elastic contact action. Thus, all on tacit assumption of separability, we historically build up a half-
scientific half-lay conceptual scheme of objects interacting along identifiable continuous ‘lines’ in 
space time. This conceptual scheme (for reasons logical or historical is not of utmost importance to 
us) provides a smooth transition between the explanations resulting from formal physical theories to 
the common-sense world-view of objects existing outside ourseleves and in physical interaction with 
our material aspect. To abandon this tradition, claims Howard (1989, p. 244), is possibly to go along 
47 
 
the lines of Leibnizian metaphysics which (however potentially philosophically complex and sound) 
was never a widespread foundation for the explanation of the real phenomena, nor was it easily 
accommodated with the wide-spread (so as to include the antirealist, as well) everyday conceptual 
scheme.  
Dickson (1998, p. 156) objects to the tenability of holism alone as a scientific, and especially as an 
explanatory doctrine. Holistic metaphysics allows for no individuation of objects that can be said to 
be in an interaction, nor for their re-identification across space and time. In that sense it is robbing 
us of the core of our conceptual scheme, its essential part needed to construct an explanation of the 
phenomena. Also, its connection to the concepts of everyday parlance, all of them structured on 
objects with intrinsic ‘thisness’ would be difficult to construct in a manageable number of steps. 
Namely, permitting the holistic aspect to theoretical metaphysics leaves the generation of the 
everyday conceptual framework out of the theoretical conceptual framework as essentially 
unexplainable, bluntly postulated and required but not counterfactually manipulable. We then seem 
to be back to the knuckles of the early measurement problem: “*...+ in what sense and with what 
objects have we [brought about the occurrence of our ‘troublesome’ phenomena+? And how are 
*the phenomena that really occurred+ related to the phenomena we thought *we observed+?” 
(Dickson, 1998, p. 156). And Dickson is quick to point just how a simple resignation to holism does 
not help remove the worry that the ‘troublesome’ phenomena raised for the possibility of 
explanations from physics. For whether we call the correlations formally apparent in the 
‘troublesome’ phenomena results of action at a distance, or the observant correlations between the 
two parts of the same objects, we still have to explain how the correlations of the space-like 
separated events come to be formally established and empirically verified.  
One possibility is to distinguish separable and non-separable aspects of ontology, maintaining that 
the link between separability and the core of the conceptual scheme can be achieved solely through 
the separable part. Thus, (Maudlin, Completeness, supervenience and ontology, 2007, p. 3158) 
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argues that for the conceptual connection between the contemporary physical theories and the 
common-sense to hold, only some of its foundational elements need to be local (i.e. conform to the 
requirements of separability), whilst the separability violating segments can be relegated squarely to 
the section of ontology, different in kind, that is non-local. In Maudlin’s words: we can have local 
beables and the non-local laws.25 He says this is actually the case in that classical beacon, Newtonian 
mechanics. One could not get a complete picture of the physical phenomena in the theory solely 
from the observation of the isolated region of space, as the objects there might behave as if caused 
to do so from outside the region. That is, a more satisfactory, from a unification of phenomena point 
of view, explanation is achieved if it is observed that the local objects can change their behaviour 
under influences from outside the region that are not evident on the local picture. (Of course if we 
posited the existence of some causal mechanism that governs the troublesome Newtonian action-
at-a-distance, such as the exchange of force particles then we could localize all dynamical 
phenomena in the region.) In Newtonian mechanics, as it is most commonly understood, a change in 
a distant gravitating body can bring about a change in the local body in the proximal region. To 
account for that the explanatory conceptualization that includes Newtonian mechanics and the 
common sense experience posits the existence of local ontology of objects and the non-locality of 
laws governing change in those objects.  
The other is to try to diffuse the potential effects of the separability-violating phenomena as either 
illusions arising from an ontological mis-ascription of the elements of quantum formalism to the 
elements of fundamental ontology, or to show them to be constricted by limitations so as not to 
endanger our everyday conceptualization (something along the lines of: our fundamental building 
blocks are non-local, but only on occasions in which they are not providing the function we crucially 
expect from them, i.e. playing the role of the fundamental building blocks in the phenomena that 
feature in our experiences). From explanatory perspective and the requirement to relate the 
                                                             
25 To be precise Maudlin does not attribute the laws to ontological postulations at this text, and in fact talks 
about the local ontology and non-local laws. With foresight to the discussions of the following chapters we can 
call them both elements of the explanatory ontology here.  
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elements of the common-sense conceptual scheme to those of quantum theory, we must then 
either show how the mis-ascription arises or how what was intended as fundamental theory 
manages to produce so radically different common sense concepts. This is to admit that there can be 
no conceptually foundational connection made between the common sense and the contemporary 
theories. It then leaves an open question in science, but also a task in philosophy, of explaining how 
come quantum systems are so radically different, given that they are expected to be the building 
blocks of all other objects in the physical world (Wessels, 1989, p. 96).  
Quantum teleportation  
A further, and for present purposes more interesting ‘troublesome’ phenomenon, is provided by the 
so-called teleportation protocol. In the protocol the sender and receiver again separate each with 
one end of the entangled physical system A and B, respectively. For sake of clarity, let us assume 
each of the systems A and B is a photon, and the photon-pair starts off in a state ‘described’ by the 
entangled quantum state. The sender has in possession another photon in some unknown state of 
polarisation, u. She then performs local operations on two photons in her possession, so that the 
formalism predicts that the distant (receiver’s) photon will be disentangled and the sender’s two 
photons will become entangled. But the receiver’s photon is not simply left in any odd state, but is 
steered by the ‘disentanglement’ procedure into a state u*, which is related to state u in a definite 
way (Bub, Quantum Information and Computing, 2007). After the sender then communicates the 
outcome of her operations (i.e. the result of the measurement on her two photons) to the receiver 
through a classical communication channel, he knows that his photon is either in a state u*=u or 
how to transform u* to u by a local operation at his end.  
To hammer this point home, consider what Bub (Bub, 2006) says about the density of coding (the 
quantity of information) employed in this transfer, by the sender and receiver he calls Alice and Bob.  
What is extraordinary about this phenomenon is that 
Alice and Bob have managed to use their shared 
entangled state as a quantum communication channel to 
destroy the state u of a photon in Alice's part of the 
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universe and recreate it in Bob's part of the universe. 
Since the state of a photon requires specifying a 
direction in space (essentially the value of an angle that 
can vary continuously), without a shared entangled state 
Alice would have to convey an infinite amount of 
classical information to Bob for Bob to be able to 
reconstruct the state u precisely. *…This is because+ to 
specify the value of an arbitrary angle variable requires 
an infinite number of bits. To specify the outcome of 
Alice's operation, which has four possible outcomes, 
with equal a priori probabilities, requires two bits of 
classical information. Remarkably, Bob can reconstruct 
the state u on the basis of just two bits of classical 
information communicated by Alice, apparently by 
exploiting the entangled state as a quantum 
communication channel to transfer the remaining 
information. (Bub, 2006)  
“The state has ‘disappeared’ from Alice’s region and ‘reappeared’ in Bob’s, hence the use of the of 
the term teleportation for this phenomenon” (Timpson, 2004, p. 66). Of course, a lot of detail is 
missing from this introductory presentation and will be furnished when revisiting it in the sections 
below (alternatively, sufficiently detailed presentation can be found in (Timpson, 2004), and a more 
precise technical exposition in e.g. (Diosi, 2007)). For present purposes suffices to say that the 
phenomenon is ‘troublesome’ because nothing like that is possible in classical physical theories, 
however imprecise the discussion of information theory associated with the situation (i.e. whatever 
one’s views of information-ontologies) may be. It is instructive, though, that it is the information 
transfer and not the matter or energy transfer that creates the puzzling effects here, perhaps 
another hint as to what direction to look in for the constraining principle of nature. The receiver has 
not created a photon out of nothing, but has merely transformed his existing photon into the distant 
one, without knowing exactly what the distant one was like in the first place. In fact no one knew 
exactly what the transmitted photon looked like before it was sent, not even the sender, no one had 
the infinite information. Unless a mysterious connection between all provisionally distant objects in 
the universe is postulated, we are ‘troubled’ by trying to explain what goes on here. Similarly in the 
‘dense coding’ situation to be presented in the following chapter, the classical analogue requires 
that the separated communicators know in advance what the distant half of the coded message says 
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(which is ex-hypothesi impossible) in order to recreate the coded messages that can arise through 
manipulations of the quantum formalism and the attendant elements of material reality.  
But stepping back from ‘information-speak’, that is to be more thoroughly analysed below, the 
teleportation phenomenon is still puzzling from the perspective of the potential for construction of 
the transcendental strategy of section 1. 4. Namely, it seems to deny an individuating ‘thisness’ to 
the supposed fundamental objects behind the phenomena by actively reducing their continuous 
space-time existence to the formal manipulations by experimenters. It illustrates most forcefully 
how the properties of the fundamental objects are dependent on the proscriptions from the 
formalism, and thus non-separably manipulable, rather than intrinsically inherent in the objects 
themselves. The experimenter that is able to more closely read the proscriptions of the 
wavefunction can come to know more about the distant object than the experimenter in possession 
of the object. The question then arises what other characteristics, other than being-thuss, our 
fundamental objects have, and whether their location is a sufficient conceptual foundation to be 
connected with the common-sense conceptual framework. Teleportation is just a vivid illustration of 
how the fundamental objects are rid of all but their point positions.26 Is that enough to reconstruct 
the phenomena of everyday experience?  
Maudlin (2007b) argues that for the proposed transcendental account to go through the conceptual 
connection between the contemporary physical theories and common-sense must have at least 
some “local beables”.27 This is not to say that it can’t postulate any non-local such beable, but 
merely that for the connection to be established in the most straightforward way it must contain at 
                                                             
26 For a detailed exposition of similar experimental situations that illustrate the qualitative paucity of the 
localized fundamental objects cf. (Brown, Elby, & Weingard, 1996).  
27 This is a terminology introduced in Bell (1987), where a ‘beable’ is a speculative piece of ontology, 
something that a theory postulates as being physically real. It is the foundational stone of our constructive 
approaches, the very construct that the explanation along the causal-mechanical lines rests on. Beables are 
the physical ontology that a theory postulates to exist. (These will be further explicated in the forthcoming 
sections.) ‘Local beables’, on the other hand, “do not merely exist: they exist somewhere.” (Maudlin, 2007, p. 
3157). If local beables are all there is to physical ontology, then we get a Humean Mosaic, a global state of 
affairs constructed linearly out of a combination of local states, a simple summation of all local beables. 
Whether this can be done in quantum theory is the contentious issue to be discussed in the thesis.  
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least some. “We take the world to contain localized objects (of unknown composition) in a certain 
disposition that changes through time. These are the sorts of beliefs we begin with.” (Maudlin, 
2007b: 3160). In principle a theory without local beables could also account for these beliefs, but the 
construction of explanation from such a theory would prove a much harder task and one ridden with 
many more frailties, claims Maudlin. And the role of “local beables” is similar to that required of the 
material structure described essentially in terms of primary qualities, for they allow for a most direct 
connection between the experience of the phenomena and the ontology that explanatorily accounts 
for them by providing a most commonly agreeable vocabulary, a conceptual framework, through 
which to account for that connection (Maudlin, 2007, p. 3160). The question that the teleportation, 
as the key ‘troublesome’ phenomenon, raises is: given how much of the conceptual framework is 
relegated to the non-local beable, are the local beables conceptually strong enough to uphold the 
simple transcendental strategy?  
1. 6 The research instrument and explanation  
Though models of explanations abound in literature it is never straightforward to apply any of them 
to the particular scientific phenomena other than those they had been specifically designed for. It is 
sometimes said that we even need not fashion individual scientific explanations after general 
models. We shall have to take from each of the models that which is useful for the case-study 
instances and apply it in the present context. Precious little guidance can be gleaned from literature 
in that respect, as there is a scarcity of systematic accounts of the notion of explanatory depth, over 
and above proscriptive and descriptive delineations of the overarching explanatory models  
(Hitchcock & Woodward, 2003, p. 181). Explanations are often subjective beasts, when I consider 
something explained others might not. So one option would be to leave the issue out of the 
discussion altogether, we could just compare directly the two approaches presented in the thesis 
and see which one ‘clicks’ better. But that would be to give in too much to the subjectivity; I should 
in that case explain why I really like one of them so much over the other and hope the reader will 
like them too. Maudlin (2002) calls this choosing scientific theories on aesthetic grounds.  
53 
 
A more objective (and let’s leave ‘objective’ as implicitly understood here) route would be to try to 
explicitly devise the criteria upon which the value will be conferred to either of the approaches and 
then carefully collect the points of each on a scoreboard, using the final tally as an objective guide as 
to which one of them to ‘like’ more. What is needed is adjudication, over and above the descriptive 
account of the proposed explanations of the phenomena.  
Upon such a strategy we need to try to box each of the approaches under a model as much as it will 
fit, in order to speed up the scoring, the more appealing the general model the more appealing will 
be the accounts subsumed under it.28 In this respect we shall follow an instruction found in (Lipton, 
2004)29 to distinguish between, tentatively termed, epistemic and ontological (or metaphysical) 
explanations. Epistemic explanations cash in on satisfying our epistemic cravings alone: they provide 
us with good reasons to believe the phenomenon (explanandum) did actually occur or reduce the 
problematic phenomenon to what is already familiar. The ontological explanations, on the other 
hand, aim to present the phenomenon as a consequence of the way things really are in the world, 
regardless of how they may seem to us or how familiar they may be. As to how epistemology is 
connected to metaphysics, or more specifically ontology, in the simple transcendental strategy, we 
can follow Ruben’s conclusions that explanations can and do have a virtue over a bare pragmatic 
satisfaction of ‘explanatory hunger’ (thus potentially making them mere narrative constructions).  
Explanations work only because things make things 
happen or make things have some feature (‘things’ 
should be taken in an anodyne sense, to include 
whatever the reader wishes to count as a denizen of 
reality). And making can be taken in a deterministic or in 
a nondeterministic (dependency) sense.  
                                                             
28 They will also allow easier linking of explanatory strategies in individual instances into a wider reaching 
world-view.  
29 Lipton’s account provides a useful starting point as he approaches the delineation of models from a 
utilitarian, not a purely descriptive, perspective. He asks what good an explanation is in science (and in 
sometimes related disciplines such as mathematics and philosophy) and sets up a simple ‘three essential 
features of explanation’ test that aims to respect these utilitarian goals. This test is not only useful in checking 
which models approach the utilitarian goal best, but also in alluding to the epistemic/ontological distinction. 
The three features test also appears to be applicable to the very instances that the explanations from the 
different theoretical approaches try to provide, and not just to the success of the models covering them. 
(Lipton, 2004, pp. 1-10).  
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And this, I think, is the ultimate basis for any reply to an 
explanation theorist who holds that full explanation is 
only and entirely a pragmatic or otherwise 
anthropomorphic conception. On my view, explanation 
is epistemic, but with a solid metaphysical basis. A realist 
theory of explanation that links the determinative (or 
dependency) relations in the world with explanation gets 
at the intuitively acceptable idea that we explain 
something by showing what is responsible for it or what 
makes it as it is.” (Ruben D. , 1990 , pp. 232-233)  
As our transcendental strategy of section 1. 4 clearly requires ontological explanations to achieve 
realist conclusions, we shall focus on two such models to be applied to the case-study instances are 
the “unification conception of understanding” and the “causal conception of understanding” (  
(Lipton, 2004, pp. 7-8).30 As the unification model in general weavers between both epistemological 
and ontological explanations it will be interesting to investigate whether it can be pinned to the 
ontological side without being turned into a causal conception (with the pitfalls inherent in that from 
our ‘troublesome’ phenomena).31 In that respect, as the historical analysis has illustrated (sec’n 1.2.), 
causal conception can be seen as a subset of the unification conception; it provides unification 
through reduction of the wide range of phenomena to the universal causal mechanism. So the pure 
unification conception here will have to be what is outside that subset, the unificatory but not causal 
(or more precisely, causal-mechanical) segment of the model.  
We will, thus, survey two conceptual approaches arguably aligned with the two types of explanatory 
models presented above. The aim is to investigate their explanatory content and scope, and 
especially to appraise the ontological characteristics of the explanatory narratives they provide for 
the ‘troublesome’ phenomena (as well as the wider scientific world-view). Each following chapter 
provides a more detailed introduction to the views of each of the conceptual and methodological 
                                                             
30 Lipton (2004) freely exchanges ‘understanding’ and ‘explanation’ in the text, as explanation is the means to 
achieve understanding. It would probably be clearer to call them conceptions of explanation, for 
understanding may be an unanalysable end-product of explanation. But it is the mystification of understanding 
that Lipton tries to avoid by, among other things, showing it to be something different than knowledge and 
practically available through the methods we use to explain things by.  
31 It is a mark of Kitcher’s original advocacy (1989) of unificationist account, though not of Friedman’s (1974) 
initial unificationist proposal, that in the realm of fundamental physics it is equated with the causal account, 
though in the special sciences it allows the divergence from the necessary construction of causal mechanisms.  
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approaches (the principle and the constructive one). A final tally is attempted in the last chapter 
where the explanatory success of the two approaches is directly compared.  
Comparative presentation of Lipton’s models of explanation  
Lipton (2004) devises makeshift criteria which help adjudicate explanatory worth (in the absence of 
a more lengthy analysis of ‘understanding’) based on a few simple insights about the state we call 
understanding, both ‘phenomenological’ and comparative to other similar states. Thus 
understanding must be separated from bare knowledge by a gap that has to be additionally bridged, 
it must stop the endless why-regress at least until explicit further enticements (such as more 
detailed analysis or new phenomena) appear and it must have that wholesome character of all its 
elements obviously fitting into their places to form a uniform whole. These criteria Lipton terms, 
respectively, the  
(i) Knowledge versus Understanding,  
(ii) Why Regress, and   
(iii) Self-evidencing Explanation32.  
In general, Lipton (2004) claims that casual-mechanical explanations fare better on the satisfaction 
of the three criteria and are on the whole best at satisfying the explanatory hunger. There is no need 
to quarrel with Litpon’s analysis here, nor to repeat it. What is more interesting is to apply the 
research instrument devised in this section, i.e. to show how the explicit instances of unification and 
causal explanations that we have chosen through our case-study instance actually satisfy the stated 
requirements.  
                                                             
32 A successful explanation not only conceptually unites the occurrence of the phenomenon into a wider 
conceptual scheme but shows just how the occurrence of the phenomenon is an essential part of our reason 
for believing that the explanation itself is correct (Lipton, 2004, p. 3). It ties the phenomenon and the 
explanation into a firm conceptual whole. It is hard to go deeper into structural analysis of this feature, and we 
take the lack of universal formal analysis of the syntactic structure of explanations to be a good indication that 
it needn’t be done here. Examples in this case seem to go a long way replacing the formal analysis, such as 
Lipton’s illustration of the velocity of the recession of a galaxy as an explanation of its red shift even in the 
situation where the shift is an essential part of the evidence for the specified rate of recession (Lipton, 2004, p. 
4). 
56 
 
But before that, it is worth summarising once more why Lipton deems the causal explanations as 
most successful in passing all the criteria and thus as the most desirable model of explanation in 
science. This is important also because it points to the direction our unification model of explanation 
should orientate itself in order to successfully compete with the general preference for the 
mechanical models (despite some of their failures that are to be discussed below). Lipton himself 
admits that the most tempting and succinct answer as to why causes provide better explanations 
than their effects, is that the causes have the power to confer understanding, at least in science. The 
idea would be: show the cause of a phenomenon and you have conferred understanding as to why 
the phenomenon occurs. But there are obvious problems with that, the first being that even though 
we could through counterfactual dependence show some event to be taken as the cause of the 
other, if there is no wider elaboration as to how it is its cause then understanding may still be 
missing. All we would have done is increased the stock of knowledge of facts, in this case that 
occurrence of the first phenomenon will under some circumstances lead to the occurrence of the 
other, that it will be the cause for it.  
His second attempt is to say that causes ‘bring about’ the occurrence of effects, but that might be 
taken as just synonymous for ‘causes cause effects’. To avoid such a reading one has to look more 
closely at the temporal asymmetry of the phenomena deemed to be cause and effect, as well as 
abandon the Humean mosaic view of causation as entrenched but contingent conjunction.  For at 
least one of our case-study instances that should not be a problem, as it relies heavily on just such a 
philosophical move. The other instance, should it make an attempt to move closer to the causation 
explanatory model will have to accommodate this distancing from Humeanism as well.  
A much stronger support for causal explanation is provided by causes ‘making a difference’ between 
the phenomenon occurring and not occurring. In explaining a phenomenon, or more precisely its 
occurrence, that seems to be exactly what we are after i.e. showing what resides between the 
phenomenon occurring as it did and it not occurring at all. It is causes that often make a difference in 
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this sense in science, whilst the phenomena we would deem their effects as rule do not (i.e. the 
asymmetry is not abolished). This kind of reading helps even in the situation where there are 
multiple possible causes or several of them contribute jointly. It is still the case that a better 
understanding is gained by selecting a cluster of causes that made the difference (preferably the 
crucial difference) to the phenomenon occurring, whilst at the same time having knowledge of their 
individual influences and joint interaction. Thus we come to another, often hidden value in 
explanation and that is not just showing that the event occurred but giving some detail (though not 
excessively) as to how it came about as well. A well structured causal explanation can do just this; 
provide a successful narrative of why and how our phenomenon occurred. Once that is done we may 
consider the phenomenon explained.  
But there is a downside to this justification for the primacy of causal explanations, the use of 
contrastive explanations (Lipton, 2004, p. 16). Our desire to have the phenomenon explained often 
stems not from simple desire to learn why and how it came about, but from an implicit question why 
that particular phenomenon came about and not some other, similar phenomenon. Without going 
into further discussions of individuation of phenomena, it is clear that often in asking for an 
explanation of a phenomenon we are asking for an explanation of some crucial feature of the 
phenomenon, i.e. for explanation of why that feature obtains and not some other closely related 
feature. And causal explanations are not straightforwardly married with the ‘contrastive 
requirement’, as it is precisely the wider story and the more complex narrative construction that is 
needed to show how a particular cause, out of a cluster of closely related potential siblings, brought 
about a particular effect.33 But on adding this criterion some causes can be shown to be weaker in 
providing explanations than the elements of other explanatory models, and this will be our concern 
                                                             
33 This need not go to the extreme of denying chanciness and random outcomes even at the fundamental 
level. It is merely to claim that in competing explanations that which came closer to showing how a particular 
phenomenon came about from a particular cause will be considered a better explanation provided that both 
are equally empirically adequate.  
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in the section on depth of explanation. Of course those causes that surmount this hurdle will provide 
even better explanations. When explanations compete we want a ‘deeper’ one.  
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2. Principle approaches  
Historically, much of fundamental physics has been 
concerned with discovering the fundamental particles of 
nature and the equations which describe their motions 
and interactions. It now appears that a different 
programme may be equally important: to discover the 
ways that nature allows, and prevents, information to be 
expressed and manipulated, rather than particles to 
move. (Steane, Quantum Computing, 1998, p. 119)  
2. 1. Bohr and neo-Bohrianism  
The founding father and his philosophy  
Niels Bohr, a self-confessed non-philosopher, and one of the founding fathers of quantum theory, 
believed the “irrational element” (the Planck quantum of action) discovered through development 
of quantum theory has put as against the insurmountable epistemic wall when it comes to the 
exploration and explanation of the physical world.34 He expected philosophy to provide a ‘band-aid’ 
for the damage this wall has caused to the forehead of empirical research, but no more than that, as 
there is no way out of the dire predicament (Vukelja, 2004). Niels Bohr believed that quantum 
theory would have to adopt a radically different approach to investigation of physical reality, from 
the theories under the umbrella of classical physics.  
In Bohr’s eyes, due to the finite size of the Planck quantum of action, we can no longer perform 
experiments on objects that are elements of physical reality, without disturbing them ‘beyond 
recognition’. The objects, independent physical entities, no longer exist in their own right, within the 
conceptual explanatory framework of the theory. This is not to say that there is no physical reality, 
or elements of physical reality, at the microscopic (‘quantum’) level (in a metaphysical sense), but 
that they have to stay forever epistemically inaccessible (or, epistemically insufficiently accessible) 
with respect to determination of individuality and physical characteristics. Thus we cannot construct 
a ‘mechanical’ conceptual scheme to describe the realm of the quantum.  
                                                             
34
 “There is an “irrational” element to nature: so stands the measurement problem on Bohr’s philosophy” says 
Saunders in an updated version of (Saunders, What is the Problem of Measurement?, 1994).  
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He took the major difference between the new language of quantum theory and that of the previous 
theories to be in that quantum theory’s lacked the following four characteristics:  
1. Determinism (or causality, Bohr finds the two terms almost synonymous, (Scheibe, 1973, p. 
13)),  
2. Terminology of pictorial description,  
3. Independence of objects of observation from the experimental apparatus  
4. Possibility of the combined use of the space-time concepts and dynamical conservation laws 
(Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge , 1958, pp. 67-82).  
The everyday (classical) language we use when discussing physical reality includes the above 
features, and is therefore not suitable to describe the reality as given by quantum theory. In Bohr’s 
own words:  
All description of experiences has so far been based 
upon the assumption, already inherent in ordinary 
conventions of language, that it is possible to distinguish 
sharply between the behaviour of objects and the means 
of observation. This assumption is not only fully justified 
by all everyday experience but even constitutes the 
whole basis of classical physics. (Bohr, Atomic Physics 
and Human Knowledge , 1958, p. 25)  
However we still have to use the classical terminology, the one we understand well from everyday 
use, to describe the results of the quantum measurement. This requirement is imposed so that 
those observations could be communicated, and made public, or even more precisely: the 
foundation of the realist explanatory conceptual scheme of physics is built on it.35 
                                                             
35 We are treading over some fine notions here, most notably Bohr’s understanding of ‘objectivity’. Howard 
(1994) argues that Bohr made a break with a traditional concept of objectivity as independence of objects 
from observers, by defining it as “unambiguous communicability” of the scientist’s descriptions of experiments 
and their results. Limitations of space preclude a wider discussion, though the notion will obviously be relevant 
to the expectations of ontology to be given by Bohr’s ‘interpretation of the formalism’. We can simply take this 
shift of definition to suggest similarities between Bohr’s attitude to constructive ontology and the attitude of 
principle approaches to be presented below.  
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Bohr then considered that the chief aim of a consistent quantum theory is an unambiguous 
description of quantum phenomena, but obtained by including in their description the experimental 
conditions in which the phenomena occur (Scheibe, 1973, p. 18). Those experimental conditions are 
not to be clearly separated from the object, as in classical terminology.36 But a problem arises 
because the apparatus is described by classical physics and the object by the quantum mechanical 
formalism, or in Bohr’s words: “the essentially new feature in the analysis of quantum phenomena 
is…the introduction of a fundamental distinction between the measuring apparatus and the objects 
under investigation.” (Bohr, 1963, p. 3). They no longer belong to the same language. Two different 
languages are required to describe what we expected is the same physical world on a continuous 
extension scale.  
From the above considerations, it should be clear that 
the whole situation in atomic physics deprives of all 
meaning such inherent attributes as the idealisations of 
classical physics would ascribe to the object. (Bohr, 
1937, p. 293)  
There is no room to enter into a detailed discussion of the route to Bohrian position, nor its eventual 
inadequacies from the present day vantage point. Insightful analyses can be found in (Vukelja, 
2004); (Saunders, What is the Problem of Measurement?, 1994), (Saunders, 2005); (Barbour, 1999); 
(Hilgevoord & Uffink, 2006); (Bub, 2000);  (Bub, 2004). What we really need here is an attempt to 
establish the outlines of his position with respect to methodology, metaphysics and explanations 
resulting from quantum theory, and how his views relate to the contemporary principle approaches 
which are often characterised as neo-Bohrian. Due to complexities of Bohr’s own writing (Vukelja, 
2004, p. 26) and extension of subsequent debate, the summation offered here serves the purposes 
of the wider positions outlined in the thesis without the luxury of argument and justification for such 
use (again due to limitation of space).  
                                                             
36
 Bohr introduces a term ‘phenomenon’ to replace the object of observation, the apparatus used to observe 
the object and their mutual interaction that takes place during the process of measurement.  
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Treacherous metaphysics and limited explanatory potential  
As is outlined above, in perhaps too coy terms, Bohr advocated the agnosticism towards the 
constructive elements of reality at the quantum level due to the inadequacy of the mechanistic 
worldview in providing a description of them. But, as our existing, and culturally unchangeable, 
conceptual framework relies precisely on the mechanistic worldview, and is perfectly adequate for 
the description of the non-quantum experience37, we are forced to use it to the best possible fit, 
even when describing ‘quantum phenomena’. This is simply because of a contingent fact that it is 
the conceptual framework we have and one that we can’t step out of when constructing another 
one anew.38 This best fit is achieved by considering each measurement of the state of the 
inaccessible quantum object in isolation, but under internal holism. This is the uniqueness of 
individual phenomena. They become isolated from the wider context (e.g. physical history leading to 
the individual measurement) and thus do not allow formation of unifiable knowledge (Vukelja, 2004) 
about the individual elements of reality. On the other hand, the holistic element within each 
phenomenon precludes a clear-cut separation between the observer, the measuring apparatus and 
the object, so as to lead towards at least potential unification of the ‘picture’ of all of the object’s 
properties.   
This implies that there is no possibility of providing a constructive-style theory of the elements of 
reality that interact with the measuring apparatus and the observer, assuming it subscribes to the 
causal-mechanical model of explanation. The language employed by quantum theory as a 
constructive theory cannot use the familiar concepts from the classical, everyday realm in the same 
sense that they are normally used in. The wholeness of the ‘phenomenon’ excludes the possibility of 
a clear delineation of new existents, their identification as objects traceable across different 
experimental contexts. Following on from that we cannot distil a unified picture of the object of 
                                                             
37
 For presentation of Bohr’s extensions of his ‘quantum philosophy’ to the realms of relativity theory, biology 
and psychology, see (Vukelja, 2004).  
38 That is, on a general level language contains a world-view and we cannot start constructing new private 
languages with altogether different world-views. Though we can correct the level of detail, in world-view 
construction we cannot start fundamentally from scratch, from some sort of non-linguistic starting point. Bohr 
thought that abandoning the mechanical view would require such a radical revision.  
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observation, which is a telltale characteristic of the non-unifiable knowledge, and which, in turn, is 
the best we can achieve about ‘microscopic/quantum phenomena’. Thus, in terms of epistemic 
access required for explanation we have to contend with wholesome phenomena, parcelled out 
from one another by the sea of standard mechanistically conceptualised experience.  
Yet, this novel epistemology, rests on a metaphysical premise that is largely unacceptable today: the 
postulation of the existence of the “irrational element” that creates epistemic havoc in each instance 
of knowledge gathering in the quantum realm.39 In each measurement interaction the “irrational 
element” disturbs the system, and this is why it is necessary to abandon hope of a ‘phantasmal’40 
nature of observation that allows the observer to simply ‘absorb’ the state affairs, as it is in itself, 
unaffected by the act of observation. Thus, Bohr relies on a constructive step about the existence of 
an “irrational” element in order to avoid the discrepancy between the predictions of the theory and 
the observed outcomes (as contained in the measurement problem). In an ontological sense, we can 
almost picture the business as usual mechanics of the very small, treacherously disturbed by the 
unaccountable and unpredictable irrational element. However, the supposed “irrational” element 
does not feature in the quantum formalism, it is a purely interpretative philosophical addition 
(Saunders, 1994). But without the element, it is harder to accept the, almost metaphysical, necessity 
of limiting ourselves to non-unifiable knowledge of the ‘quantum reality’ however scarce that 
knowledge may be presently. In fact, Beller (1999, pp. 171-190; 197) cites opposition to Bohr’s view 
from the likes of M. Born and W. Heisenberg, who held that there is no need to adopt such neo-
Kantian view, and that a conceptual framework that includes quantum phenomena should be a 
correction of the inaccuracies discovered in the current everyday (classical) one.  
                                                             
39
 This is a curious mixing of the principle and constructive methodology, as Bohr postulates a new existent of a 
special kind (the “irrational element”) and uses that postulation as a constraining principle on the possibility of 
analysis and explanation of the experimental situation.  
40
 Classical causal explanations of phenomena rest on the said ‘phantasmal’ nature of observation, i.e. 
possibility of detachment of the observer from the unfolding of the physical process (Vukelja, 2004).   
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A more charitable reading of Bohr’s approach, in Howard (1994) does not stress the reliance on the 
irrational element, but in fact sees Einstein’s separability principle as the guiding idea behind Bohr’s 
explanation of the phenomena. On Howard’s account, the necessity of separability of elements of 
the universe is, according to Bohr, untenable in quantum theory. As the notion of objectivity as 
metaphysical independence of object and observer was also based on separability41, it had to be 
redefined into ‘unambiguous communicability’ (see ftn 37 in the previous section). On this reading 
Bohr’s explanation of the phenomena rests on taking separability as the foundational presumption 
of our conceptual framework (i.e. language) and this is in perfect agreement with the theories of 
classical physics. In the quantum realm separability is violated and the language based on it cannot 
adequately describe the situation. Thus, we cannot have unifiable knowledge/explanation of the 
phenomena in that realm. With the separability broken, due to “irrational element” or something 
else, our conceptual framework has hit against the limit of understanding, and we must contend 
with agnosticism concerning the ontology at this level of reality.42 One might also suggest that Bohr’s 
acceptance of non-unifiable knowledge presents a criticism of the evidently limited mechanical-
causal explanatory framework.  
 The methodological legacy  
Vukelja claims that it is Bohr’s general position on the role of science that it should not aim at a 
conceptual mapping of reality, in a constructive sense of delineating existents and their interactions, 
but should instead aim to systematically unify human experience through objective presentation of 
                                                             
41 Namely, that the act of observation, a passive act by the observer, does not affect the outcome of the 
physical process as the whole process of observation consists of separable segments of physical process and a 
recording by the observer.  
42 Of course, an important question of where exactly this cut between the levels is placed can be posed. Some 
commentators leave it as a weakness in Bohr’s position to place it ‘somewhere’ between the scale of the 
macroscopic measuring instrument and the ‘atomic’ object. Hence, the metaphysical importance of the 
“irrational element” being the Planck quantum of action. Others, hold that the formalism should not permit 
‘quantum effects’ to be amplified to the macroscopic size (though we do not observe that, and thus get the 
problem of measurement) and that the cut is not a matter of scale of material extension, but of choosing those 
parameters from the formalism that permit the accurate prediction of the desired experimental outcomes and 
the description that respects separability of object and apparatus. Such a description can be found in the 
formalism, at the expense of rendering unknowable other characteristics of the overall system. Thus, our 
description conforms to the classical conceptual framework but is irrevocably incomplete and does not allow 
construction of a unified explanation.  
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the experienced phenomena (Vukelja, 2004). Hilgevoord and Uffink say that Bohr renounces “the 
idea that [conceptual] pictures refer, in a literal one-to-one correspondence, to physical reality” 
(Hilgevoord & Uffink, 2006). As will be discussed later, with reference to Einstein’s explanation of his 
reasoning behind the use of principle approach, these can be seen as conforming with the principle 
methodology requirement of trying to abstract as much as possible from the assumptions and 
postulates about ontology, and formulating empirical generalisations expected to survive any 
foreseeable ontological clarification. Yet, this is not a full-blown principle approach based on 
achieving desired unification through one or more foundational generalising principles, and allows 
the use of alternative constructive conceptualisations (wave and particle mechanics) as useful 
fictions in individual contexts. Bub (2000) on the other hand, is not perturbed by this constructive 
misdemeanour, and claims that Bohr’s position treats quantum theory as a principle theory with a 
Kantian twist (the necessity of using classical concepts).43 As for the formalism, Bohr sees no reason 
to attribute credence to any of its particular demands as to the nature of reality.  
The entire formalism is to be considered as a tool for 
deriving predictions, of definite or statistical character, 
as regards information obtainable under experimental 
conditions described in classical terms *…+. These 
symbols themselves, *…+, are not susceptible to pictorial 
interpretation; and even [the formal predictions] are 
only to be regarded as expressing the probabilities for 
the occurrence of individual events observable under 
well-defined experimental conditions. (Bohr, 1948, p. 
314) 
On the other hand, what makes contemporary principle approaches of this chapter neo-Bohrian is 
their agreement that a constructive picture along the classical lines of the phenomena guided by the 
quantum formalism cannot be built. In fact both Fuchs and Bub admit Bohrian leanings, towards 
Bohr’s position as they understand it to be ( (Fuchs, Quantum states: What the hell are they? (The 
                                                             
43
 Another similarity, presented in (Bub, 2004) is the denial of the measurement problem in Bohr’s philosophy 
and the CBH principle approach. The former, according to Bub, simply placed the measuring instruments 
outside the domain of the theoretical description, however arbitrary the cut might seem. This way there was 
no problem to be solved (we were not to ask what happens to the measuring instruments between the 
‘ready’-state and the measurement interaction). The latter, purport to show that the measurement problem is 
a pseudo-problem that different interpretations waste time ‘solving’ (Bub, 2004, pp. 262-263).   
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Post-Växjö Phase Transition), 2002); (Bub, 2004)). We cannot construct metaphysical postulates that 
will satisfactorily fit into the existing overall conceptual scheme and provide a mechanical 
underpinning of the said phenomena. The quantum realm is conceptually radically different from 
the classical one, and we have to learn to respect that. Without any speculation as to the nature of 
ontology, we can ascertain that quantum formalism and separability are in conflict. Yet, the 
constructive approach of Chapter 3 is also willing to accept this, but build a modified mechanical 
picture of the processes ‘producing’ the experienced phenomena. Perhaps Bohr was simply wrong at 
the last step, and given some hindsight available to contemporary physicists he would have sided 
with the constructive picture and abandoned calls for non-unifiable knowledge (this would in effect 
be giving in to the criticism of Heisenberg and Born, as reported in (Beller, 1999)).  
What can be seen as characteristic of the principle methodology in Bohr’s position is the overall 
reduction in explanatory utility of the quantum formalism, whilst nevertheless holding on to some 
sort of determinism and realism. All principle approaches (which distinguishes them from pure 
unashamed instrumentalism) see the reduction as an indication of constraints on what can be 
known about the quantum-domain phenomena imposed by the reality itself (to a greater or lesser 
degree), thus not as a consequence of pure technical ignorance that further research might remove. 
Constructive approaches postulate entities that they hope will lead us out of such self-imposed 
ignorance with questions in the right direction.44 The principle approaches and Bohr also treat the 
formalism as an instrumental tool and not an ontological pointer.  
Quantum [formalism] postulates a geometry of 
propositions because complete knowledge of the system 
is not possible; the geometry both guides and constrains 
the extent of our fragmentary knowledge of the 
properties associated with an instantaneous state. *…+ 
Our knowledge of the propositions true of the system is 
unstable and changing. It is so unstable that quantum 
mechanics proceeds by articulating only the exact 
                                                             
44
 Though, even they are aware of some serious obstacles on that route, as given by the in-principle 
unknowability of some important states of the universe.  
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fashion in which this instability is evidenced. 
(Demopoulos, 2004, pp. 103-104) 
2. 2. Quantum information theory and principle approaches  
Step one and step two in principle-based explanations  
Methodologically, the principle approaches of this chapter set out from the observation that formal 
theoretic accounts of the phenomena considered characteristic of quantum theory can be derived 
from a limited set of formalised principles about constrictions on the amount of knowledge an 
observer can have about reality, or similar principles about information acquisition and transmission 
when dealing with ‘reality measuring’ instruments. A common denominator for the approaches 
surveyed here is that they are explicitly in the state of development, i.e. that they do not offer 
complete explanatory accounts of the phenomena in question that are sufficiently couched in the 
wider explanatory framework concerning the physical world. We shall survey two such approaches, 
though most of the discussion in the end will be focused on one of them, a formally more complete 
one.  
Yet, as their proposal is a deviation from the standard preference in physical explanation for causal-
mechanical accounts the actual formal methodology of their derivation will have to be outlined to a 
greater extent. In that, the Fuchs programme can be seen as, conceptually, an intermediary step 
towards the more abstract CBH programme. As we shall see, though the more abstract programme 
is harder to fathom, it is less committed to ‘sins’ inherent in the principle approaches (cf. exposition 
of Einstein’s principle derivation of Special Relativity in Chapter 1, section 1. 3. 1). Also, as both 
programmes are fresh and to a great extent still under development we can learn more for the 
purposes of assessing explanatory accounts based on them by considering two, rather than just the 
preferred one of those accounts. Likewise, with the non-constructive accounts being less common in 
philosophy of science, two are included here to help clarify matters. As a rule, at this stage they set 
the foundations and delineate questions to be addressed in future research. They are also not fully 
68 
 
formally equivalent with ‘standard’ quantum theory, and seek to uncover ‘metaphysical clues’ from 
the ways of bridging the gap between their formalism and the ‘standard’ one.45  
These clues come from some formally describable situations (entanglement assisted 
communication, non-commutativity, dense coding, superdense coding, teleportation and the like), 
at least one of which we have introduced in the previous chapter. In attempt not to stray into too 
technical aspects of the discussion and lose sight of the primary aim of providing an explanatory 
framework of the phenomena intuitive enough to appeal to a wide enough audience, it suffices to 
say that the quantum information theory uses a well-known and tested classical information theory 
appropriated to the quantum context. Classical information theory concerns mathematical 
formalisation of quantification of transmittance and loss of information through classical 
communication channels (such as pieces of paper with pre-arranged code pushed through a 
boundary impenetrable to other information, or a standard telephone line, or a mobile phone radio 
frequency). The quantum context is provided by replacement of formal states of the communication 
devices expressed in terms of classical variables46 by the formal states as expressed in terms of 
quantum variables.  
Information: classical and quantum  
Before even introducing the two principle approaches, each of which has some unavoidable formal 
aspects associated, it is worth examining a general situation of dense coding (Clifton, 2004, pp. 431-
432) in order to better illustrate why principle approaches are strongly oriented on the epistemic 
(and to a degree subjective) aspects of the situation. Namely, the classical analogue employs a 
system of codes inscribed onto blank cards and exchanged between agents. The situation is so set up 
that the receiving agent needs two cards (one initially taken with him, and the other received 
                                                             
45 Though more explicit about this than the constructive approach surveyed in Chapter 3, this does not put 
them in a great disadvantage to the latter as those are also, at this stage, unable to complete the explanatory 
framework in every detail (as will be discussed in Chapter 3).  
46 These, of course, needn’t and as a rule won’t be the basic classical variables of a standard Newtonian phase 
space, unless one chooses to communicate through physically interacting point-particles, which is not the case 
in information theory. But classical variables are also other variables (such as orientation of an arrow or the 
amount of the electric current) codified in accordance with the mathematical formalism of classical physics.  
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through the communication channel) to subsequently recover 2bits of information the sender is 
transmitting through the communication channel. The receiver, that is, needs both cards to make 
sense of the 2bit message, no relevant information is carried by either card in isolation. The codes on 
the cards are ‘entangled’ to provide a whole message.  
If the analogy is perfectly appropriate, it seems to suggest that the information carried by the 
communication channel need not be parcelled out amongst the physical systems making up the 
channel, and thus that we need not invoke the metaphysical (even if we do it formally in terms of 
calculations) mysteries of entanglement to account for the dense coding phenomena. If the analogy 
is perfectly appropriate, there is no need to look for the ontology inherent in the quantum formalism 
over and above trying to fit that formalism with the classical ontology we are already happy with 
(and as has been repeatedly attempted for the past 100 years that quantum theory has been 
formulated). But the classical communication protocol Clifton describes is disanalogous to the 
quantum ‘dense coding’ situation in one important respect: for the sender to be able to choose the 
right sign (a piece of code) with which to convey the said 2bit message she must know in advance 
what is already written on the receiver’s first card (the one he initially takes with him). And in the 
quantum versions of the protocol such foreknowledge is not envisaged, nor is it explicitly required 
(over and above whatever may be encoded in the formalism per se) for the protocol to be 
successfully completed. Thus, it seems at this tentative stage the quantum formalism somehow 
embodies the ‘knowledge’ required in the classical case. How the sender comes to acquire this 
knowledge remains a mystery (i.e. it is either a foreknowledge akin to common cause explanations, 
or it is a knowledge somehow acquired in the process akin to a holistic supraluminal connection) 
that the principle approaches try to resolve (cf. Chapter 1, section 1. 5. 2 on teleportation, as well).47  
                                                             
47 Of course, the constructive approaches we shall consider later need not concern themselves with the 
mystery of foreknowledge as they have a metaphysical mechanism by which the non-local or holistic effects 
can be produced by local interventions, such as choice of signs to write on a card is.  
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Yet, we will not move sufficiently away from the ‘troublesome’ aspects of the phenomena if we 
attempt to explain away the mysteries by structural accounts of encoding large amounts of 
information directly into the material existents (this may also be a pointer in moving from Fuchs to 
CBH). We should not turn mystery of one kind (supraluminal causal connection) to that of the other 
kind (instantaneous exchange of large amounts of information). Steane (2003) claims that processes 
involving quantum information transfer and manipulation, quantum computation, are not superior 
to classical computational processes in terms of efficiency. There is no mysterious transfer of large 
amounts of information.  
What in fact happens in the quantum case is that the physical situation corresponding to entangled 
states, a physical entanglement, provides a sort of a ‘physical shorthand’ in information transmission 
and manipulation. That is, we get the appearance of efficiency in quantum information processes 
because “quantum entanglement offers a way to generate and manipulate a physical representation 
of the correlations between [entities represented by formal expressions of quantum states] without 
the need to completely represent the entities themselves48” (Steane, 2003, p. 476). What the 
characteristic of quantum entanglement provides is a way to represent and manipulate correlations 
directly, without having to go through a lengthier and computationally more expensive route of 
manipulation of the correlated entities.  In conclusion, the principle approaches then try to present 
the ‘troublesome’ phenomena in a perspective that aims to remove from their description all that is 
metaphysically postulated but does not seem to do any work on conceptually linking the elements of 
the phenomena. And mechanical details of the physical systems might be just the thing if the 
phenomena are viewed in terms of outcome correlations on the black-box instruments. Thought this 
might be explanatorily ‘efficient’ in a sense of generating a wholesome narrative from a limited set 
                                                             
48
 This means that the computational correlations can be so set up to be able to produce desired results 
without the need to calculate a lot of ‘spectator’ results. For example, one can find the period of a function 
without calculating all the evaluations of the function, one can find a specific property of a quantum system 
(such as energy level) without also finding the complete quantum state, one can communicate some shared 
aspect of distributed information without transmitting as much of the information as one would otherwise 
need to. (Steane, 2003, p. 477)  
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of concepts, it faces the problem of satisfying explanatory depth (cf. section 4. 1) and conceptual 
connection with the simple transcendental strategy (as in section 1. 4).  
Metaphysics: epistemic and ontic states  
The ontological characteristics of the principle and constructive approaches are most clearly seen in 
the interpretation of the ‘quantum state’. A quantum state is a part of the quantum formalism that 
purports to provide a formal description of the relevant characteristics of the physical system, thus a 
‘formal state’. It is useful here to introduce a dichotomy between states of reality and states of 
knowledge, following (Spekkens, 2007), as used in interpretations of formalism (thus, also of formal 
quantum states) of physical theories. Spekkens terms these ontic and epistemic states, respectively. 
From a classical and realist perspective, an ideal state in physics is an ontic state. An ontic state 
provides a complete specification of all the properties of the system.49 An example of such state is a 
point in classical phase space (cf. glossary).  
But classical physics also provides examples of epistemic states, namely when the formal state 
specification expresses a probability distribution over phase space. In this case the formal state 
represents a relative likelihood (a probability distribution is a function, but this aspect need not 
concern us here) that some (human) agent assigns to the ontic states associated with the points of 
phase space ‘covered’ by the distribution. “The distribution *, a formal state in this case,+ describes 
only what this agent knows about the system” (Spekkens, 2007, pp. 032110-2). Note that it is not 
claimed that there are no properties of the system, or that the system is not in some sense fully real 
(endowed with a full set of necessary physical properties).50 It is rather that in the given 
experimental (physical) situation the agent is not in a position to know what ontic state corresponds 
to the true state of the system, but given some set of constraints is able to ascertain a probability 
                                                             
49 These properties needn’t all be explicitly listed in the specification of the state, i.e. some of them can be 
derived from the specification of the state and the overarching theoretical formalism. But the crucial point is 
that these ‘implict’ properties can in principle be so derived at any stage with complete certainty. In other 
words, all the properties of the state are at all times in-principle epistemically accessible.  
50 One might interpret Bohrian metaphysics as claiming that there is no fact of the matter as to whether the 
system possesses all the properties, including those unknown or unknowable to the agent, but this is not what 
is claimed here.  
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distribution over some set of relevant ontic states. The metaphysical projection states that the 
system is in a state corresponding to one of the ontic states, but the agent cannot be sure which, 
though she can specify the difference in likelihood between those states.  
Of course, the ideal situation is the one where the ontic and the epistemic states coincide, i.e. where 
the epistemic states encode complete knowledge and thus a complete specification of a system’s 
properties. It is the claim of the principle approach that using epistemic states provides conceptually 
superior explanations of the ‘troublesome’ quantum phenomena (Spekkens, 2007, pp. 032110-2), 
even though constructive approaches are taken to provide equally valid demonstrations of the said 
phenomena as mathematical consequences of the theoretical formalism. Principle approaches 
concede that the explanations from the constructive approach (taking quantum states as ontic 
states) are conceptually equally well founded if one were to abandon certain preconceived notions 
about physical reality (such as the principle of separability, for example). But they argue that such 
abandonment does not make the phenomena sufficiently intuitive because, among other possible 
complications, it makes the construction of the overarching explanatory framework for the 
understanding of reality impossible (or at least too difficult to be worth the effort).  
Yet, at present the principle approaches have a recurrent explanatory pitfall of their own, one taken 
to be the plague of the pure unification-type explanations in general (Lipton, 2004, p. 7), in the lack 
of answer to what the epistemic state is knowledge about; what exactly in reality is the source of the 
knowledge codified in the epistemic state.51 This is where a clarification of the analogy with the 
example from classical physics above may be useful. Whereas in the classical case the identification 
of the epistemic and ontic states was precluded on practical grounds (due to insensitivity of the 
measuring instruments or the practical limits of computational power), in the quantum case (i.e. 
according to our principle approach) it is precluded on theoretical grounds. The principle approach 
                                                             
51 It is assumed here that having such knowledge would cure the unificationnist type of many ills at once, most 
notable of the weakness in stopping the why-regress (Lipton, 2004) as description of material existents and 
their properties as a source of some phenomena observed about them is taken as a stronger explanatory 
foundation than the claim that a set of abstract principles holds about some phenomena we observe.  
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claims that it is not our lack of knowledge of some local and noncontextual hidden variables, or our 
ability to manipulate those computationally through the formalism, that prevents us from 
interpreting the quantum state as ontic state. They in fact take it (to a varying degree52) as the 
foundational principle of nature that the two states cannot be equated in interpretation of quantum 
theory, but as yet lack a further explanatory account as to why this is so.  
This is not to say that the question is not important. 
Rather, we see the epistemic approach as an unfinished 
project, and this question is the central obstacle to its 
completion. Nonetheless, we argue that even in the 
absence of an answer to this question, a case can be 
made for the epistemic view. The key is that one can 
hope to identify phenomena that are characteristic of 
states of incomplete knowledge regardless of what this 
knowledge is about. (Spekkens, 2007, pp. 032110-3) 
C. A. Fuchs: constraining principles from a deep conviction  
A simple method  
In Fuchs’ programme we could view the claim, rephrased to suit the Spekkens terminology above, 
that ‘quantum states are irreducibly epistemic states’ as one of his foundational constraining 
principles. By respecting the nonlocal nature of the EPR situation Fuchs claims that quantum states 
cannot be ontic states, as if they were separability would be violated as a universal principle (we can 
thus take the expression of separability as another of his foundational principles). Fuchs further 
relies on the pre-communication segment of the teleportation phenomenon to argue that quantum 
states cannot be objective even in principle, and thus must be epistemic and uniquely tied to the 
individual experimenters that employ them. That is, before Alice in the teleportation protocol 
broadcasts her 2bit message no one can even begin to perform the operations that will complete the 
                                                             
52 Due to varying degrees of development and metaphysical commitment that the research programmes 
subsumed here under the umbrella of principle approach currently undertake it is difficult to provide a 
clearcut summary on this point, providing room for discussion to appear in this text as well. Some of the 
approaches considered take the most direct view that the epistemic states are just best rational guesstimates 
of the agents as to the instantaneous value of the relevant properties of the physical state (Fuchs, 2002). This 
is perhaps most akin to the classical analogue, only the preclusion of the identification of the epistemic and 
ontic states is seen as a ‘law of nature’ and not a technical difficulty. Others are much less direct and more 
explicit in claiming only an initial step in development of the satisfactory account, thus choosing to at this stage 
remain “agnostic about the nature of the reality to which the knowledge represented by quantum states 
pertains” (Spekkens, 2007, pp. 032110-2).  
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conversion of the distant state into the outcome of teleportation. And yet, the ontic interpretation 
of the state would expect the material for the conversion to already be in (the distant) place.  
If Alice fails to reveal her information to anyone else in 
the world, there is no one else who can predict [the final 
outcome of the teleportation] with certainty. More 
importantly, there is nothing in quantum mechanics that 
gives the [the power to reveal its ontic state out of 
possible a spectrum of epistemic states]. If Alice does 
not take the time to walk over to it and interact with it, 
there is no revelation. There is only the confidence in 
Alice’s mind that, should she interact with it, she could 
predict the consequence of that interaction. (Fuchs, 
2002, p. 12) 
However, Fuchs’ programme still sees the ‘troublesome’ phenomena as outcomes of imperfect 
interaction between conscious observers and a strangely constructed reality. Though the quantum 
formalism is not a fully objective description of the physical system, it is somehow related to it, 
whilst containing many elements that are dependent on the individual observer. It is the aim of 
Fuchs’s programme to wean the objective from the subjective elements.  
There is something about the world that keeps us from 
ever getting more information than can be captured 
through the formal structure of quantum mechanics. 
Einstein had wanted us to look further – to find out how 
the incomplete information could be completed – but 
perhaps the real question is, “Why can it not be 
completed?” (Fuchs, 2002, p. 11)  
Methodologically, the programme aims to re-derive the quantum formalism whilst ignoring all of its 
ad hoc metaphysical connections (such as what elements of the physical system have to correspond 
to which elements of the formalism, and what happens to the systems upon measurements) and 
respecting only his foundational principle that the states of the formalism are epistemic. In narrative 
terms Fuchs sees the formal states as individual conscious agents’ guesstimates about the possible 
states of the physical system, guesstimates which then have to updated upon each interaction with 
the system (the measurement intervention) in accordance with rational procedures of the Bayesian 
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probability calculus.53 Where the re-derived formalism differs from the historically developed 
‘standard’ quantum formalism, we get a glimpse of the objective characteristics of interaction with 
‘quantum-level’ reality different from what we have come across classically. One such glimpse says:  
The objective content of quantum mechanics (or at least 
part of it) is that if we subjectively set our probabilities 
for the outcomes of [any as-complete-as-possible 
measurement on some segment of the material reality], 
we are no longer free to set them arbitrarily for any 
other [outcome of same or different type of 
measurement]. (Fuchs, Quantum states: What the hell 
are they? (The Post-Växjö Phase Transition), 2002, p. 32) 
Explanation: you mess up and you try to estimate the damage  
We may recall that one of the primary philosophical problems accompanying the development of 
quantum theory was the problem of measurement, i.e. the problem of explaining the collapse of the 
wavefunction during the measurement process. But more importantly, where explanation of the 
phenomena is based on the outcomes of interaction with the physical systems, measurement 
process plays an inexorable role. According to Fuchs, if we believe that the quantum state is rigidly 
bound to the elements of reality we “will never find a way out of the conundrum of 
“unreasonableness” associated with “state-vector collapse at a distance””, i.e. the nonlocal causal 
connection between the separated phenomena (Fuchs, Quantum states: What the hell are they? 
(The Post-Växjö Phase Transition), 2002, p. 164). Fuchs divides the measurement process into two 
parts, each of which is clearly illustrated by the limiting cases. The measurement process thus 
consists of (1) Bayesian conditionalisation and (2) further mental readjustment. (1) is the raw 
collapse of the wave function, the improvement of the ‘guesstimate’ of future measurements based 
on the outcome of the present one. It relies on Bayes’ rule of ‘factorising the fact’ (the observed 
measurement outcome) out of the probability distribution. This is an entirely classical procedure 
that depends on the rational rules of Bayesian statistics and not some hidden characteristic of 
nature. Fuchs calls this the ‘knowledge refinement’.  
                                                             
53 It suffices to say here that Bayesian statistics is a formal mathematical for updating beliefs about future 
chancy outcomes based on the evidence previously gathered. It is the most rational form guesstimating 
available.  
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(2) is a further constriction, specific to quantum theory. It is a theoretical representation of the 
supposed intrinsic sensitivity of reality to experimental interventions. Fuchs calls it the ‘back-
action’54 or ‘feedback’ that the measurement device inflicts on the system being measured, and that 
is dependent on the details of the measurement interaction, individual outcomes of measurement 
and the initial quantum state assigned by the observer. This ‘back-action’ is the specific quantum 
addition that is not found in the classical probability theory and that depends on the observer’s 
rationalised subjective estimate of the consequences of her experimental intervention. Fuchs 
concludes:  
Quantum measurement is nothing more, and nothing 
less, than a refinement and a readjustment of one's 
initial state of belief. (Fuchs, Quantum mechanics as 
quantum information (and only a little more), 2002, p. 
34) 
Thus Fuchs explains the basic interaction with a system in a state that one posses maximal possible 
information about as pure occurrence of the ‘back-action’ of the interaction with a reality sensitive 
to touch. Such a measurement does not provide the observer with any new information, but merely 
affects what she can predict due to the side effects of the experimental intervention. “That is to say, 
there is a sense in which the measurement is solely disturbance” (Fuchs, Quantum mechanics as 
quantum information (and only a little more), 2002, p. 34) 
But more interestingly, in the case of distant part of the system in the EPR situation, the 
experimenter has another limiting case of the two components of the measurement process, the 
refinement of beliefs without any disturbing interaction with the system. There is thus no violation 
of separability as no real change is induced in the system itself, but merely in the experimenters’ 
ascription of a state to the distant system. The change in the quantum state that is assigned to the 
distant system on the basis of such measurement corresponds to the pure (i.e. classical-like) 
Bayesian factorisation without any further ‘mental readjustment’.  
                                                             
54
 The idea of back-action does not originate with (Fuchs, Quantum mechanics as quantum information (and 
only a little more), 2002). See (Valente, 2003) for further bibliography.  
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It is these ‘mental readjustments’ that put Fuchs firmly on the Bohrian train, along with all the 
conceptual problems that may bring. But even before that, we have to note that in ascribing this 
intrinsic and insurmountable sensitivity to reality Fuchs breaks away from the principle approach 
into speculation about the nature of ontology at the quantum level. Yet, this speculation does not 
seem to be better supported than it was in Bohr’s day, i.e. exhibits great resemblance to the 
influence of the “irrational element”. According to Fuchs, the reality itself changes under invasive 
interaction (the measurement), thus we can never repeat the same type of measurement on the 
same system in order to achieve a fully complete description. It appears that in this case the 
constructive speculation does not rest on a satisfactorily complete principle-based explanatory 
account, but is in fact introduced to complete it. It is also not a formally negligible speculation, that 
might come about as a result of an oversight, as one could say about Einstein’s implicit assumption 
about the internal dynamics of measuring rods and clocks (cf. Chapter 1, section 1. 3. 1).  
We thus do not get a sufficiently principle-based explanation of the troublesome phenomena. 
Though Fuchs claims no mysterious interaction between the separated segments of the entangled 
system taken place, he goes on to include a constructive postulate of ‘inherent sensitivity’ into the 
explanatory account. The correlations in the EPR-like situations are a product of the common cause 
that does not violate the separability, but that is, by some natural trickery, forever hidden from us. 
We shall never be able to gain complete knowledge about the initial state of the system, so are 
forced to surprising updates of it (such as the one in EPR situation) when the abstract formalism 
permits it. In the teleportation case, such updates are only possible with the assistance from other 
experimenters.  
We conclude this section with the observation that though initially based on the intuitive 
generalisations from our ‘troublesome’ phenomena, namely that quantum states are inherently 
epistemic; this approach fails to show sufficient coherence to stand against the competing 
constructive approaches. This is largely due to its venture into the constructive domain where it 
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bases the explanation of the phenomena at least in part on the changes of the physical systems 
themselves, which is conceptually on the same level as the constructive approaches. This in the end 
forces it into an explanatorily self-constrained position55 akin to Bohr’s and this is not solid enough 
ground to build explanatory accounts to compete against the causal mechanical account of Chapter 
3. On an ontological side the explanation from Fuchs seems to rest on the narrative of changes to 
primary entities characterised by specific properties, but that only have a statistical existence, i.e. 
can never be claimed to exist (bearing the said properties) with certainty.  
The Clifton-Bub-Halvorson (CBH)56 programme  
A different sub-class of principle approaches is the route that does not start with the epistemic 
interpretation of the quantum state per se, but sets off by looking for more general principles of 
information reception and transfer (via microphysical material world, but not relying on any of its 
particular characteristics). Thus, on the question of nature of quantum states it remains as agnostic 
as possible, this way moving even further from the metaphysical projections (as the quantum state is 
probably closest one can come to the connecting point between the formalism and the existents 
supposedly behind it).  
*…+ the CBH *programme+ should not be understood as 
providing a ‘constructive’ *sic] explanation of the 
quantum formalism, along the lines suggested by Chris 
Fuchs [ (Fuchs, Quantum mechanics as quantum 
information (and only a little more), 2002) …+, but rather 
as a ‘principled’ reconstruction of the theory within a 
suitably general mathematical framework. (Bub, 2008, p. 
15)) 
Thus adopting lessons from the pitfalls of the Fuchs programme (above), the CBH programme makes 
no use of the postulates about the nature of the physical systems employed in producing the 
                                                             
55 Recently, Timpson (Timpson, 2008) argues, rightly, that Fuchs is not a full blown instrumentalist. Fuchs 
remains agnostic about the details of the underlying reality, but is very much committed to its existence. Yet, 
with regards to the reality of the quantum state, i.e. interpretation of the quantum state (an element of the 
formalism) as a formal description of the physical state of the system, he is instrumentalist. That is, he denies 
the reality of the description and yet maintains the usefulness of the quantum state in making predictions 
about future interactions with reality. And that ‘localized’ instrumentalism is what we are concerned with 
here.  
56 Named after R. Clifton, J. Bub and H. Halvorson.  
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‘troublesome’ phenomena that result in the ‘mysterious’ correlations of measurement outcomes. In 
fact, it makes no use of the systems, measurements and outcomes in its derivation of the formalism, 
but focuses on constructing a mathematical description of the relationships between the formal 
expressions used as input and formal expressions for output of such procedures. Thus the 
phenomena to be explained on their view are mathematical structures that result from a coding 
game experimenters play with the lab instruments. No use of the structure of the instruments or 
their ‘objects of observation’ is made, in fact the CBH proponents prefer to call them ‘black boxes’. 
What they show is that if the game is played respecting certain principle constrictions on the moves 
(other than those restrictions that the formalism itself imposes, i.e. the internal mathematical rules) 
the resulting formal structure is sufficiently similar to the formal representation of quantum theory 
with the interpretative assumptions about the nonlocal interaction of the physical systems.  
Here is a brief presentation of the principles in a language that avoids reference to complex algebras 
and connects the content of the principles to the more standard informal presentations of the 
‘theorems’ of quantum theory, as given in (Timpson, 2004, pp. 199-205). The first principle forbids 
superluminal signalling via measurement, and corresponds to the more standard no-signalling via 
entanglement prohibition in standard quantum theory (to be explored in greater detail in section 4. 
3). The principle mandates that the state assigned to the system at B, shall not be affected by any 
operation performed on the distant system A. The second principle in general forbids the 
‘broadcasting; of states, which can be seen as a generalisation of the ‘no-cloning’ restriction 
(applicable only to pure states). Simply put it forbids that a manipulating device takes a system to 
which we assign a certain mixed state and produces as an output two systems A and B, each of 
which will (through some further manipulations of the formalism) have a version of the initial state 
assigned to it. Though the exposition is more technical, intuitively we can understand the ‘no-
cloning’ aspect of the prohibition as forbidding the systematic multiplication of the states assigned 
to systems through manipulations of material measuring instruments. The final principle, the no-bit-
commitment, is even more technical, but following Timpson (2004, p. 203), we can understand it as 
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a formal requirement that provides for the selection of formalisms that do allow entanglement, just 
as the standard (empirically adequate) quantum formalism does. This may be seen as a purely 
methodological move, for if we are trying to derive a formalism from the principles we want to hone 
in on the characteristics (however problematic) of the existing standard formalism, and exclude 
those formal constructions that deviate from it in significant respects.  
In summary the methodological process strives to “derive the basic kinematic features of a 
quantum-theoretic description of physical systems – essentially noncommutativity and 
entanglement – from [the] three fundamental information-theoretic constraints” (Bub, 2004, p. 
241), i.e. from the assumption that we live in the a world in which there are certain constraints on 
the acquisition, representation, and communication of information. Thus, it assumes that what 
defines any theoretical formalism as ‘quantum formalism’ is a certain characteristic algebraic (in 
other words abstract mathematical) structure of what the formalism takes to be observables and 
states. This structure is to be identical to the elements of the traditionally derived quantum 
formalism that are taken to exemplify noncommutativity and entanglement (as above). An example 
of these ‘traditionally derived’ formalisms is standard quantum mechanics of a system with a finite 
number of degrees of freedom represented on a single Hilbert space with a unitary dynamics 
defined by a given Hamiltonian, i.e. the standard university-course formalism of the quantum 
theory.  
So, the methodological starting point in this case is twofold: on the one hand there is the abstract 
mathematical generalisation (some kind of constraint on what it takes for a chunk of formalism to be 
a quantum theoretical formalism), and on the other is the mathematical generalisation of the said 
information-theoretic principles. In terms of ontology, the former has more potential to smuggle in 
some metaphysics than the latter, though (as we shall see later) the latter on its own and in 
combination with the former carries some metaphysical assumptions about the world as well. In 
having to prove the similarities with the more constructive interpretations of the formalism, the CBH 
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proponents have to keep going back to the conceptual framework of systems and properties.57 
Methodologically this is not a ‘sin’ in itself, provided the assumptions are explicated and we can 
keep an eye on them through the development of the formalism (i.e. through its approach to the 
structure of ‘quantum formalism’).  
*…+ if there is no minimum amount of mathematical 
structure shared by all theories, and if any fairy tale can 
count as a legitimate “toy theory” — then it would be 
hopeless to try to derive QM from information theoretic 
principles, or from any other sort of principles for that 
matter. (E.g., why assume that the results of 
measurements are real numbers? Why assume that 
measurements have single outcomes? Why assume that 
the laws of physics are the same from one moment to 
the next?) (Halvorson, On information-theoretic 
characterizations of physical theories, 2004, p. 292)  
CBH do grant existence to physical systems, but it remains unclear just how much individuality (and 
in some respect: independent existence) these things have. The formalism, as derived by CBH, is only 
used to mathematically represent the statistical correlations between ‘measurement’ outcomes. 
Even ‘measurement’ is a problematic term here, for at this stage the measurement involves an 
epistemically rather agnostic situation of black boxes used to derive statistical correlations58 (Bub, 
2004). Yet, Bub also claims that the formalism constructed the CBH way excludes “haecceitist 
theories that associate a primitive ‘thisness’ with physical systems” (Bub, 2004, p. 253) in the 
description of the phenomena.  
To associate the observables of the theoretical formalism with the properties of a physical system, 
as a system that is individuated and does have a primitive ‘thisness’, requires a metaphysical 
                                                             
57 At this stage the CBH projects relies heavily on the standard metaphysically burdened language of (at least) 
minimal interpretation of quantum formalism. Yet, as the presentation of the methodology above tried to 
outline this should not properly be the case, as the CBH approach professes to stay as far away as possible 
from the metaphysical speculations about the nature of the elements of reality behind the ‘troublesome’ (and 
other) phenomena. For the time being we can try to excuse this as an attempt to convince the standard 
practitioners, physicists using the formalism together with the language, of the worth of the newly derived 
formalism, i.e. of its equivalence with quantum formalism. 
58 Bub likens this situation to the one outlined at the beginning of Albert’s (1992 ) book Quantum Mechanics 
and Experience, a familiar example in literature, in which the measurement simply takes “a system in an input 
state *… and produces+ a system in one of two output states, with a certain probability that depends on the 
input state” (Bub, 2004, p. 253).  
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commitment to elements of reality with a ‘mysterious’ nonlocal connection, because of the 
appearance of entangled states. And this contradicts the authors’ deep-seated expectations of 
explanatory ontology.59 Bub quotes Einstein’s letter to Born:  
*…+ whatever we regard as existing (real) should 
somehow be localized in time and space. That is, the real 
in part of space A should (in theory) somehow ‘exist’ 
independently of what is thought of as real in space B. 
When a system in physics extends over the parts of 
space A and B, then that which exists in B should 
somehow exist independently of that which exists in A. 
That which really exists in B should therefore not depend 
on what kind of measurement is carried out in part of 
space A; it should also be independent of whether or not 
any measurement at all is carried out in space A. *…+ 
However, if one abandons the assumption that what 
exists in different parts of space has its own, 
independent, real existence, then I simply cannot see 
what it is that physics is meant to describe. For what is 
thought to be a ‘system’ is, after all, just a convention, 
and I cannot see how one could divide the world 
objectively in such a way that one could make 
statements about parts of it. (Einstein, Letter to M. Born, 
18th March 1948, 1971, pp. 164-165)  
Furthermore, given teleportation and assignment of primitive ‘thisness’ to physical states it is 
possible to devise a hypothetical protocol, such that would allow the separated agents to send 
signals to each other, almost instantaneously and faster than the speed of light, relying on the 
measurement of the distant particle (the state of which will be steered by the operations on the 
proximal particles in the standard teleportation protocol) (Halvorson & Bub, Can quantum 
cryptography imply quantum mechanics? Reply to Smolin, 2008, p. 3). So respecting quantum 
information theory and the phenomenon of teleportation, along with classical (and empirical 
quantum) demands for no superluminal signaling, indicates that the physical states ‘corresponding’ 
to quantum states in the formalism do not have an individuating ‘thisness’. In other words, 
‘teleportation is just a flashy name, but nothing material traverses the distance between the 
                                                             
59 Consider: “*…+ an independence condition for distinct  *spacelike separated+ systems *…+ is taken for granted 
in both classical and quantum mechanics.” (Halvorson & Bub, Can quantum cryptography imply quantum 
mechanics? Reply to Smolin, 2008, p. 1)  
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experimenters. The trick is then to explain what happens that enables the experimenters to know 
(and verify) what they do, and still try to respect the separable existence of material objects.  
Given all this, the authors choose to remain in a precariously suspended state of denying a primitive 
‘thisness’ to physical systems that are a part of the phenomena they aim to explain, and yet to use 
the concept of ‘physical system’ in providing a non-formal account of the phenomena. This brings us 
back to the track of neo-Bohrianism: denying the reference to the terms we are nonetheless forced 
to use in accounting for the phenomena. On the other hand, we lack a positive account of what it is 
that the structured regularities of the CBH formalism correspond to, what the phenomenal structure 
that is mapped by the algebraic structure of the formalism is. Despite the precariousness of their 
position, the CBH claim that the most rational position to take is one of cautious agnosticism about 
any metaphysical commitments (despite being forced to use a metaphysically richer language than, 
perhaps, they would like, in order to communicate to the physics community). This is because they 
see the ontic commitments and interpretations of the formalism beyond what is given above, as 
extensions of a quantum theory for the purposes of mechanical visualization, explanation and 
understanding. But as the formalisms associated with such extensions cannot produce additional 
empirical evidence60 for the additional  ‘mechanical elements’ over and above the evidence used to 
produce statistical correlations predicted by the bare formalism of a quantum theory, they see it as 
most rational to withhold metaphysical commitment in any direction.61  
Still, one might wonder whether this is not putting things the wrong way round: surely we should 
use some theory about the structure of matter to show how the information-theoretic constraints 
                                                             
60 Albert, 1992 also seems to imply that there are metaphysical commitments of different interpretations of 
the quantum formalism that cannot be decided amongst by experiment, i.e. that are empirically equivalent. 
(Albert, 1992 , p. 189)  
61 Though on the whole he finds a lot of problems in the CBH approach, and Bub’s further elaboration of the 
philosophy behind it, even Duwell (shortly to be presented criticising the CBH approach) in the end expresses 
sympathy towards this metaphysical supposition. He says we can always prefer one theory over another 
(though, note, Bub is actually talking about theory extensions from the common core), but that it is not 
rational to have a cognitive state as extreme as belief that one theory is true and its empirically equivalent 
rivals false (Duwell, Re-conceiving quantum theories in terms of information-theoretic constraints, 2007, p. 
198) [my emphasis].  
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arise. Not so, according to CBH, for that would not be respecting the full metaphysical implications 
of the principle methodology. The principle methodology, as explicated in the Bub (2008) article, 
does not seek to fight head to head with the constructive alternatives, but redefine the battleground 
altogether. This is not a difference between a top-down and a bottom-up approach, but one of 
radically different ontological world-views. Not just a list of what does and does not exist, but also 
how that which exists behaves and interacts (e.g. whether an electromagnetic field requires an 
aether as a carrier, and whether all rods and clocks have ultimately fixable positions relative to the 
aether). This is what the CBH want by requesting that information be understood as a new physical 
primitive. The theoretical formalism then builds on this assumption:  
Quantum mechanics represents the discovery that there 
are new sorts of information sources and 
communication channels in nature (represented by 
quantum states), and the theory is about the properties 
of these information sources and communication 
channels. (Bub, 2008, p. 14)  
*…+the claim that quantum mechanics is about quantum 
information—that quantum mechanics is a principle 
theory of information (in the sense in which Einstein 
regarded special relativity as a principle theory)—and 
that this physical notion of information is not reducible 
to the properties of particles or fields, is not to be 
construed as the claim that quantum mechanics is about 
observers and their epistemological concerns, *…+ nor 
that the basic stuff of the world is informational in an 
intentional sense. Rather, the claim is that the lesson of 
modern physics is that a principle theory is the best one 
can hope to achieve as an explanatory account of 
quantum phenomena. (Bub, 2008, pp. 15-16) 
Explanation 
According to the CBH programme we should not be trying to explain what happened mechanically in 
the ‘troublesome phenomena’, as we don’t even have sufficient tools to properly account for the 
interaction between the object-systems, the instruments used to observe them and ourselves (or at 
least the hypothetical experimenters).  We should instead view the situation as containing 
epistemological black boxes, which may in part be successfully described by some other physical 
theories, but not in terms that account for the ‘troublesome’ measurement outcomes. The black 
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boxes in turn produce signals, that can be formally accounted for by the theory, and based on which 
establish signal correlations between different (and possibly distant) black boxes. The theoretical 
formalism allows the experimenters to attach some probabilities to certain signal correlations and 
not others. If the black boxes are ‘real objects’ (whatever they may be made of) it seems certain 
information transmission protocols are ‘permitted’ by reality and others are not (Bub, 2004).  
But if the game of predicting signals is all that we can safely say to be doing in ‘quantum 
experiments’ then, Bub claims, the quantum formalism (‘quantum theory’ in Bub’s terms) provides a 
theory about representation and manipulation of information, and not a theory about the ways in 
which non-classical waves of particles move, or the ways in which the universes split and recombine. 
As, on the CBH approach, the representation and manipulation of information is constrained by the 
information-theoretic principles, accounting for those principles becomes the fundamental 
explanatory aim of (this segment of) physics. This newly discovered aim has not produced many 
outcomes as yet, but the shift of focus marks an important departure for the provision of 
explanation from contemporary physical theories. Yet the primary focus in this thesis is on the 
ontological characteristics, so we will want to know what can be deduced about ‘what is out there’ 
from the constraints on the representation and manipulation of information that hold in our world.  
The explanation for the impossibility of a [description in 
terms of a classical conceptual framework] then lies in 
the constraints on the representation and manipulation 
of information that hold in our world. (Bub, 2004, p. 259) 
 Of course the ambitious aim lacks the sturdy output as yet, but Bub warns that we must “recognize 
information as a new sort of physical entity, not reducible to the motion of particles or fields” (Bub, 
2004, p. 262). In principle this does satisfy the first question about the ontological characteristics of 
explanations from this type of contemporary quantum theory, namely that they should concern a 
new kind of ‘stuff’: information. Yet, this is a short-lived satisfaction for we are essentially changing 
categories altogether here. As will be discussed subsequently, it is disputable whether we can think 
of information as stuff at all. But even if we could, this is radically different stuff from our more 
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familiar matter. And yet, we are by no means replacing matter with the new stuff (this would be a 
welcome and simple situation, then we could simply compare the explanatory success of the two). 
But as the above section on metaphysics indicates, the CBH are not suggesting that the world is 
‘made of information’, or that material physical systems and the measuring instruments we use do 
not exist in material sense.62 To explain what is going on in the world, what produces the 
phenomena we experience, we still need some account of the physical matter; or some account as 
to why we think there is a material world that produces phenomena in us in the first place.  
But in the narrow domain of experience that is dominated by the prediction and measurement 
games of quantum physics, we have thus far been mistaken in thinking that the games we 
successfully played allowed us a glimpse of the structure of physical reality. We must now wake up 
to the fact, the CBH claim, that quantum physics was never about constituents of reality but about 
information manipulation. But information, that new stuff, is somehow linked to reality, and by 
investigating the link we can gain some understanding about the nature of reality, though probably 
(if the CBH theory derivation and assumptions are right) not about the mechanical aspects of its 
nature. There seem to be two possible routes to follow (which we shall investigate in greater detail 
in Chapter 4): (1) to sufficiently modify, or even replace the ‘extended stuff’ explanatory 
conceptualization (as perhaps presenting all ‘extended stuff’ as an illusion reducible to something 
else); or (2) to find ways to reduce the properties of the new stuff (information) to those of the 
primary qualities of the ‘extended stuff’. There is as yet no suggestion in literature as to how the 
information-stuff and the extended stuff can coexist at the fundamental level. And as a way of 
introduction to discussion in Chapter 4, let us recall the notion of depth of explanation, briefly 
introduced in Chapter 1 (cf. (Hitchcock & Woodward, 2003)), that stresses the importance of the 
                                                             
62 Though they do suggest a quibble with a ‘primitive thisness’ of those instruments, and their individuation 
may end up in some non-standard, albeit material, form. It remains an important open question how the 
proponents of this principle approach propose to connect the information-oriented research with the ‘material 
foundation’ of the common conceptual scheme.  
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detailed account of the controllable variations in objects that the changes to be explained happen to. 
What replaces the objects in information-ontology will be important for discussion in Chapter 4.     
2. 3. Principle approaches: problems and objections  
The types of objections to different stages of the derivation of principle versions of quantum theory 
can be divided into those that object to the principle methodology (either that the adherents do not 
truly stick to it, or that principle methodology cannot be a valid road to explanation), to the 
metaphysical shyness (seen, perhaps, as deceit or trickery) and to explanatory robustness and lack of 
attention to detail. We shall try to survey all three types of them, though often the critique of one 
type is interconnected with another or they entail one another. The common point of most criticism 
can be summed up as the strong conviction that only constructive accounts can be sufficiently 
explanatory, and that no convincing explanation can stop at the principle stage without outlining the 
details of the metaphysics of the causal processes behind the phenomena.  
Methodology 
Most vociferous criticism of the methodology of the principle approach, focused on the CBH version 
here unless explicitly stated otherwise, is that following Einstein’s principle methodology of the 1905 
Special Relativity derivation is unjustified in the current state of research in physics. Namely, Brown 
and Timpson (2006) claim that Einstein’s own approach of 1905 represents a victory of pragmatism 
over explanatory depth that was only justified by the context of the chaotic state of physics at the 
start of the 20th century. They aim to stress that taking Einstein’s 1905 approach as a role model fails 
to appreciate his own admission that such strategy was “a policy of despair, and represented a 
strategic retreat from the more desirable but, in his view temporarily unavailable constructive 
approach” (Brown & Timpson, 2006, p. 31). It seems Einstein never wanted to be followed in this 
respect, though it will take some further argument that he never should be (i.e. that his 
recommendation should be obeyed).  
It seems to me too that a physical theory can be 
satisfactory only when it builds up its structure from 
elementary foundations. *…+ If the Michelson-Morley 
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experiment had not put us in the worst predicament, no 
one would have perceived the [special] relativity theory 
as a (half) salvation. (Einstein, 1995, p. 50) (bold 
emphasis mine)  
Brown and Timpson proceed to explicate just why the special theory of relativity is only a ‘half 
salvation’. They illustrate how a much more satisfactory (though computationally more laborious) 
explanation of the workings of the single piston heat engine undergoing a Carnot cycle can be 
provided by statistical mechanics than by thermodynamics. Most notably they criticise the fact that 
the thermodynamical approach for failing to answer why the perpetual motion machines cannot 
exist, though it explicitly forbids them through its foundational principles. “What this theory gains in 
practicality and in the evident empirical solidity of its premises, it loses in providing physical insight” 
(Brown & Timpson, 2006, p. 32). And such theories are only acceptable in special circumstances, and 
then explicitly as temporary solutions until an overarching constructive theory is produced (“When 
we say that we have succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes, we invariably mean 
that a constructive theory has been found which covers the processes in question” (Einstein, 1954, 
p. 228)). So for our principle approach the proponents should demonstrate that the situation in the 
quantum theory and the explication of phenomena from quantum information theory is akin to the 
“worst predicament” of the Michelson-Morley experiment (cf. (Einstein, 1995), the quotation given 
above).  
And Brown and Timpson rightly pick at segments of CBH’s reading of history of Special Relativity 
(Clifton, Bub, & Halvorson, 2003) that are contentious in the philosophy of physics community today 
(cf. (Brown & Timpson, 2006, pp. 36-38), for a discussion of whether Minkowskian geometry should 
be seen as an algorithm for kinematic effects that require explanation through Einstein’s theory or 
whether Minkowskian geometry is itself a constructive part of the special theory of relativity). Yet 
their own careful and thorough analysis seems to suggest that it was the impeding problems of 
quantum theory, namely the wave-particle duality which threatened to preclude a formation of a 
theoretically (i.e. precisely mandated by the mathematical formalism) sound conceptual framework 
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for the electromagnetic and mechanical phenomena, that prompted Einstein to adopt the principle 
approach. Namely, he could not envisage the metaphysical conceptual framework that can 
‘reproduce’ the phenomena in the climate of wave-particle duality, and these concerns over 
metaphysics pushed him to look for a solution in an unlikely place. He searched for a theory that 
could ‘reproduce’ the phenomena, even if all of the previously adopted metaphysics has to be 
abandoned (as it was undergoing a revision). If these difficulties with quantum theory metaphysics 
still give reason for concern today (as we have been trying to outline above), does that not give 
some impetus for a principle approach, despite Brown and Timpson’s objections?  
Thermodynamics was in Einstein’s eyes the only theory to reproduce the phenomena without the 
troublesome metaphysics at the time, for whatever the speculations about the structure of matter, 
he could not envisage a situation in which its phenomenological principles were shown not to hold. 
So he opted for a methodological guidance from thermodynamics and searched for those aspects of 
the phenomena in electromagnetism (the domain of the ‘troublesome’ Michelson-Morley 
experiment) whose conceptual formulation could survive whatever structural hypothesis proposed 
for their constructive reduction.  
*…+the speed of light is independent of the speed of the 
source and isotropic – something every ether theorist 
took for granted when the frame in question is taken to 
be the fundamental ether rest frame and something 
which remarkably Einstein felt would survive whatever 
the eventual quantum theory of radiation would reveal. 
(Brown & Timpson, 2006, p. 36) 
Thus, it seems that despite the potentially erroneous “CBH historical fable” it is not entirely 
unjustified to treat the current situation in quantum theory as one where doubts about the 
metaphysical foundation for a unified conceptualisation of reality prompt for a principle speculation: 
for a search for those aspects of the phenomena that can survive any eventual construction of the 
explanatory metaphysics.  It is of course, worth noting the warning from Brown and Timpson that 
even following the empirical success of Special Theory of Relativity, Einstein remained uneasy about 
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the “sin” of the role that the ideal rods and clocks played in the theory (Brown & Timpson, 2006, p. 
36). Special relativity, in Einstein’s own words, divided the world into “(1) measuring rods and clocks, 
(2) all other things, e.g. the electromagnetic field, the material point etc.” (Einstein, 1951, p. 59). 
Einstein admits that this is unacceptable in the long run, but also that it was a necessary, though 
unwanted, consequence of the derivation of the theory from the generalised phenomenological 
principles. In some sense, this is warning us that principle theories cannot in and of themselves 
(without further metaphysical speculation and theoretical construction) yield their own constructive 
replacements. But it is also giving us a historical example of how, despite the self-confessed 
conceptual shortfalls, principle theories can make advances in conceptualisation of the explanatory 
framework (even if, in places, pointing to its inherent explicit shortfalls).  
A situation present in the quantum theory today, including the phenomena in the domain of 
quantum information theory, can be seen as justifying the return to the drawing board and a search 
for the foundational principles (as phenomenological generalisations). Namely it is difficult to see a 
conceptual framework for the theory that will combine the requirement of separability of physical 
systems and locality of physical processes, with the demonstrated phenomena such as teleportation. 
We might be prompted to search for those aspects of the phenomena that are best positioned to 
survive any future constructive speculation. Thus, a principle approach may be called for, though it is 
by no means clear which of the offered principle approaches it should be. But even if the CBH story 
(Clifton, Bub, & Halvorson, 2003) of Einstein’s special theory of relativity furnishing an acceptable 
principle interpretation for the already existing empirically adequate Minkowskian formalism is not 
historically correct, it can be dismissed as an unsatisfactory analogy, without questioning the 
justification for the overall principle project.  
Let us turn briefly to the criticism that in the proposed principle approaches (most notably that of 
CBH) the foundational principles do not correspond to the requirement of simple, intuitive 
generalisation of the key aspects of the phenomena. Most notably Duwell (2007) claims that the 
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supposed natural empirically discovered constraints of natural processes (in this case information-
theoretic processes) are not empirically discovered constraints at all. Namely, if the foundational 
principles are to be mathematically expressible generalisations of the phenomena, what exactly are 
the phenomena that the information-theoretic constraints generalise? Duwell claims that the 
evidence for the constraints is indirect and challengeable, for they are not unshakeable enduring 
straightforwardly observable characteristics of the phenomena, but are mere predictions of the 
standard theory. But then he goes on to say that such is the nature of any constraint, which 
constrains what is possible and cannot be tested directly (i.e. we cannot test how well we have 
recognised what is possible, as the impossible – the other side of the constraints on the possible – is 
not empirically/epistemically accessible at all, being physically impossible).  Predictions, Duwell says, 
can be verified more straightforwardly, but constraints can’t. However, in the light of the 
methodological discussion on whether to follow Einstein’s example of the 1905 Special Relativity 
derivation, this criticism applies across the board for Einstein too had no means of testing whether 
the constraints he ‘imposed’ on the natural processes truly hold out in the world63 (until they are 
demonstrably broken, that is). The situation can be taken as far back as Einstein’s methodological 
role model, thermodynamics, for there too the fundamental principles of the theory are the 
constraints on the unfolding of natural processes, and this is precisely where the sturdiness of the 
theory lies.  
Yet it is worth following this complaint a little further. The CBH constraints (unlike the ‘Fuchs 
negative principles’) do not appear to be empirical/phenomenal, nor straightforward. Perhaps the 
previous discussion showed, though, that their most remarkable characteristic should be their 
strength in the light of potential changes of the constructive structure that they might some day be 
reduced to. They must be the characteristics of the natural process that we expect will never 
                                                             
63 Think for example of the light postulate that has no direct verification, and where the debate about the 
conventionality of simultaneity (and thus the isotropic spread of the light wave) is still open in the philosophy 
of physics.  
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disappear as ‘unreal’ from our explanations of the phenomena.64 For example, the ban on 
superluminal information transfer via measurement is one such sturdy constraint, the one that 
seems to hide the deeply entrenched expectation of the separability behind it. But the ban on bit 
commitment would not seem even to many physicists as a physically necessary characteristic of 
reality (though it might be).65  
Though this would be leaning away from the direct proscription by Einstein to look for the 
unchangeable characteristics of the phenomena, adoption of a mathematical formalism could help 
here, for we may find that some ‘sturdy’ characteristics are most economically expressed formally, 
even if this makes them less accessible to a wider audience. In a theory that aims to account not just 
for what people see (like maybe length contraction theory might be expected to do, be it a 
dynamical account through structure or a phenomenological account through principles), but also 
for what they get after manipulating instruments in accordance with their expectations of what they 
should have (could have?) gotten, it may not be so preposterous to introduce fundamental 
principles expressed in terms of some shorthand or mathematical formalism. But even if this were 
granted, Duwell objects to the choice of the mathematical framework that the constraints are 
situated in (Duwell, Re-conceiving quantum theories in terms of information-theoretic constraints, 
2007, p. 184). He, rightly, expects the mathematical framework, the formalism,  to be neutral 
regarding the choice of physical ontology to accompany the eventual quantum formalism. But, as 
Spekkens (2007) illustrates, the mathematical framework and the constraints are capable of yielding 
                                                             
64 We could for example liken them to primary qualities, namely the famous Cartesian derivation of the 
extension of the wax as its unchangeable quality (in Meditations). Unlike the secondary qualities that do not 
retain their phenomenal sturdiness when subjected to the explanation of what is really going on, i.e. 
secondary qualities as essentially dispositional and unreal.  
65 Duwell is in fact even more critical, he says the constraints only hold from the perspective of standard 
quantum mechanics, but not from that of other quantum theories (Duwell, Re-conceiving quantum theories in 
terms of information-theoretic constraints, 2007, p. 199). There is no room to enter that discussion here, but 
from the rest of the text it will become evident that this claim is tied to an erroneous assumption that the CBH 
argument starts from the ‘standard quantum mechanics’ and not the bare formalism common to all theories. 
Perhaps the warning by Halvorson and Bub (2008) that the CBH version of the theory is not developed in 
isolation from ‘theoretical context’ can be interpreted the Duwell way, but it needn’t. The context can likewise 
be provided by the empirical results and the background assumptions about physical reality in general (such as 
is the one of separablity) without subscribing to any particular interpretation of the quantum formalism 
beforehand.  
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non-quantum theories, so the choice of formalism needs to be strengthened so as to exclude 
unwanted theories, such as the toy theory of Spekkens (2007). It remains an open problem of the 
programme whether all the possible, but unwanted, toy theories should be excluded by further 
modifications of the choice of mathematical framework (which will inevitably affect the choice of the 
metaphysical assumptions that go with it), or whether we should find what are reasonable 
constraints for the formulation of physical theories and rule them out on grounds of those.  
Part of the answer to this question is given in Halvorson and Bub’s response to Smolin’s criticism of 
the CBH methodology (Halvorson & Bub, Can quantum cryptography imply quantum mechanics? 
Reply to Smolin, 2008). Smolin proposes to derive a mathematical formalism from the information-
theoretic constraints that will not be the quantum formalism sought by CBH (Smolin, 2003). 
However, Halvorson and Bub swiftly respond that it was never the intention of the authors of the 
CBH approach to take the constraints in isolation from any theoretical (assuming this to mean 
physical, as well) context. Halvorson and Bub indeed acknowledge a whole host of explicit and 
implicit background assumptions (some of which have been considered here) that contribute to the 
particular derivation of the quantum formalism, and do not result in an altogether abstract 
mathematical game.66  
Metaphysics  
As has been indicated above, and in the previous chapter, every principle approach carries with it 
some metaphysical assumptions that can point to the search for a more constructive conceptual 
framework, so it is worth investigating the objections to the metaphysics of the proposed principle 
approaches. But the approach of CBH has some even more provocative and explicit metaphysical 
commitments, namely the claim that a quantum theory should primarily be viewed as theory of 
information processing in ‘the quantum world’, and that information should be introduced as the 
new primitive in physics. This claim rests on a deeper principle that when mechanical theories (in 
                                                             
66 They, in fact, go further to find and point out more technical problems with Smolin’s account, which make 
his mathematical formalism unacceptable as any sort of physical theory, but those details are beyond the 
scope of this discussion.  
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this case theories of everything material and non-informational, from particles to waves) fail to show 
empirical supremacy over the metaphysically more conservative ones, then the latter should be 
preferred. A further step then requires that the representation and manipulation of information be 
recognised as the appropriate aim of physics (or the quantum segment of it).  
It is the deeper principle that is seen as problematic. Depending on different formulations, different 
readings of it in the literature, it either rests on the bare quantum formalism, or the more (though 
not much more) meaty ‘standard theory’. If Bub’s deeper methodological principle rests on the 
‘standard (quantum) theory’ as the starting point for validating metaphysical speculations of other 
theoretical interpretations, then Duwell’s (2007) criticism (explicitly credited to (Timpson, 2004)) 
that the CBH start from minimal metaphysical expectations of interpretative ‘standard quantum 
mechanics’ and not the bare mathematical formalism stands. Namely, what right do we have, other 
than historical contingency, for taking the ‘standard (quantum) theory’ as the basis for all 
metaphysical speculation; and without such right any other interpretation that is empirically 
adequate can be taken as the yardstick against which to measure the alternatives. On the other 
hand, if Bub did not have the whole package of the ‘standard theory’ in mind, but barely the 
formalism that is supposedly shared by (is common to) all the interpretations, then there is a clear 
reason to prefer it to the metaphysical speculations.  
It is a categorical difference between the bare formalism, a mathematical tool, an abstraction, and 
all the other segments of particular interpretations (including the ‘standard’ one). The latter are not 
formalisms (or parts of the formalism), nor an abstraction, but are metaphysical conceptual 
frameworks built around the bare formalism in order to provide an explanation, or at least some sort 
of visualisation, of the physical processes corresponding to the mathematical representation. Fuchs’ 
programme above also seems to rest on the assumption that there is a common formal 
mathematical core of all different quantum theories. CBH’s search for a unique mathematical 
framework that would cover all the classical and quantum theories, and yield quantum ones through 
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the introduction of the constraining principles, strongly suggests that there is in the background an 
expectation that a common mathematical formalism can be found in all quantum theories. 
Assumptions though do not amount to a proof, so it remains an explicitly open question whether 
principle approach authors recognise a common formalism in all quantum theories, whether such 
formalism can be separated from the theories so that the remainder can be compared between 
different interpretations, and whether Bub is relying on this assumption when using his deeper 
methodological principle.  
Lacking the answer to the above, we can search Bub’s writing to find whether he takes the ‘bare 
formalism’ or the whole ‘standard theory’ as the starting point. In the very same section that Duwell 
takes passages for his criticism from, Bub says:  
Note that the argument here is not that it is never 
rational to believe a theory over an empirically 
equivalent rival: the methodological principle I am 
appealing to is weaker than this. (Bub, 2004, p. 260), my 
emphasis 
We can take this to be a strong indication, along with perhaps methodological errors67 pointed out 
by Brown and Timpson (2006) above, that Bub does not imply that ‘standard (quantum) theory’ 
takes a privileged position as a starting point, but that it is the bare theoretical formalism (in itself 
insufficient to be taken as a theory, even a minimal one) that is common to all quantum 
theories/interpretations and thus worthy of the privileged position. Of course, Bub could be 
mistaken about there being such bare formalism, a distillate available from all 
theories/interpretations, but that, as is indicated above, even Duwell leaves as an open question.68 
                                                             
67 That CBH authors think Einstein starts with the ready made formalism provided by Minkowski, for which his 
special theory provides an interpretation.  
68 Duwell (2007, pp. 186-187) does actually recognise a problem vaguely along these lines, and sets off to 
rectify it by looking for conditions that might make one theory a foundation (or a common core segment) for 
the other, but does not open the discussion over common mathematical formalism. Timpson on the other 
hand is happy to accept the existence of the bare formalism and divides the quantum theories into three 
groups. Those that stick as closely as possible to the bare formalism (instrumentalist and (sic) Everett 
interpretations), those that appeal to non-unitary dynamics as modifications of the formalism (dynamical 
collapse á-la-GRW), and those that add extra metaphysical structure to the bare formalism (Bohm theory, 
hidden variable theories and some modal interpretations).  
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However, even supposing that Bub is justified in holding on to agnosticism about the metaphysics 
behind the quantum phenomena, and preferring his own metaphysically agnostic theory over those 
that dare to speculate, there are problems with the ontological commitments of his approach.  
Namely, what is to be made of Bub’s use of concepts of ‘system’ (or more precisely, ‘physical 
system’) and black box, in accounting for the troublesome quantum phenomena. On the subject of 
black boxes, Duwell is precise and devastatingly critical: these are not metaphysical black boxes, 
objects that we cannot now but might be able to one day, take apart and come to know better. They 
are ‘epistemological’ black boxes, meaning we can observe and take them apart, just as physicists 
have been doing ever since they have been constructing the measuring instruments, but that (due to 
the guiding principle we have adopted) we cannot speculate the ultimate nature of (Duwell, Re-
conceiving quantum theories in terms of information-theoretic constraints, 2007, p. 188). On a 
certain level our observation of the measuring instrument itself (not the physical system in the 
measuring process) will hit the ‘quantum wall’, will run into a constructive speculation, and because 
such speculations are banned, we will simply choose agnosticism about the whole thing full stop.  
The metaphysical extent of this ‘whole thing’ is virtually endless, for there is no incontestable barrier 
between the measuring instrument, the rest of the world and myself, save for the implicit 
assumption of the mind-body dualism that allows me to escape the measuring instrument, at least 
at the level of consciousness. By epistemological black box, Bub seems to mean, that we can know 
what the thing does in terms of input and output, whilst remaining completely agnostic about where 
it is, how big it is, and what it is made of. Strong adherence to the methodological aim of dedicating 
physics to information manipulation and ‘investigation’ is all that is supposed to stop us from taking 
the objects at hand apart, nonetheless.69 
                                                             
69
 This is no trivial matter for such adherence us attainable for those who accept from the start that taking the 
‘black boxes’ apart has nothing to do with explaining the ‘troublesome’ correlation-based phenomena. But if 
the ‘black boxes’ are not to be taken apart, then either there is never to be an overall reduction of the 
information ontology onto the ontology of extended matter, or the reduction should be directed towards 
some other segment of material reality (though it is hard to see what that would   
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But it is then only a minute step from accepting such view to committing to the CBH metaphysical 
speculation that the information is the newly discovered physical primitive and that quantum theory 
is our best theory about that. On the other hand, Duwell says that taking the environmental 
decoherence as the only joint segment of different quantum theories and thus not susceptible to 
agnosticism about metaphysics is not a safe road to take. He claims that there is evidence that 
environmental decoherence may not be sufficient to recover our experience of the world ( (Duwell, 
Re-conceiving quantum theories in terms of information-theoretic constraints, 2007, p. 188); 
referring to (Bacciagaluppi, 2004)). More recently Duwell (2008) suggests a technical account of how 
information can be analysed as an abstract entity, short of awarding it the status of substance, 
where substance is a general form of the material ‘stuff’. Now that goes some way in helping the 
principle approach of CBH (though Duwell does not explicitly refer to that particular research 
programme) lay its ontological commitments in the open. It is not for us to evaluate the details of 
this proposal, but a few remarks that bear on its potential for provision of information are in order.  
As abstract entity quantum information is not subject to change, or rather it possesses not durable 
changeable properties that would allow it to withstand identity under change. It must also not be 
regarded as a property (an abstract property akin to kinds or universals) of the underlying material 
ontology, as the Duwell analysis (relying on further technical distinctions in (Timpson, 2004)) 
explicitly shows it to fall short of the requirements for a substance or a property of material 
substance. Yet it goes some way to addressing the troublesome phenomena, by firstly disentangling 
them from the problems of separablity violations by extended matter, and secondly showing that 
from a purely (and again technically) informational aspect their troublesome phenomena dissolve as 
they are in no way reliant on spatial extension or location of the information-entity. The latter in fact 
has no pretence to such grounding. Of course, as soon as we would try to treat the information as 
the new property of material substratum, the worries about separability violation would return. This 
difficulty in tying up (one such) proposed information ontology with material ontology point two 
feature interesting from the perspective of explanation. Due to its resistance to alterations of 
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properties, abstract entity information (if that were the paradigm we adopted) cannot feature in the 
explanations of the causal mechanical type. Duwell therefore advocates that “explanations of the 
quantum phenomena, if provided by the quantum information theory” (Duwell, 2008, p. 215), 
feature only in the unification type explanations. The unification of course should be provided by the 
phenomenological status of their constraining principles.  
A brief objection, to be elaborated in greater detail in the discussion in the final chapter is in order 
here. Supposing we follow the suggested Duwell route, or some methodologically similar, two 
objections arise, especially in comparison to the more candid constructive explanations of the next 
chapter. The unification explanations of the type proposed above would be extremely blunt about 
removing the troublesome aspects of the phenomena, not really making it clear how we came to see 
the phenomena as troublesome in the first place (except by simply saying we were constantly in 
error about what the object of physics at this level of reality should be). Tied in with that is the 
observation that they hardly even point towards the connection to objects whose changes in the 
material world lead to the appearance of the troublesome phenomena. And that is the truly 
interesting question: what is the link to the material foundation for the troublesome phenomena.  
 The question remains whether Einstein’s guideline above: take only what you can be confident will 
not be affected by future metaphysical speculation, can help us out in this segment as well. Can we 
safely assume that whatever constructive explanation we may some day come up with for the 
behaviour of systems and apparatuses in the measuring process, they will always behave so as to 
have some input and some output?  
On the face of it, it is not such a bad assumption, given that we are looking for something, anything, 
that survives the withdrawal from metaphysical speculation. We can never expect to ‘see’ directly 
into the measuring process at the extension level of the quantum phenomena, but there will always 
be some input and some output of the process. The only problem is, there is hardly any physical 
process that cannot be characterised under input-output principle, yet we have tried and have 
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succeeded to find physical theories of greater precision than ‘rubbish in, rubbish out’ model. We 
have to postpone settling this discussion for the final chapter.  
There is a further complication even for the assumption that the formalism is a mere calculational 
device, that the formalism is informationally incomplete (Maudlin, Completeness, supervenience 
and ontology, 2007, p. 3155), as suggested in Fuchs’s approach. In the troublesome phenomena, 
such as the EPR situation, the calculational device tells us that had things been different on the 
proximal side of the experiment, so they would have been on the other, distant side. If this is further 
coupled with recognition that the proximal outcome is a result of chance, an inherently 
unpredictable outcome of intervention in nature (or even, to strengthen the argument, a chancy 
choice of parameter to be measured), then we know things could have been different even with all 
the causal antecedents the same (i.e. our initial instrumental codification).70 And, so Maudlin 
(Maudlin, 2002, pp. 146-148) argues, we get a counterfactual-supporting causal connection between 
the material outcomes on two sides of the experiment which cannot be explained by a common 
cause. Thus, even though the material existents are not described by the formalism of the theory, 
they do present a situation which cannot be explained by a common material cause for the two sides 
of the experiment. Our experimenters’ guesstimates seem to still rest on the mysterious non-local 
connection between the material existents about which they have been formulated. More generally, 
it seems that any epistemic interpretation of the formalism that presupposes it has some direct links 
to the states of the world (however unpredictable and partial these links may be) will have to endow 
those states with non-local causal connections that violate the separability principle. If, on the other 
hand, holding on to material separability was one of the starting points of the particular principle 
                                                             
70 Of course, this assumes the analysis of causation based on support for the counterfactual situations, which 
there is no room to quarrel with here. Nonetheless, it serves as an indication of the difficulties that the Fuchs 
programme comes across, but that the CBH programme can hope to avoid.  
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approach (in this case Fuchs’) that approach would appear to fail purely on the grounds of lack of 
internal consistency.71  
More recently, Brown (private correspondence) objects to the notion of the evolution of the 
wavefunction (or state-ascription) in the long intervals between the measurement interactions. Why 
should the conscious agents expect their expectations (guesstimates) about the interactions with 
reality to change of their own accord in the intervals that they are not interacting (and not even 
planning to) with that very reality. Metaphysical commitments in Fuchs’ response (private 
correspondence) clearly come about here again, strengthening the above criticism that separability 
violations cannot be avoided on this approach after all. In simple terms, the issue is why the state 
ascription, the guesstimate, changes with the formally calculated evolution of the wavefunction 
overnight whilst the experimenters are sleeping and are thus not likely to induce any unpredictable 
reactions into the super-sensitive reality. And Fuchs replies that something is, after all, changing 
about the material system overnight and the experimenters commitments are update in the 
morning to stay true to that commitment. He falls back on calling for the treatment of the quantum 
state as epistemic to be an unimpeachable dictum from which the further research programme 
should proceed, without at this stage providing an answer to worries about what in reality compels 
the experimenters to make the necessary overnight updates.  
Explanation  
What is the explanation of the material (or otherwise) foundation for the ‘troublesome’ phenomena 
to be extracted from the principle approaches, individually and in general? Following Einstein’s 
model principle theories do have embarrassing features (despite their empirical sturdiness), such as 
Einstein’s privileged rods and clocks were. They are also only an interim step towards a more general 
constructive explanatory account. But for such an account to be possible, there has to be an 
                                                             
71
 It has recently been suggested in Timpson (2008) that Fuchs’ programme makes no explicit (and formal) 
demands for the adherence to the principle of separability. Whilst this is strictly true, the narrative 
argumentation for the development of the new formalism from the principles, especially in the original 
proposals by Fuchs (2001)), relies on the unpalatability of explanations of phenomena that allow for the 
violations of separability.  
101 
 
empirically testable speculation about the limits of the principle theory, a constructive account has 
to provide a situation that needn’t necessarily falsify the principle theory, but can show where to go 
beyond it. Bub, and Brown and Timpson agree that the theory of Brownian motion provided such 
superior metaphysical projection in the case of statistical mechanics: it allowed molecules to be 
directly counted and demonstrated the limits of validity of thermodynamics ( (Bub, 2004); (Brown & 
Timpson, 2006)).  
Yet Bub seems to claim that there is no road beyond quantum theory, principle derived quantum 
theory that is agnostic about the mechanical structure behind the phenomena, that such advance is 
precluded in principle by all the empirically equivalent quantum theories (perhaps even by their 
common core, quantum formalism). For the case of the CBH programme Duwell concludes:  
[Though] no positive claims are made about what the 
quantum otology is, Bub thinks that it is not hidden 
variables, and no matter what it is, it is beyond the scope 
of physics to investigate it. Hence, quantum mechanics 
ought to be regarded as a principle theory of 
information. (Duwell, 2007, p. 194)  
Yet there seems to be a missing step here: how come that a particular derivation of the bare 
formalism imposes any particular interpretation of that formalism? Given that CBH manage to derive 
what is some core formalism of all quantum theories, we must examine further steps that lead them 
to a particular interpretation. Of course, there is the deep principle of withholding judgement on 
metaphysical issues. And then there is the further claim that withholding judgment legitimises the 
hypothesis that (quantum) information is the new physical primitive.  
It is worth reiterating that on the information-theoretic principle derivation of quantum theory, the 
objects of the theory whose behaviour is constrained by the fundamental principles are the 
macroscopic directly observable outcomes supported by the apparatuses (preparation and 
measurement instruments), whereas the apparatuses themselves are treated as unanalysed black 
boxes (as has been outlined above). The principles provide a derivation of relations between various 
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preparations and measurements, and this is supposed to be the first-hand explanation of why the 
preparation and measuring apparatuses display the relations (“in terms of relative frequencies of 
various experimental outcomes”, (Timpson, 2004, p. 216)) that they do. At the most basic level of 
interpretation of the formalism, the elements of the formalism are related with the observable 
physical quantities (the frequencies with which various outcomes of experiments may be expected). 
But in the principles themselves there is not much else that can help us go beyond this most basic 
level of interpretation (Timpson, 2004). Despite the nature of its derivation, such quantum theory 
would remain at best very similar to the ‘minimal interpretation’ (perhaps, ‘instrumentalist 
interpretation’, with the inherent pitfall concerning possible reliance on the metaphysical 
projections towards properties of the material background, summarised from (Maudlin, 2002), 
above), it would link the mathematical abstraction to the statistics of individual measurement 
outcomes, but it would not go much further in providing explanation of the material foundation of 
the phenomena that the outcomes are a part of.  
What is needed to produce an explanation is the Redhead second-sense interpretation of the 
formalism, an account of the nature of the external world and/or our epistemological relation to it 
that serves to explain how it is that the statistical regularities of the formalism-outcomes relations 
come out the way they do (Redhead, 1987). This is not to say that a constructive account is 
necessary, though one such would obviously fit well with the ‘nature of the external world and our 
epistemological link to it’ requirement, but an extended principle account that goes beyond the 
minimal interpretation and is, preferably, explicit about any of its inherent ‘sins’. Now we can see a 
further motivation for the employment of the deeper methodological principle, and the eventual 
road to metaphysical projections (the call for new physical primitives). But, according to Timpson 
(2004) the methodological principle involves a petitio principii argument and cannot be used against 
the rival constructive explanations (most notably, the Bohmian theory and the GRW dynamics) 
(Timpson, 2004, p. 220). To take the constraints as imposed natural laws is where the petitio lies 
according to Timpson: the constraints rule out the GRW interpretations for the latter can violate one 
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of the principles, and the Bohmian interpretations because they cannot show additional empirical 
content over metaphysically more conservative interpretations. To simply state that the constraints 
hold as a matter of natural law (and thus physical necessity), is according to Timpson to beg the 
question against rival explanatory conceptions.  
It is worth revisiting once more the way the constraints are introduced into the CBH (or, with 
alterations, some other principle approach). At least CBH are explicit about waiting for a 
demonstrable violation of any of the constraints. If such violation is to be found in practice, not 
suggested in principle, then the associated theory would falsify the constraints and the theory based 
on them. And the discussion would be over; the principle approach based on the violated constraints 
would fail. This is why the constraints are carefully chosen to be of the sturdy variety, to secure the 
best possible foundations for the principle theory. But no theory today is beyond the possibility of 
falsification, though we aim to build them to survive at least for some time. On the other hand, some 
of the contending theories, such as Bohmian mechanics, claim to be able to predict possible 
violations of the constraints, but cannot demonstrate them because we live in a particular universe 
in which all such violations are impossible (cf. the notion of the quantum equilibrium in Chapter 3).  
Without going into details of this proposal at this stage (cf. Chapter 3), this appears to be a weak 
argument against taking the violations as outright forbidden. It has long been the case in the history 
of science that explanations based on universal conspiracy to conceal empirical support for 
explanatory frameworks have been considered unacceptable. Supposing that the CBH and similar 
programmes are open to empirical demonstrations of the violations of their constraining principles, 
but that no such demonstrations can, at this stage, be proposed, it is not circular to argue that the 
constraints hold in our universe as a rule (a phenomenological rule in some sense) and that 
additional metaphysical structures do not play an explanatory role. Of course, the constraints 
themselves can perhaps be derived (as lawlike, or merely approximate), rather than postulated, from 
the overall theories containing additional metaphysical structure, but that is a methodological issue 
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of a different approach to the quantum formalism, not one of logical clarity. Given that there are 
reasons to consider a principle approach, adherence to principle methodology has to be respected. 
With hindsight we may correct the inadequacies of the robustness of principle approach (cf. (Bell, 
1987), concerning Einstein’s derivation of Special Theory of Relativity), we may explicate its sins, but 
hindsight is not a luxury we have at the early stage of development of such theories.  
Let us also briefly consider Timpson’s objection that according to his grouping of the explanatory 
frameworks, even after the mechanical and dynamic-changing interpretations  of the formalism 
have been discarded by the deep methodological principle, two further possible interpretations 
remain: the bare instrumentalism and the Everett interpretation (Timpson, 2004, p. 221). The former 
carries with it all the problems usually associated with instrumentalism in science, and for our 
purposes can be said to explain very little (and not to aspire to explain much more than that), and is 
therefore not a serious contender. The latter would take at least an additional chapter of its own to 
elaborate and analyse, but its greatest weakness in the present context is that it is just not as 
innocent of the metaphysical burden as Timpson portrays it. For present purposes we take it here to 
be a version of quantum theory with a heavy burden of (however fickle) existence of multitude of 
universes, through which the physical processes unfold, but where only the phenomena of one or 
relatively small group of them are epistemically available to us. But Timpson is right in calling for 
clearer explication of just how is it that quantum theory supersedes the bare instrumentalism 
(remember black box instruments) and becomes a theory about representation and manipulation of 
information (Timpson, 2004). For even if there is something special in quantum experiments, unlike 
in the more technically demanding classical ones, to suggest seeing the measuring apparatus as a 
source of signals, it is still sensible to ask what the signals signify or codify. In the context of search 
for explanations it is almost irresistible to ask what a particular measurement outcome is a signal of, 
given that it must not be a signal of something about pre-existing hidden variables (or some other 
details of mechanical structure of reality).  
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Until the notion of the ‘new physical primitive’ is further explicated, we can also take as strong 
criticism Timpson’s complaint that it will not help turn an instrumentalist interpretation of quantum  
formalism into something more meaty by simply “*concluding+ that information, or quantum 
information, is an entity” (Timpson, 2004, p. 222). A primitive, of course, does not have to be read as 
entity72, in the same way that extension is not an entity (before or after Descartes). But we need to 
be told more about just what it is. It is certainly problematic for the CBH account to claim being open 
to falsification or some future clarification through a constructive theory (though not one of the kind 
available now and dismissed by Bub), whilst on the other hand changing the aim of physics in the 
quantum domain and claiming that the best we can achieve is a principle theory of information 
manipulation (where the measuring apparatuses remain essentially black boxes forever). And with 
the latter claim holding forth, Bub (and CBH in general) veer closer to the neo-Bohrian approach of 
Fuchs, by claiming that the reality is such that we will never be able to know the workings behind our 
measurement outcomes (a metaphysical claim of some sort). The principle approaches (that do not 
see themselves as mere unfortunate intermediate steps to a constructive theory) deny the implicit 
premise that a fundamental theory ought to apply to the workings of measurement devices that are 
constituted out of the very systems that the theory is meant to apply to. And yet, they have to think 
that on their account the measurement (or any other physical processes, but always those involving 
acquisition of new knowledge/beliefs) and the behaviour of directly observable devices in it is 
somehow explained (Duwell, 2007, p. 195).  
The only alternative Duwell sees to the hidden variables of the Bohmian mechanics type (to be 
presented in Chapter 3), is to go back to Bohr and state that the elements of reality that are 
represented by the quantum formalism “are simply not like classical definite valued properties” 
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 There is, in fact, no indication that it should be, and as frustrating as it might be for the title of this thesis, 
Bub does not explicitly commit to an ontological claim in (Bub, 2004). Duwell ascertains as much: “Bub does 
not out and out make an ontological claim” (Duwell, 2007, p. 193). In fact, a more charitable reading and one 
in greater accord with other texts, may be that Bub’s explanatory framework is simply ontologically neutral 
regarding the underlying ontology of quantum physical processes involving interaction with conscious agents 
(i.e. measurement).  
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(Duwell, 2007, p. 196). This is a constructive approach of sorts, similar to the constructive elements 
in Fuchs, but it is too small a step towards a wholesome (mechanical) explanatory framework for the 
quantum phenomena. It may be linked to the ‘sinful’ status of reference-frame-defining rods and 
clocks in Special Relativity. Not that such a framework is impossible (which would be arguing in line 
with many who demand an outright constructive account for physical explanations, full stop), but we 
as yet do not seem to have enough of its structure to be able to take an explanation of the 
phenomena off the ground.  
2. 4. Summary of the principle approaches  
The principle approaches provide an explanation of the ‘troublesome’ phenomena, but the 
explanation struggles to provide sufficient features for the transcendental strategy as it struggles to 
connect to what we take to be ontological concepts therein. On the face of it it bridges the gap 
between knowing that a phenomenon occurs and understanding why it occurs, as in the conceptual 
framework of information-entities the occurrence of the phenomena is singled out of the sea of all 
possibilities by the constraining principles. But the caveat is that we just don’t know enough about 
the information ontology to construct some story of how the ‘information-entities’ get into the state 
that evinces the observed correlations. From the perspective of exposition of pseudo-problems (cf. 
Kepler above and further discussion below), we might say that it achieves what it set out to do, it 
exposes the said gap as something different, a state of new entities rather than just a statistical 
correlation of macroscopic states of the material black-boxes. And it is true that the principle 
theories have little worries about the nature of the entities they take up. But this worry is more 
easily ignored only from the perspective of prediction, than the perspective of explanation.  
For example, in thermodynamics we can predict the occurrence of certain observable states of 
properties of a wide range of objects (the ‘black boxes’) without any concern as to how those 
properties come to hold of those objects. We simply choose what to call an object and track the 
changes of a chosen set of its properties. This is a powerful predictive tool, but in terms of 
explanation it does not go far enough, as we can see different objects (these are macroscopic ‘black-
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bodies’ whose macroscopic constructs we can still see, there is no need to worry about 
unobservables as yet) being constructed in different ways. When certain external conditions can be 
satisfied about them (that they are in a thermal equilibrium with the surroundings – which we again 
do not deconstruct) we can predict a whole lot of their properties.  
Yet, in terms of explanation, we know them not to be the same object. We took different objects to 
put them together. To put it bluntly, this type of explanation does not respect that we conceptualise 
the situations in terms of re-identifiable objects, the latter lose any meaning in the erasure of 
differences between complex objects in thermodynamical situations. We again jeopardise the 
conceptual starting point of the transcendental strategy. For explanation, if not for prediction, we 
would like to see some investigation of the conditions that lead to the same observable properties 
despite the differences in construction of objects. The real devil here is in the detail. Similarly, 
information ontology requires some further philosophical justification at the level of connection to 
the material substratum that is a part of the starting point of the transcendental strategy above. We 
can take the fact that several slightly different mathematical models can be used as toy-theory 
derivations of the formalism attached to the information-ontology as an illustration of this point.  
Likewise, on the face of it the principle approach explanations stop the why-regress at the level of 
information ontology, simply by establishing that this is what this segment of reality is like. But even 
in taking the new ontology to be at the first stage of development of the Nersessian (1984) 
advocated route, the analogical stage, there is preciously little hooks to anchor the analogy on. For 
as soon as we start looking for the hooks, we are back at the common-sense conceptual scheme and 
the threat that ontological holism poses for it. This is in general how the principle approaches of 
Chapter 2 struggle with even complying with the unification-style explanation paradigm, as they 
cannot connect to the material ontology without threatening to make it non-separable. And the 
whole problem for the transcendental strategy goes back to the beginning again. Finally, Lipton’s 
criterion of self-evidencing is easily satisfied in this case, as the occurrence of the ‘troublesome’ 
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phenomena was methodologically an important point for the development of the whole new 
conceptual scheme. Yet this on its own does not go far enough.  
Beyond the criteria, if we take the principle approaches’ explanations as not of the ontological type, 
then they are of not much use for us here, seeking to compare the ontological characteristics of 
explanations. They are of not much use for the transcendental strategy either, as it aims to show 
how the non-problematic everyday ontology can be connected to the theoretical ontologies 
assumed to be fundamental. If we take it to be ontological, and trying to develop a novel ontology of 
its own, then we are back to the problems of connecting it to the common-sense conceptual 
scheme, as has been outlined above. A useful pointer to take at this stage, though, would be to look 
into how dissolving the danger of the non-separable (i.e. holistic) ontology can still be achieved, 
even without having to move to wholly novel ontological entities. This would mean taking some of 
the proscriptions of quantum formalism as incomplete, as guesstimates, whilst furnishing a sufficient 
generative mechanism behind such limited epistemology. In the vein of our transcendental strategy 
narrowed down to this special domain of experience we should look into what the world ought to be 
like so that we could know what we come to know about it through quantum formalism.73  
So given that we are dealing with a unification-type explanation, it remains to show in Chapter 4 that 
it can be taken to fall under the ontological rather than the epistemic variety, and that it can stop 
the why-regress. For according to Lipton (2004, p. 7) this is the biggest problem for unification-type 
explanations in general. In some instances this can be satisfied by embedding those explanations 
into the “wider” pattern, but we will have to investigate in greater detail just how this is to be done. 
We should not forget that the constraining principles themselves carry with them some ontological 
characteristics, along with that carried by deeper metaphysical principles behind them. For example, 
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 One might suggest that this is precisely what the principle approaches tried to achieve with the identification 
of the constraining principles. But as yet they tell us nothing about what the world must be made of for the 
principles to hold as they do, and that is what is required for a deeper explanation: an account of the ontology 
that gives rise to these principles. What it certainly can teach us is to remove some deep conceptual 
expectations we may have had, by exposing them to be the root of our problems, and in this case one such 
expectation seems to be the account of the world whose fundamental structural feature is solely geometrical.  
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the principle approaches are deeply committed to preservation of separability, an underlying 
principle that imports the individual existence of macroscopic objects and the like.  
We should also bear in mind that the principle approaches are not aiming to replace the existence of 
material objects with information, but claim that the explanation of the ‘troublesome phenomena’ is 
essentially about information manipulation. Manipulation that is still performed with the aid of the 
material world, so we should be able to ask what the basic objects of such explanations (objects 
whose existence is invariable in counterfactual situations) are. This is to ask what is carrying the 
burden of explanatory work (most notably in the CBH programme). This is not a question about 
detailed nature of systems and instruments in the input-output manipulating process, but a request 
for clearer delineation of the existents suffering change at the level of information manipulation.  
In summary, explanation, even of the unification type, will require a physical theory that steps away 
from bare instrumentalism, even if moving the whole debate to the level of macroscopic, directly 
observable, outcome manipulation, i.e. away from the mental processes. To set up an explanation of 
the unification type we need to explicitly state the segments that unify it with the rest of our 
(standard) conceptual framework.  
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3. Constructive approaches  
3. 1. A quantum (mechanical) theory: ‘Bohmian Mechanics’  
From epistemic restrictions to mechanical superstructure: historical and conceptual 
background  
In the previous chapter the theories that follow Bohrian interpretation have been presented. They 
hold firm to some expectation of physical ontology, namely that it must be based on the familiar 
notion of macroscopic objects, some of whose properties must be directly perceived, whilst others 
are be derived from those. Directly perceived properties are spatial position and ‘geometrical’ 
extension, with existence independent from the surrounding environment. This way a body is 
conceptualised primarily in Cartesian-like primary qualities, with other perceivable properties 
reduced to further features resulting from primary qualities (such as e.g. colour). Of course, in 
classical physics further ‘primary’ properties must be attributed to such bodies, such as mass and 
charge, thus the picture is by no means perfect. But, it is assumed that such picture, modulo 
augmentations, is the fundamental conceptualisation of the physical world. Given that quantum 
theory contradicts such picture in certain aspects, it is taken not to provide a definite description of 
the micro-physical reality as this reality is also expected to conform to the general feature of the 
sketched conceptual scheme. It is thus taken that there must be some obstruction to acquiring the 
complete knowledge of the detailed nature of the physical objects at the micro-physical level, with 
the quantum theory providing the codification of the best of such knowledge that can be acquired.  
The conclusion thus seems to be (though this will be further investigated in the final chapter) that 
we have to make the best of this limited knowledge, try to explain why we can’t have it, but that we 
must not abandon this deep-seated expectation of what material reality must structurally be like. A 
parallel reasoning that runs alongside this is that there is not to be a hierarchy of physical theories 
associated with different ‘levels of zooming in on reality’. That is, we should not have one theory 
describing the objects at one ‘level of zoom’ and another kicking in once we coarse grain the 
inspection. In fact, more than two such layers may be envisioned, and maybe even several entirely 
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separate theories for different aspects of the reality at the same level of zoom, and things soon start 
running out of proportion. Given that the ‘zooming’ view is discarded it is taken that the theories 
that do not conform to the preferred conceptual structure (the one constituent of the preferred 
‘level of zoom’) must be ‘epistemic’ and not ‘ontic’. Early precursor (though not altogether a 
prophet) of this view can be found in the philosophy behind Heisenberg’s derivation of matrix 
version of the quantum formalism (Lochak, 2007).  
The theories presented in this chapter to a large degree share the convictions the above sketch 
starts with but take different conclusions. Generally, they agree with the denial of hierarchy of 
theories, i.e. do not accept the ‘level of zoom’ view, and aim to reduce all the phenomena to those 
of micro-physics as a realistic ontological foundation behind all others. One can note a certain 
agreement with the linearity of spatial zooming; the smaller things are expected to make up the 
bigger things, not the other way round. They take a somewhat diverse view as to the nature of 
objects at the ‘zoom-level’ of interest, as will be outlined in the below (section 3.1.2.). But even 
those give precedence to primary qualities (with some additions) over and above elevating 
traditionally secondary qualities (or inventing new ones) to a higher status. In that they seem to 
share the starting point with the theories of the previous chapter, but reach a different conclusion.  
They say that we must do what we can with the primary qualities at this level, and treat the results 
as discoveries about the fundamental nature of matter, rather than project our expectations onto 
this level, and in resulting experimental disappointment give up on the project of delineation of 
quantum ontology altogether. We must, as de Broglie tried, explain the correlations and phenomena 
by reduction to deterministic objects and their standard and special properties (Lochak, 2007).  
These theories, thus, reject more strongly than the ones from the previous chapter, the possibility of 
contending with ‘unsharp reality’ of objects at the level of micro-physics ( (Busch, Classical versus 
quantum ontology, 2002); for exposition of the alternative cf. (Busch, Grabowski, & Lahti, 1995)). 
Whereas the theories of the previous chapter could find a route to be reconciled with the ‘unsharp 
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realities’ (though they did not set out to do so at the outset) through accepting ‘unsharp realities’ to 
be the ontological foundation behind their epistemic interpretations, the theories of this chapter 
stand firmly against ‘unsharp realities’ by delineating what some of the ‘sharp realities’ alternatives 
may be like. (There are, of course, other such alternative options that will not be considered here at 
all.) 
Historical development of Bohmian Mechanics  
According to Lochak’s (2007) exposition, the historical development of quantum theory followed 
these two lines of reasoning from the outset (with a brief interlude of expecting them to be united 
through the Schrödinger wavefunction). The Heisenberg, Bohr, Pauli et al. camp advocated 
abandonment of ontological speculation about reality at the microscopic level, whilst Einstein, 
Planck, Schrödinger, de Broglie et al. aimed to supersede the theory as it was given at the time with 
a thorough ontological account. Historically, the Copenhagen camp won for some time, most of all, 
according to Lochak, due to easier formation of a unified camp (‘there is nothing more to explain’). 
The anti-Copnhagen camp had trouble offering an alternative account as the difficulties in reducing 
the observed phenomena to the behaviour of simple ontological primitives were quite substantial 
and could not, at the time, be borne out in formalism. Thus, even de Broglie, the originator of the 
view that the particle like behaviour can be reduced to singularities of spatially extended waves, 
gave up for a while (Lochak, 2007, p. 78). Eventually, David Bohm resurrected (Bohm, A suggested 
interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of hidden variables, I and II, 1952) some of de 
Broglie’s notions in his pilot-wave theory, which in the end gave rise to contemporary versions 
known as Bohmian Mechanics.  
Even though there are different variants of Bohmian approach today, some of which we shall 
consider in more detail below, they all share a general conceptual dualism of particles and waves in 
existence. The particles (or ‘the particle’ in some cases) build up the macroscopic objects and behave 
in many ways as we expect from macroscopic objects themselves, i.e. they are finitely extended 
objects in space and time. Yet they are further guided in their behaviour by the wavefunction, a 
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special and novel kind of entity that is not spatially localised and that provides ‘the information’ for 
the particles’ nonlocal interactions. We thus have at the micro-level (this is now true only of one 
strand of Bohmian mechanics, the one that posits the existence of particles in ordinary spacetime, 
not in high dimensional phase space) objects similar to the objects familiar from everyday life and 
classical physics (i.e. characterised by primary qualities). Unlike in classical physics, alongside those 
objects there is/are also a novel and special kind of object: the wavefunction(s).  
It is obvious that the status and the role of the wavefunction will prove to be the most contentious 
issue for our purposes. Again, versions of Bohm-style quantum theory differ on this issue and we 
shall focus on only one of them. The one to be discarded outright is the notion of the wavefunction 
as a physical potential field spread out in physical space or the configuration space. On such account 
the potential literally forces the particles along their trajectories. Though this would, at face value, 
be an appealing view from the perspective of search for the explanatory ontology that respects the 
traditional view of primary qualities, it faces technical and conceptual difficulties especially from the 
perspective of explanation. Namely, it presents the quantum theory as classical mechanics with a 
special metaphysical addition. This addition is responsible for all the non-classical phenomena but is 
itself highly obscure. It cannot be manipulated or investigated directly, but only through its influence 
on the particles. It is extremely nonlocal, but inert to any direct intervention (so can’t be used for 
superluminal signalling). Philosophically, it can be seen as an ad hoc metaphysical addition with no 
other role but to carry the blame for all non-classical (‘troublesome’) phenomena encountered.  
The other extreme is to make the particles equally unreal as the wavefunction, i.e. to claim that 
fundamentally reality corresponds to a highly abstract formal presentation of the observed 
phenomena in a high-dimensional configuration space. In that case there is a physically real 
universal and unique wavefunction for the entire universe and a single ‘point-particle’ in 
configuration space that is the summary of formal encoding of the position coordinates of all the 
supposedly observed particles in the three-dimensional physical space. The three-dimensional space 
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and the multiple particles are not fundamental and must be reduced to the ‘universal wavefunction 
+ the marvellous particle’ construction. This is highly speculative in terms of metaphysics and it is 
difficult to see how an isomorphism between the observed phenomena and their ‘true’ constructive 
explanation can be satisfactorily established (Monton, 2006). In terms of explanation it is a very 
expensive construct that generalises from ‘the nonlocality of troublesome phenomena is an illusion’ 
to ‘the whole known world is an illusion’.74   
Thus the approach to be elaborated in the rest of the chapter takes the middle ground. It claims that 
the micro-physical reality is irreducibly non-classical and that we should give up on trying to force it 
into a classical mould (particles moved exclusively by the force field). It acknowledges the need for a 
universal wavefunction (as there is no fundamental divide in the formalism between the 
wavefunctions associated with individual systems), but treads carefully in characterising its 
ontological features. It claims the material world is made out of particles, classically familiar objects 
embedded in space-time, but not that all of the properties we tend to ascribe to them are ‘really 
true of them’. Notoriously, it acknowledges some Bohrian-like limits of knowledge through claiming 
that the world is fundamentally deterministic, but the details of this are forever obscured from us so 
that the best we can have is the stochasticity inherent in the quantum formalism. In that, it has to 
acknowledge the real influences of the wavefunction, but its unreality in the ‘quantum potential’ 
sense. Finally, it is openly nonlocal, allowing the wavefunction to coordinate behaviour (more 
precisely, motion) of the particles in synchrony that disredgards the spatial separation.  
As we shall see in the final chapter there are contact points between this approach and the principle 
approaches of the previous chapter. Strangely, the wavefunction encodes important information 
                                                             
74 Monton (2006) specifies two main problems with this extreme view. The first is that such a view goes against 
the pragmatic rule that we should not accept theories which radically revise people’s everyday understanding 
of the world when there are empirically equivalent theories on offer in which such revision is not as radical. In 
our case, the search for a deeper explanation, this pragmatic rule seems quite natural. Monton’s other 
objection is that it is hard to see how our mental states, representationally supervening on some physical 
structure (i.e. relying on some isomorphism between the representational content and the physical structure 
of the world), would have the content that they do. That is, it would be hard to explain why we conceptualise 
the world in terms of three-dimensional objects evolving through time, given that the true reality consists of 
single high dimensional point-particle.  
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about the world without corresponding to anything ‘tangible’ in that world. The most notable 
characteristic for our purposes of this approach is that it takes ontology as the starting point. It takes 
as given that the macroscopically observable world is made of something sufficiently similar at the 
microscopic level, namely particles, and then tries to reconcile this view with the observed 
‘troublesome’ phenomena. The said particles are not classical, but they are endowed precisely with 
the primary qualities that have since the early modern era been so firmly established in our 
conceptual framework. This way a picture of the more complex phenomena is built out of the 
relatively simple formal scheme, just as Einstein (1954) required.75 The key problem is that these 
particles do not enter into causal interactions in the way we classically expect them to, thus 
stretching to the limit the applicability of the preferred causal-mechanical model of explanation.  
Particle mechanics and the law-providing wavefunction  
Introductory remarks 
Bohmian mechanics stipulates at the outset that the macroscopic objects familiar from classical 
physics are constructed out of particles. This is expected to hold as at least partially true, even if 
some more fundamental theory of fields or strings or some such eventually supersedes Bohmian 
mechanics. The particles will then be an intermediate stage, but conceptually clearly delineated and 
essentially populating the three-dimensional space. The macroscopic objects are reduced to 
particles, which themselves have to be further reduced to the more fundamental objects. But for the 
time being there are particles with definite positions and trajectories. These parameters are definite 
even when the formally assigned wavefunction is not an eigenstate of the position operator 
(Maudlin, 2002, p. 117). In general Bohmian mechanics takes a rather dim view of the naïve realistic 
interpretations of operators as formal representations of properties of real systems. The 
wavefunction (ascribed to the system, not the universal one mentioned above) itself evolves 
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 There are claims that Einstein even expected this very route to be taken for quantum mechanics, i.e. that he 
expected something along the lines of Bohmian mechanics to play the role that statistical mechanics (as 
opposed to that other theory of gases: thermodynamics) does in the classical framework. This would make the 
Bohmian mechanics the constructive extension of the principle-style standard quantum formalism  (Goldstein, 
2006).   
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deterministically in accordance with the Schrödinger equation with no collapse occurring in the 
process of observation or measurement. The particles are guided by the wavefunction, but are not 
identical with it, thus there are no macroscopic superpositions (such as supposedly befall the 
Schrödinger’s cat) even when the wavefunction represents a superposition of possible macroscopic 
states.  
Alongside the particles as the constructive building blocks of matter, for any given system under 
consideration there is also the wavefunction. Its ontological status is more problematic, but let us 
not get into that yet. Formally the wavefunction provides a link between the Schrödinger equation 
as the fundamental formal encoding of the evolution of the system, and the derivative Bohm 
equation that specifies the temporal evolution of the positions of the particles. The Bohm equation 
is not formally sufficiently fundamental to simply incorporate the necessary elements of the 
Schrödinger equation and disregard any future talk of the wavefunction. Thus the Schrödinger 
equation remains the key element of the formalism, shared with other versions of quantum 
formalism, whilst the Bohm equation is a further step specific to the Bohmian Mechanics (as 
illustrated below).  
i (∂ψ/∂t) = Hψ     (Schrödinger equation) ; ψ: the wavefunction  
dQk/dt = ( /mk) Im *ψ*∂kψ/ ψ*ψ+ (Q1,...,QN)  (Bohm equation); Qk: position function for 
the kth particle  
Of course, a question related to the formalism immediately arises: how come we still have to deal 
with probabilities in quantum formalism if this whole evolution is deterministic? Why can’t we just 
investigate (as in observe, even if indirectly) how the particles behave and describe that through the 
formalism?  
A simple answer to this question is that we don’t know the exact initial positions of all individual 
particles, so cannot track their evolution formally and deterministically. We have to rely on 
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ignorance probabilities, rational guesstimates of the possible overall configurations of particle 
positions. A more complex task is to explain why this is so, and for the moment we shall have to 
leave the precise exposition aside (cf. section on Quantum Equilibrium hypothesis). More 
importantly for us, Bohmian mechanics also precludes future determination of the particle positions 
to a degree of precision that removes this statistical guesstimate (Maudlin, 2002: 119). Thus it 
cannot empirically supersede the other interpretations of the bare quantum formalism in this 
respect. In this particular respect the constructive explanation along the Bohmian lines does not 
empirically offer more than the competing principle explanations. If this limitation to increase in 
precision of knowledge acquisition can be explained as a fundamental feature of nature, this can be 
a pardonable sin.  
But there is another feature of Bohmian mechanics of crucial importance to us. It is manifestly 
nonlocal (Goldstein, 2006). The behaviour of the particles, i.e. their velocity (intensity and direction 
of motion), as codified by the Bohm equation, will typically depend upon the positions of other, 
possibly very distant, particles in situations (which are not at all rare) in which the wavefunction 
formally assigned to the system is entangled (i.e. is not a simple product of the single particle 
wavefunctions).76 The wavefunction, whatever it is, is to be blamed for possible violations of 
separability, as we can have situations in which against our will (and even possibly against our 
knowledge, given the irreducible stochasticity) the distant objects affect the objects we are trying to 
investigate. The phenomena we are trying to explain can then not be simply reduced to the 
mechanical interactions of the constituent and nearby particles.  
There is a partial escape from this dire situation, but only partial. Namely, in the multidimensional 
configuration space, in the arena for the abstract formal representation of the situation investigated, 
the ‘troublesome’ phenomena are not nonlocal, the trajectory of the abstract representation of the 
                                                             
76 In fact, in the extreme it can depend on the positions of all the particles in the universe, and we are back to 
the ‘universal wavefunction + the marvellous particle’ picture. But there are formal mechanisms of effectively 
decoupling the relevant systems from the rest of the universe so that we are not always forced to this picture.  
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particles in configuration space is affected only by the value of the wavefunction around that point ( 
(Maudlin, 2002, p. 119). But unless we are to be pushed to the extreme view of reducing everything 
in the universe to the single multidimensional wavefunction and particle, we have to have a way of 
knowing when we have included enough information in our codification of the situation so that 
potential influences from higher dimension configuration spaces can be ignored. Moreover, though 
this helps with separability violation (by allowing us to sufficiently isolate our systems under 
observation from the rest of the universe) it does not remove the violation of locality in the three-
dimensional space as observed in the EPR situations.  
It thus remains a task to specify in greater detail how the middle ground between the introductions 
of the unwanted ‘quantum potential’ situated in ordinary space and the all pervading wavefunction 
with a single multidimensional particle is to be constructed. Furthermore, this path has to offer 
viable models of explanation of the troublesome phenomena that violate locality and separability.  
Methodology and metaphysics resting on explanatory constructs  
It is worth repeating once again the central methodological and metaphysical tenets of the Bohmian 
Mechanics constructive approach, those held by all versions. Methodology and metaphysics of this 
approach are straightforwardly linked, in that the proponents of Bohmian mechanics claim that one 
of the staring points for any theory must be to say what it is about. In this respect, the Bohmian 
approach starts with the metaphysical claim: quantum theory (or in this case its Bohmian 
alternative) must be about particles that build up the macroscopic objects. The secondary question 
is to determine what governs the particle behaviour, i.e. how their spatial positions evolve with 
time. It is at this step that the troubles begin, as the status of the wavefunction must then be 
elucidated.  
Most of the criticism of the Bohmian approach is directed against the ‘physical quantum potential 
pushes the well-defined particles about’ view. As we shall not be focusing on that view, we can skim 
that issue here. What we have to assume (as there is no room to enter into the related debate here) 
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is that the view that we shall focus on can overcome the problems generally levied against the 
Bohmian approach. Thus we shall assume that Bohmian Mechanics is indeed empirically equivalent 
to the bare quantum formalism. This is to simply disregard the criticism summarised in e.g. (Streater, 
2007), most of which is directed more specifically against the ‘quantum potential’ view. The most 
potent criticism included in the given summary, that along the lines of (Aharonov & Vaidman, 1996), 
is primarily effective against the ‘quantum potential’ view. Modulo the discussion on the quantum 
equilibrium, below, we shall assume that the empirical equivalence between the bare formalism and 
its modification along the Bohmian lines stands, and that, therefore, Bohmian mechanics is a 
justified contender in providing explanation of the phenomena we are concerned with here.  
Be that as it may, the ‘quantum potential’ view still gives us the most direct visualisation of the 
processes behind the ‘troublesome’ phenomena. In its absence we have to skim the technically 
demanding issue of the introduction of the quantum equilibrium and a philosophically more 
complex interpretation of the wavefunction as the fundamental dynamical law, which 
methodologically brings us closer to the principle approach. We shall elaborate on that further in the 
following section, but this early warning suffices to point towards the complexity of the problems 
addressed by our two approaches. When even the candidly constructive approach, the one that 
places the constructive methodology at the heart of its research programme, is forced to retort to 
principle-style steps, the initial unease (summarised in Chapter 1) about the general principle 
approach (of Chapter 2) is reduced.  
Moreover, even the ‘quantum potential’ view, that is easy on visualisation, is forced to introduce 
some ontological oddities (beyond the unobservable potential) in dealing with the phenomenon of 
teleportation (cf. Chapter 1). In the explicit analysis of (Maroney & Hiley, 1999); and the subsequent 
criticism in (Timpson, 2006), strange information ontology is pasted on to the potential view. 
Namely, in the Bohmian case it is clear that no teleportation of the particle itself takes place, but 
that in fact some properties of a distant particle get (informationally-for-humans) assigned to the 
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proximal one. In the Bohmian ontology the particles are the foundational existents and their 
trajectories through space are, at least in principle, traceable (they do not instantaneously jump 
from place to place).  
What is supposed to happen is that some ways the quantum potential affects the particles get 
transferred through the classical communication channel (the telephone line) between distant and 
proximal locations (i.e. locations of experimenters Alice and Bob). When this ‘information’ is 
subsequently lodged into the quantum potential (through the operations Bob performs on his 
particle conditional on the message he receives from Alice) it enables the particle to behave in 
subsequent measurements as the distant particle would have (or at least it enables the 
experimenter to expect it to behave in that way, by relying on the formalism). The difficulty lies in 
explaining just what gets transferred between the separated locations, and how. In attempting to 
explain what goes on Maroney & Hiley (1999) edge ever closer to the law-like view of the quantum 
potential that will be developed in greater detail below. They take the potential to be holding 
‘information’, alongside standard mechanical effect on the particles, but information in a special 
sense. The sense of “action of forming or bringing order into something” (Maroney & Hiley, 1999, p. 
1408). This information is moved nonlocally through the potential, and is somehow available to the 
particle, but not to the experimenters.  
That is, the experimenters can only work with what the formalism gives them, i.e. the probabilistic 
predictions of some future behaviour (position change) of the particles. In other words they deal 
with the 2bits of information exchanged classically, whilst the much larger quantity of information 
required to deterministically guide the particle is stored in the potential, and available to the particle 
only.77 But, due to some other technical difficulties with the ‘quantum potential’ view, the authors 
are forced to introduce a further distinction into the ‘information’ inherent in the quantum 
potential, namely they distinguish between the active, passive and inactive forms of that 
                                                             
77
 Available as guidance in future evolution of the trajectory, no one is attributing consciousness to the 
particles here.  
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information. These forms can be changed by action of the particles or their interaction with the 
measuring apparatus, and the picture becomes even more complicated.  
Because of the non-classical nature of the potential itself we do not get a clear picture of what 
exactly is transferred and how, in the teleportation protocol. We are told by Maroney & Hiley (1999) 
that active information is moved through the potential, and coupled with further action of the 
experimenter Bob based on the message he receives from Alice, this information serves to make the 
particle at his possession behave just as desired. But how this ‘active information transfer’ process 
proceeds is left as a mystery.  
What we see clearly emerging here is that it is active 
information that has been transferred from particle 1 
*Alice’s particle, where teleportation originates+ to 
particle 3 *Bob’s particle, destination of teleportation+ 
and that this transfer has been mediated by the nonlocal 
quantum potential. (Maroney & Hiley, 1999, p. 1413) 
Timpson (2006, p. 609) objects to this understanding of information, as instead of making matters 
clearer (by supposedly defining a ‘physical’ rather than ‘information-theoretic’ sense of 
‘information’) it requires ontology of ‘action’ such that it can be moved about as an object. That is, if 
active information is some property of the ‘quantum potential’ such that it performs an action on 
the proximal particle at the end of the protocol, as it did on the distant particle at the beginning, 
then the transferral of ‘active information’ in the protocol requires action to be moved about in 
space. For our purposes there is no need to claim, along with Timpson (2006, p. 610) that this cannot 
be done, but suffices to say that this is not as straightforward as might initially have been expected 
of the constructive approach.  
However, if the potential is not regarded as a physical field, then such difficulties need not arise. A 
more straightforward explanation of the teleportation process might involve the outright 
abandonment of any physical exchange in the protocol. The particle is not ‘teleported’ (in the sense 
of transported) nor are its properties transferred from one particle to another, as there were no 
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properties (other than position; cf. objections to naïve realism about operators in (Goldstein, 2006)) 
to transport in the first place. What happens is that the wavefunction exhibits the nonlocal 
characteristics and based on the distant operations guides the local particle towards novel 
unexpected experimental outcomes. Yet an important question remains: how do the situations in 
which the protocol is enacted and those in which it is not differ; i.e. how is the proximal outcome 
‘based’ on the distant  one and not just contingently conveniently correlated ? Namely, how are the 
characteristics of the wavefunction based on the distant operations?78 At this stage we have to 
postpone addressing this question (until Chapter 4), but I hope sufficient introduction is provided to 
take a closer look at the explanatory potential of the ‘wavefunction as the universal law’ view.  
Other problems and objections to Bohmian ontology  
A powerful objection to the above solution-sketch turns the situation on its head. What if what is 
unreal, or less real, is not the wavefunction, but the particles? For however the particle ontology 
may seem appealing in terms of explanation of what is ‘going on’ in the ‘troublesome phenomena’, 
the whole picture rests on somewhat shaky legs empirically. In general we are barred from ever 
knowing the exact particle positions for any large enough collection of particles, and must work from 
some assumptions about the general characteristics of the entire collections of particles that we can 
never verify directly.  
That is, given that we don’t know the exact values of all the parameters in the universal 
wavefunction, we have to work under the assumption that we are able to formulate effective 
wavefunctions, which help us describe the situation at hand whilst ignoring any effects the rest of 
                                                             
78 Of course, one possible and rather simple (but for many non-physical reasons abhorrent) solution is that the 
wavefunction simply behaves universally as a prerecording of events, guiding all the particles through definite 
trajectories with no regard for their spatial location (in fact, in the ‘marvellous particle + goo’ view this is to be 
expected) or interaction. The particles simply dance according to the tune set from the beginning of time, and 
teleportation protocols are not enacted by the experimenters, but were simple coincidences of particle 
behaviour set out from the beginning to look like experimental outcomes. Though some of the major 
problematic consequences of such a solution (such as the question of free will) are outside the scope of this 
thesis, it does not score well as an explanation of what happens in the ‘troublesome phenomena’, as the latter 
presuppose a voluntary action on behalf of the experimenters, and this solution is simply a denial of these 
phenomena (as ‘troublesome’) altogether. It also disregard Bohmian Mechanics’ respect for causal non-locality 
in the ‘troublesome’ phenomena.  
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the universe has on it. But to be able to form such effective wavefunctions in the first place, we must 
assume that (i) the universal wavefunction can be satisfactorily mathematically split into the 
‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ parts, and (ii) the actual particles of interest (those of the object system 
and those of the ‘relevant’ parts of the environment – even if distant) are guided by the ‘relevant’ 
parts of the wavefunction  (for more precise technical exposition, cf. (Maudlin, 1995, pp. 480-482). 
So in describing the individual phenomena formally we are relying on the calculational, but really 
nonexistent, effective wavefunction and some assumptions about the particles that that can only be 
tested by the very occurrence of the phenomena themselves. In itself this is not a sin in terms of 
explanation, as laid out in Lipton’s ( (2004, p. 3); Lipton further refers to (Hempel, 1965, pp. 370-
374)) exposition of self-evidencing features of explanation. These account for situations in which 
what is explained provides an essential part of our reason for believing that the explanation itself is 
correct. They also are a part of Lipton’s preference for both unification and causation types of 
explanation, over less popular reason and familiarity79 types.  
However, it seems that in trying to explain what goes on in the troublesome phenomena the 
wavefunction does most of the work, whilst the particles are there just because of their good 
relationship with the visualisable reality demand: they simply do a good job of playing the building 
blocks of material reality. In their survey of hypothetical and real neutron-interferometry 
experiments (Brown, Dewdney, & Horton, 1995) show how many of the traditionally intrinsic 
properties of the neutron-particles, such as mass, spin and charge must be carried, in part, by the 
wavefunction-field rather than a particle with definite position. They are thus not purely intrinsic to 
the particles. Furthermore, it appears that in some situations such particles can even fool the 
specific detectors as to their position, again suggesting in reconstruction of the definite-path-for-the 
particles situation that even features of the phenomena related to the particle should more properly 
be attributed to the spread-out field and not the precisely localised position of the particle. This 
                                                             
79
 Neither of the latter two will be considered in greater depth in this thesis due to their theoretical weakness 
relative to unification and causation types.  
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difficulty is more immediate for the view, not pursued here, that the wavefunctions correspond to 
real fields in space-time, as then we might be more tempted to pursue the general reduction of the 
re-identifiable objects of the common sense conceptual scheme to them,80 than in the case where 
the wavefunction is taken to be more immaterial. From the perspective of competing interpretations 
of the quantum formalism, interpretations that we cannot go into here, this is simply not a good 
enough reason to admit them into the explanatory framework.81  
Brown and Wallace (2005) stress other important features of the wavefunction that argue in favour 
of making it more than a mere law for the motion of particles. They see the wavefunction as a 
dynamical, as having degrees of freedom independent of the particles, and as being structurally very 
rich82 (Brown & Wallace, 2005, p. 531). In other words, it may not be so straightforward to simply 
eliminate the wavefunction from the theory altogether, and formally recover it as “an effective, 
phenomenological object” (Brown & Wallace, 2005, p. 532). We shall devote the second part of this 
Chapter to grappling more closely with these issues, but it suffices to say at this stage that following 
this route Bohmian Mechanics is losing ever more of its explanatory head-start (gained initially by 
notionally subscribing to hardcore realism and the causal-mechanical type of explanation) over the 
principle approaches of Chapter 2.  
                                                             
80 We might interpret Holland’s (1993) warnings that without assigning energy, angular momentum etc. to the 
particles themselves serious problems arise in the classical limit, as arguing in this direction.  
81
 It is simply too time consuming for us to go into a detailed elaboration of a further interpretation, the so-
called Everett interpretation in this case. With its heavy ontological reliance on the wavefunction it 
complicates matters for the simple constructive-principle dichotomy, whilst at the same time introducing 
technical problems of its own. This is not a value judgement of its worth compared to the two case-study 
interpretational instances chosen, but a mere expression of limitations of this text. Nonetheless, the 
contemporary versions of the Everett-style quantum theory that take the single universal wavefunction to be 
the fundamental existing thing out of which the appearance of everything else arises, is a good starting point 
from which to address the wavefunction ontological denigration one senses in Bohmian Mechanics. In that we 
have to bear in mind that we have, above, been moving ever closer to the wavefunction-as-the-universal-law 
view of Goldstein and colleagues (Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1996), and away from the wavefunction-as-the-
potential-field-in-three-dimensional-space  (e.g. (Holland, 1993); (Bohm & Hiley, 1993); (Maroney & Hiley, 
1999)). In their criticism of the above view Brown and Wallace (2005) stress that it is at present a research 
programme and not a complete solution. From the perspective of the comparison to the Everett-style 
solutions this indeed is a valid point, but as the alternative approach we are considering here (cf. Chapter 2) is 
itself only a research programme, we needn’t take that as a weakness.  
82 In fact, relatively richer than the mathematical field structures that can normally be ‘argued-out’ of physics 
by being shown to be functions on configurations space that are ontologically reduced to features of a more 
fundamental ontological elements (for example, point particles).  
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In dealing with the effective wavefunction in the ‘troublesome’ phenomena we seem to be engaged 
in no more than knowledge updating (even when formally describing the situation, as the effective 
wavefunction has no direct real counterpart with particles being an indirect support). There are 
axiomatic conditions that have to be met for the formalism to be applicable to the phenomena in 
the first place, and (as we shall see in the section on quantum equilibrium) we have to postulate 
some general principles about the nature of reality and limits of knowledge acquisition for the whole 
approach to even get off the ground (Reutsche, 2002). From such perspective, treating the 
wavefunction as the only real and existing thing, out of which everything else arises, including the 
experimenters’ consciousnesses, may not seem so strange.  
The greatest worry for the Bohmian Mechanics approach, from the perspective of constructing the 
simple transcendental argument (as in section 1. 4 above) is that what was taken to be fundamental 
material ontology almost entirely fails to feature in the causal explanatory account of the 
phenomena, except as a decoration added in by hand. As Brown, Elby and Weingard (1996) argue, 
there are situations where most interactions can be reduced to the quantum potential field, so as to 
lose even a mechanical account of how the corresponding field gets to distinguish the supposedly re-
identifiable particles. That is, in some situations it is impossible to see how the interaction of the 
field and the particles takes place at all. As the particles were initially expected to be perform the 
role of the re-identifiable objects in space and time, out of which the observable features of the 
phenomena are constructed, the tenability of the whole approach becomes questionable if the 
formal accounts of the phenomena need no reference (even in explanatory reconstructions, not just 
experimental predictions) of the particles’ causal role. It appears they only stand in the place of 
‘space-fillers’ for the geometrical construction of the macroscopically observable objects.  
The reduction of properties to the wavefunction raises worries from a heuristic perspective as we 
seen increasing number of particles’ intrinsic properties slipping away to the other entity of this 
dualist-ontology account (cf. (Brown, Elby, & Weingard, 1996) for this terminology), fearing for what 
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eventually remains. But if the leakage of properties can be stopped so that the bare bones of the 
structural geometric isomorphism can be preserved, our initial aim for the transcendental argument 
will still be satisfied. From the perspective of everyday utilisation of the formalism, this may seem 
like decorative addition, large part of what we really need to predict and manipulate outcomes is in 
the wavefunction, so why as for more. From the perspective of construction of realist explanatory 
accounts that little more may still be needed, but even so must be seen to be very, very bare. By 
reducing the wavefunction (in either effective or the universal form) to a non-material law, a 
proscription for how the particles ought to behave without itself occupying space nor bearing 
properties, we appear to artificially recover some of the ontological explanatory justification for the 
particles’ introduction.  
The quantum equilibrium and the absolute uncertainty   
Adherents of the Bohmian mechanics view of the quantum theory repeatedly stress their 
commitment to constructive theories by putting the notions of ontology first in the construction and 
manipulation of theories. This, of course, suits the expectations of the research instrument, which 
aims to compare the principle and constructive approaches to the ‘troublesome’ phenomena. But it 
also asks of the Bohmian mechanics to account for the empirical equivalence with the competing 
extensions of the bare quantum formalism. Taking particles as primary existents should provide for 
alternative explanations of the ‘troublesome’ phenomena, but if those explanations are not to be of 
the classical kind (which they can’t be, for the phenomena are indeed troublesome; cf. Sections 1. 5. 
2 and 3. 1. 2 above ) we need to know the specifications of the difference between the classical 
particles and the quantum particles in Bohmian mechanics.  
For the purpose of explanation-provision as set out in this thesis, we will first and foremost want to 
know what exactly happens to the particles in the troublesome phenomena. Yet, given empirical 
equivalence, Bohmian mechanics cannot help us with that, for even here there is a (neo-Bohrian) 
element of limits of knowability of the exact states of nature (Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1996)). The 
exact exposition of notions summarised here is lengthy (Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1992) and 
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complex, and the brief sketch should suffice for the subsequent discussions concerning explanation 
and the comparison with the principle approaches in Chapter 4.  The Bohmian approach we are to 
follow in the remainder of this chapter thus gives up on treating the system wavefunction as a real 
spatially extended object that (almost classically) guides the particles in their trajectories, with a 
caveat that it has no strong enough answer to the challenge that the wavefunction, the unreal 
calculational device is much more rich and descriptively complete than the bare particles ontology.83  
So wherefrom the wavefunction for a system then? Let us not forget that whatever the ultimate 
speculation about the nature of reality turns out to be, if it is to be supported by science (even if it is 
not arrived at directly through empirical observation, but is a product of some delayed philosophical 
speculation) it has to agree with and explain the predictions made by the currently successful 
theory. That is, even extensions of the bare quantum formalism, such as Bohmian Mechanics is, 
must be able to tell us why the formalism works in the cases in which it does. If the whole universe is 
entangled in the single wavefunction how come we can get the non-local correlations and have 
them confirmed by experiment from a simple system wavefunction that does not explicitly include 
the formal description of particles in the Andromeda constellation? What is more, Bohmian 
mechanics itself is unable to go beyond the predictions for empirically observable phenomena made 
by the bare quantum formalism.  
How do restrictions of knowability come about from a theory that is decidedly deterministic, a 
theory in which the particles move along the trajectories that are set in stone for all eternity? Can 
we not, given enough effort, come to know at least some of these fixed trajectories, hopefully those 
of most significance for our everyday life? Bohmian mechanics is forced to explain wherefrom comes 
this limit on what can be learnt about the universe in a theory so precise, with precise motion of 
                                                             
83 Another reason to expect such abandonment is the expectation, also mentioned above, that through 
interactions the wavefunctions of larger chunks of matter, and eventually the whole universe should get 
entangled into an overall universal wavefunction. The nonlocality of wavefunctions also precludes the long-
term isolation of the system wavefunctions.  
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spatially located, almost tangible, particles. This is, so it seems, where the constructive approach 
leans close to the principle one, though the exact comparison will be left for the next chapter.  
The proponents of the limited constructive approach have to postulate a universal constraining 
principle based on the simple phenomenological observation that the bare quantum formalism is 
the most we can know about the physical systems we are dealing with. They claim (cf. (Dürr, 
Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1992)) that we must assume that the set of initial distributions of the universe 
capable of yielding wavefunctions for individual systems that we in fact observe, out of the total set 
of all possible initial distributions, is itself very large. That is, given some universal wavefunction for 
the whole universe (the great universal ‘goo’) there are relatively many particular distributions of 
particle positions that accord with the given wavefunction and the ascription of individual system 
wavefunctions to many systems today ( (Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1992), cf. also (Goldstein & 
Struyve, 2007)). So we can’t know which particular particle distribution the universe started off in 
and has been evolving deterministically from ever since.  
Further technical argument is then developed to show that we cannot in fact know more than the 
individual systems’ wavefunctions tell us (and, remember those are stochastic and give rise to 
entanglement etc.) even for isolated systems today. The technical argument states that the 
individual system wavefunction can be thought of as a hypothetical part of the universal 
wavefunction. Hypothetical in that it does not represent a real object, but is an encoding of the best 
of human knowledge about what is going on. In order to work with systems at hand we can rely on 
such hypothetical separation of the world into the ‘system at hand’ and the ‘rest of the universe’ 
because, mathematically, such separation is complete modulo the wavefunction. Our best 
knowledge of the dynamical evolution of the configurations of interest will be given only by the 
individual system wavefunction. For that wavefunction provides the mathematical link between the 
abstract representations of the configurations of the system of interest and the rest of the universe. 
The configuration of the system of interest and the configuration of the environment are 
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conditionally independent given the wavefunction ψ of the system of interest (Dürr, Goldstein, & 
Zanghi, 1992)).  
To summarise the above in even simpler terms. We can’t know the exact distribution of all the 
particles in the universe at some given point in time. Take that point to be the starting point. In 
order to derive the formalism that we use for the limited sets of particles today, we must assume 
that at the starting point the exact distribution of those particles was typical, i.e. that overall it was 
standard (that the particles, or the particle in many dimensional configuration space, were 
‘randomly’ strewn about). That assumption then provides us with the mathematical tools to derive 
the individual system ‘hypothetical’ wavefunctions from the universal wavefunction (whose exact 
state is also unknown to us). Given that assumption we can relate our ordinary quantum formalism 
for the systems we play with in the lab and the universal wavefunction for the entire universe. The 
latter is unknown to us, but as long as the universe started in some typical state, we don’t even need 
to know it for we will be able to extract our ‘mini-wavefunctions’ for the systems of interest from 
the general outlines (the ‘typical’ features) of the ‘supreme global goo’.  
But we, nonetheless, have to bear in mind the extreme nonlocality of the Bohmian Mechanics in 
which all the systems of interest are inextricably causally (though not mechanically) linked to all 
other particles in the universe through the universal wavefunction. So even when we extract our 
hypothetical wavefunction for the systems of interest, the predictions it is able to give us about the 
behaviour of the system are at best probabilistic, we only get a probability distribution of possible 
outcomes. So the world is made of particles that move in a unique manner through spacetime, but 
the exact manner of their movement (even their exact positions) is forever unknown to us. 
Unknown, because it is linked to all the other matter in the universe in a highly non-classical way (i.e. 
not linked through the causal mechanical interactions we are familiar with).  
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Troublesome phenomena as products of a global law  
So we end up with a strange world. The individual wavefunctions are not fields that spread through 
classical  spacetime. The only such field is the universal wavefunction. But that wavefunction does 
not exist in the three-dimensional space with us and our everyday objects, it exists in the 
multidimensional configuration space and guides the universal particle, a queen bee of all the 
fundamental ontological entities in the universe. Somehow, through the universal particle (which 
itself is not real or fundamental, on this interpretation) the wavefunction affects all the universe’s 
three-dimensional particles in a highly choreographed, nonlocal and deterministic ‘dance’. Our 
troublesome phenomena are a product of the behaviour of the three-dimensional ontological 
primitives mysteriously instructed by something that is itself immaterial (by not being a part of the 
three-dimensional space of matter). Moreover, we have to postulate a constraining principle, 
namely the hypothesis of the (initial) quantum equilibrium, in order to reproduce the 
phenomenology of the bare quantum formalism and its role in the lives of the physicists. This 
principle is not unreasonable, it is more than a bare statement of the existing constraint, it aims to 
provide a rational justification for the constraint on the acquisition of knowledge about the precise 
current state of the particles in the reality, but it is nonetheless postulated as an a priori hypothesis 
in order to save appearances.  
Another look at the situation described above opens up a perspective that we are dealing, 
unexpectedly for the constructive approach, with the in-principle limits of knowability situation 
again (just as in the neo-Bohrian approaches of the previous chapter). Yet following the historical 
precursor it is worth asking how it differs from the explanation of entropy through statistical 
mechanics rather than thermodynamics. Are the limits of knowability themselves explained or just 
posited as a theorem of the conceptual framework? Whatever the answer might be, the crucial 
difference for us is that statistical mechanics fitted well with the conceptual framework based on 
spatially extended particles in interaction, whilst Bohmian Mechanics has an extreme demand for 
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separability violation. The saving grace lies in exploring the potentials for a conceptual framework 
without separability as its implicit foundational principle.  
An account from Albert ( (1992 ); and further modifications in (Maudlin, 2008)) can help illustrate 
this problem visually. We consider a device that provides some ‘measurement’ of the particle, 
depending on the trajectory the particle takes through the device. More precisely, the particle can 
exit the ‘measuring’ device through an exit facing the ceiling, and in that case we say the particle has 
the value of some property ‘up’; whilst if the particle exists the device through the floor-facing exit, 
we say its value of the given property is ‘down’.84 It can be shown that when a single particle is fed 
through this device (and because the trajectories in configuration space cannot cross) the initial 
details of the location of the particle affect its behaviour following the measurement. That is, the 
particle that entered the device via a route that is closer to the ceiling, ended up exiting it through 
the ceiling hole, and the one that enters closer to the floor ends up veering towards the floor-facing 
exit. In such case, even if it cannot be demonstrated experimentally because of the knowledge-
gathering limitations of the quantum equilibrium, we would have a perfectly visualisable account of 
the physical phenomena formalised by quantum theory.  
But in the entanglement situations things become more complicated. It turns out that if we set up 
two devices to ‘measure’ two such particles that are initially taken to be in the entangled anti-
correlated state, then the outcomes of measurements of individual particles must be ‘opposite’ (i.e. 
one exits through the ceiling-facing exit and the other through the floor-facing exit) regardless of 
what their initial positions were. Or rather, the outcome of the second measurement to be 
performed must be opposite of that of the first, regardless of what the particle’s position in the 
entrance hole of its measuring device was. Whether an individual particle exhibits a particular result 
cannot be determined simply by the initial location (in the range of positions allowed by the 
                                                             
84 The original formulations of the example contain properties (such as spin) that make the situation more 
physical, but as the point is to demonstrate the importance of the location of the particle, and its dependence 
on the locations of other particles, I prefer not to introduce unnecessary technicalities here.  
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entrance hole), for if it could then there would be a completely local account of the EPR-style 
correlations, and those correlations would not be exhibited the way they are.  
Suppose the two particles were both in the initial location ranges that would, had they not been in 
the entangled state, see them exit the device through the ceiling facing exit, and the devices are 
sufficiently separated in space. Albert (1992 ) shows that if the left-hand particle is ‘measured’ first, 
it will be found to exit the device through the ceiling-facing exit and the right-hand particle will be 
found to exit its device through the floor-facing exit. If the situation is reversed, and the right-hand 
particle is measured first then it will be found to exit through the ceiling-facing exit, and the left-
hand particle through the floor-facing exit of its device.  
“And this holds no matter how far apart the two 
[particles] are, and it holds without the action of any 
intermediary particles or fields traveling between the 
two sides of the experiment. So the behavior of the 
right-hand [particle] at some moment depends on what 
has happened (arbitrarily far away) to the left-hand 
[particle]. The dynamical non-locality of Bohm’s theory is 
thereby manifest.” (Maudlin, 2008, p. 162) 
All of this is achieved, according to Maudlin (2008) by the way the wavefunction choreographs 
particle behaviour. We are not given a mechanism of how the effects of what happens to one 
particle can influence what happens to another (there are no particles or fields travelling between 
them), but rest on the simple summation that what one particle exhibits (in a ‘measuring’ 
interaction, for example) may depend on how a very distant particle is treated. In fact, when the real 
universal wavefunction is taken into account, instead of the conditional wavefunction for individual 
systems, then it may depend on how (indefinitely) many distant particles are treated.  
What kind of explanation does this leave us with? Correlations in measurement outcomes on our 
separated particles cannot be attributed to a common cause (cf. (Maudlin, 2007) exposition of 
separability violation in 3. 2. 2 below), but neither can they be attributed to the transmission of 
physical signals between the particles. They are taken to simply come about without a causal 
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mechanism, but through a previously (prior to measurement) unknown nomic prescription (encoded 
in the universal law) that they should. A serious question arises: how does this explain them?  
In Bohmian Mechanics the troublesome non-local phenomena are arrived at bluntly, even if the full 
justification of their ‘explanation’ is rather convoluted. The events whose ‘outcomes’ are 
mysteriously correlated over large distances in fact share a connection mediated by the 
wavefunction, rather than by some spatially localised physical conditions or particles that propagate 
faster than light (Maudlin, 2008). The distant correlations are thus explained by the dynamics that 
governs the total configuration of particle positions (the global wavefunction) by a global law rather 
than an effect of a local law on each individual particle. Of course, one problem with this notion is 
that it seems to require the absolute simultaneity, something that seems to be prohibited by Special 
and General Theories of Relativity.  
The universal wavefunction, as some form of a universal dynamical (and causal) law must rely on 
some notion of absolute flow of time, in order to determine the instants of absolute simultaneity, 
and thus determine which particles enter their ‘measuring’ devices universe-wide. Though the latter 
is an interesting technical issue, it need not concern us here, as we are not arguing for locality from 
the technical position of conflict with Relativity, but from a more general position of universal 
application of the principle of separability. As far as our explanatory viewpoint is concerned, and 
especially its concurrence with the classical everyday conceptual framework, we can easily, taken at 
face value, accommodate the absolute simultaneity and the notion of flow of time.  
What pushes us to consider the wavefunction in general, and most importantly the universal 
wavefunction, as the physical law rather than an element of the physical reality described by laws of 
nature? Two primary reasons are (1) the fact that although the wavefunction affects the behaviour 
of the particles, there is no formal account of particles affecting the wavefunction; and (2) for a 
system of many particles the formal expression of the wavefunction is not a field in physical space 
(such as, for example, electromagnetic field is) but on an abstract high-dimensional configuration 
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space. However, formally, this is not a unique case as there are objects of formalism in classical 
physics which exhibit similar prediction-usefulness combined with abstraction, but are not 
considered to correspond to anything special in the real world. They are recognised as shortcuts in 
human descriptions of the real world, without accompanying ontological projections. They, though, 
are not dynamical.  
The universal wavefunction does not itself change with time (though precise formulations are as yet 
insufficiently explored, according to (Goldstein, Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Information, 
2007)), but is just a nomological encoding of the changes of particles (which is what we observe in 
the end). In that case the derivative or system-wavefunction is just a phenomenological law, an 
instrumental ease of calculation device (similar ontologically to the suggestion of the principle 
approach from the previous chapter), whilst the (unknown) universal wavefunction is in fact the 
fundamental dynamical law governing the behaviour of all the particles in the universe.  
What is more interesting for us, and is related to the discussion about simultaneity in Bohmian 
mechanics in literature (cf. (Albert, 1992 ); (Maudlin, 2008)), is the empirical inaccessibility of the 
planes of absolute simultaneity, i.e. the precise global dynamics of the particles as governed by the 
wavefunction. That is, we cannot, for reasons sketched above, experimentally determine the exact 
position of the particles in Bohmian Mechanics (Maudlin, 2008). With each attempt to physically 
determine the exact positions of the particles we disturb the wavefunction and thus those very 
positions of the particles.85 History of science notes a strong dislike (in part due to the tradition of 
logical empiricism, but only in part) for the explanations based on the postulation of empirically 
indeterminable facts. In this case we have the perfect determinism of the distantly correlated 
events, precise constructions of macroscopic objects out of unique positions of constituent particles, 
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 Notice the functional similarity here, that is at the moment only to be noted and taken at face value, 
between the Bohmian inaccessibly of the exact particle positions, Bohrian and neo-Bohrian sensitivity of the 
real systems to observer-intervention and the structural ‘black boxes’ of the CBH programme. Yet, we can still 
expect to get different explanations of the troublesome phenomena from these varying theoretical 
programmes based on the role the empirical inaccessibility plays within each account.  
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and the unique temporal evolution of the wavefunction governing them; but all of them forever 
inaccessible to empirical observation. The best we can contend with are the probabilistic 
‘guesstimates’ as encoded in the standard quantum formalism.  
Maudlin (2008) (Putnam, Mathematics, Matter, and Method, 1979)offers two lines of reasoning in 
defence of such obscurantism. Firstly, the posited structure is not physically superfluous, it does 
some explanatory work and is not merely introduced into the theory as a decoration. He sees the 
Newtonian Absolute Space as such a decoration, because not only can it not be physically detected 
(or rather the position within it cannot be physically ascertained) but also its postulation has no 
physical consequence (unlike that of the Neo-Newtonian, or Galielan, space). But all the ontological 
elements of the Bohmian scheme are not physically superfluous; they cannot be subtracted from the 
conceptual framework without physical consequence.  
The second line of reasoning aims to show that there is no extra work being done to cover-up the 
existence of the empirically inaccessible structure. That is, we do not add new elements in the 
Bohmian theory that do no other work but obscure some elements of its ontology from empirical 
observation.86 Maudlin claims that the inaccessibility of some of the ontological elements is an 
involuntary (maybe even unwanted) consequence of the simplest dynamical solutions to the 
explanatory problems we are facing. Take the world made of particles, take the information about 
its behaviour as given by the formalism (or its important element, the wavefunction) and you get a 
mechanism (supposedly) explaining how the troublesome phenomena arise, but not permitting the 
direct accessibility of the ontological elements the said explanation depends on. This does not have 
to be direct observation, it can be some form of empirical testing designed to tease out the precise 
characteristics of the ontological element. Though such explanatory mechanism may not be popular, 
Maudlin claims it is not devastating for the viability of the Bohmian conceptual framework, as the 
empirical inaccessibility of the said ontology is a consequence of the physics, but not of the physics 
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 One might argue, though, that postulating the quantum equilibrium hypothesis achieves exactly this, but as 
has been argued above there are additional reasons for its introduction.  
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designed or motivated to produce that inaccessibly. Though the latter line of reasoning seems 
shakier than the former, we can temporarily accept both as defence of the viability of the Bohmian 
framework. They will both prove to be a relative weakness of that framework, though, if the 
explanatory models it is compared against can do without them.  
Perhaps unnecessarily repeating what has been stated above, it turns out on this account that 
explaining the ‘troublesome’ phenomena rests on an instance of knowledge-updating so it would 
accord with the pre-determined universal ‘choreography’. On such view even the separability loss is 
not so crucial as the supposed fundamental principle behind our ordinary conceptual framework was 
just an illusion arising from ignorance, anyway. So on extreme reading even influences can be sent to 
achieve change from proximal to distant measurement (and vice versa), only we are in-principle not 
in a position to learn about them directly. The following half of this chapter examines once more, 
from various philosophical angles, how we could learn to live being forced with such a predicament.  
3. 2. Laws as part of fundamental explanatory ontology  
Metaphysical problems related to realism about unobservable microstructural concepts  
Leaving aside, for the moment, quibbles over the role of fundamental laws it is worth briefly 
considering the philosophical problem of resting scientific explanations on properties of entities that 
are not directly observable, such as the Bohmian particles are. Unlike the principle approaches of the 
previous chapter, the constructive approach of Bohmian mechanics must be able to account for the 
classical criticism, most notable from the extreme empiricist camp, against relying on speculations 
about the properties of unobservable entities in producing scientific explanations.  
Most philosophers of physics would agree that novel predictions in science provide a good reason to 
believe the theoretical constituents they rely on. A simplified version of the ‘miracle’ argument 
(Putnam, 1979) could say that it would be a miracle for a novel prediction to come out right and the 
theoretical construction preceding it to be wrong (or at least wrong in more than inessential details). 
Were we to be given such a prediction, which resulted in confirmation, and for which one of our 
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approaches above had a ready made explanatory account whilst the other struggled to even 
incorporate it into its world-view, the case would be next to decided. This is in fact what the 
traditional accounts in philosophy of science expect from the competing theories. However, to the 
best of my knowledge our ‘troublesome’ phenomena still lack such predictions, not to mention their 
confirmations.87 Thus novel predictions remain excluded as the deciding factor between the 
explanatory successes of our two approaches. As has been sketched in the introduction most of our 
preferred, successful explanations rely the on mechanisms that contain unobservable entities. We 
might even say that the preferred explanations in contemporary science consist of reductions to 
unobservable entities. Add to those the causation and laws, the possibility of manipulation as 
exemplified in the counterfactual situations and the predictive success evidenced in contemporary 
science, and we see that alternative models should only be sought for in situations which make the 
causal mechanism utterly unpalatable. But there are more general arguments that work against 
resting explanatory success on unobservables whose essential function is to produce the observed 
phenomena.  
For example, van Fraassen (1980) argues against using the explanatory virtues (in this case the 
adherence to a widely popular model of explanation) as reasons for believing a given theory. He 
distinguishes between epistemic and pragmatic virtues of theories. A pragmatic virtue might be the 
property of a given theoretical framework to make quick and easy calculations. Though this would 
count in favour of using the framework when dealing with the phenomena covered by the theory, it 
cannot be the reason for considering the given framework to be closer to truth than its alternatives.  
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 This is not strictly true. The constructive approach is able to offer some predictions, but they deal with much 
deeper theoretical generalizations than the narrow group of phenomena under consideration (separability 
violations). The principle approach also has some theoretical expectations closer to the ‘zone of observation’ 
but currently out of reach of verification. The caveat is that the theoretical constructions characterised by the 
two approaches prevent the empirical verification of the said predictions, i.e. they have built-in a priori 
constraints to empirical verifications of the differentiating predictions, cf. (Albert, 1992 , pp. 183-189).   
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Thus, van Fraassen claims that the only epistemic virtues of theories are the empirical virtues of 
getting more observable consequences right and fewer of them wrong.88 On such a view explanatory 
virtues of our two approaches constitute a pragmatic virtue, and as such cannot decide between 
them, given that both are empirically adequate. But this objection is ignorant of the special situation 
we are in given the ever increasing closeness among our two opposing approaches, as well as the 
admitted reaching for purely philosophical tools outside the realm of good empirical scientific 
practice.  We are, thus, choosing to simply overstep van Fraassen’s concerns in order to move out of 
the stalemate of empirical adequacy of both approaches, even if van Fraassen were to declare the 
choice a purely aesthetic one. An upshot of further and more detailed criticism of using explanatory 
power as virtue in defending mechanistic accounts (cf. (Boyd, 2002)), or similar realist accounts, is 
the requirement that the findings of the relevant background sciences should be relevantly 
approximately accurate. Now, such justifications can indeed be provided, but not a priori as the 
reliance on the explanatory virtue requires. Furthermore, it will not be an easy task to provide them 
in the light of alterations to the conceptual scheme required by the failure of separability. This 
seems to be another respect in which the mechanistic approach of this chapter is comparable to the 
speculative elements of the previous one.  
Properties  
Yet in the troublesome phenomena it is not just correlations within the entangled states that are the 
problem, but the actual swapping of properties in the phenomena such as teleportation. Is it at all 
possible to explain such processes by the ‘action’ of a law? What form would a law of regulated 
property swap need to adopt and how would it fit with the wider worldview?   
The fundamental ontological tradeoff reflects the 
perennial tension between explanatory power and 
epistemic risk, between a rich, lavish ontology that 
promises to explain a great deal and a more modest 
                                                             
88 We shall not enter the discussion of the pros and cons of empiricism, nor whether van Fraassen’s view 
sketched here is an instance of excessively strong empiricism. Let us just assume that empirical adequacy is 
guaranteed for both of our approaches and that it constitutes the bedrock below which neither of them can 
go.  
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ontology that promises epistemological security. The 
more machinery we postulate, the more we might hope 
to explain – but the harder it is to believe in the 
existence of all the machinery. (Swoyer, 2000)  
We are here interested in determining properties (in the traditional sense) that withstand the loss of 
separability and are affected by the laws imposed on the world as fundamental. A most pressing 
issue is to survey the choice of properties traditionally (in classical physics) assumed fundamental 
and investigate any possible changes to them by acceptance of the Bohmian strategy for addressing 
the troublesome phenomena.  
Swoyer (2000) claims that properties are usually introduced into ontology in order to help “explain 
or account for phenomena of philosophical interest.” They are usually taken to be the ground of 
phenomena in a manner that some phenomenon holds in virtue of some properties. We can then 
play the game of investigating the conditions imposed on the property by its explanatory role: 
investigate what properties would have to be like in order to play the roles of explaining the 
phenomena. It is, of course, possible to claim that this is a vacuous game, that properties have no 
explanatory power and are a mere fig leaf to cover our lack of understanding of what a given 
phenomenon is. In our case, if that were really so, a strife to settle for any sort of explanation of the 
troublesome phenomena should help us decide how much, if at all, we really need to rely on the 
properties proposed.  
The philosophical topics surrounding properties are wide in scope and not always empirically 
grounded. What we are concerned with specifically is how the classical properties characteristic of 
physical objects fare in the physical interactions of a novel kind, such as those presented as the 
troublesome phenomena. These phenomena themselves do not directly dispute that the objects 
participating in them have a position is space or even some discrete extension, but it is the nature of 
changes of those properties that is troublesome from the viewpoint of classical physics, the physics 
that introduced those properties to explain its own phenomena of interest. We are thus more 
concerned with how a property of a particle can change or be undetermined (metaphysically, as well 
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as epistemically) without observable physical interaction with other particles or fields, rather than 
whether a given property, a universal, can simultaneously exist in more than one place (which is a 
popular problem related to properties). Moreover, what kind of a world is inhabited by objects that 
seem to interchange properties as if they were coats without us being able to keep a precise record 
of the details of those exchanges and what governs them.89 Finally, what can we hold fixed in such a 
world, so as to recognise a change as a different state against a background of things that do not 
change?  
Such firm foundation was provided by primary properties, made most famous by Locke, though the 
notion goes back to the Greek atomists. The primary properties are the directly recognisable 
objective features of the world, the most straightforward exemplifications of the isomorphism 
between the structure of reality and the formal elements of our physical theories (and 
accompanying conceptual frameworks) describing that reality. They are often so fundamental that 
they are used to explain why things have the other properties that that they do. Traditionally these 
have most famously included shape, size (features of extension) and some variants of mass and 
charge/force field. The secondary properties, on the other hand, are the reflections of powers 
inherent in objects to produce certain responses in humans, but are primarily rooted in primary 
properties (cf. Descartes’ rules for understanding complex phenomena in terms of primitives, in 
Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule XII, (Descartes, 1931)).  
What kind of properties can we expect the constructive approach of this chapter to rely on? With 
the particles moving in the physical space, extension remains a fundamental property. But what 
other properties are there and what role does extension play if it is not sufficiently/significantly 
contributing to the changes in those other properties given that they can change instantaneously at 
a distance? If we cannot account for the systematic attainment and alteration of properties by the 
token objects (in this case particles) what sort of realism can we cling to with regard to the physical 
                                                             
89
 Of course, even coats are exchanged along some traceable spacetime route, so we are really stuck for 
analogies here.  
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reality described by quantum theory? Abandoning realism, even if of some weaker kind, would put 
this approach to the troublesome phenomena in the same metaphysical boat (if not even worse) as 
the principle approaches of the previous chapter, at least when it comes to accounting for the real 
changes in the world that stand behind the observation of the troublesome phenomena.  
In Devitt’s (2006) account (relying on his detailed exposition in (Devitt, 1997)) realism assents to 
existence of the most common-sense and scientific physical types as objective and independent of 
the mental. Opposed to it is the view that the independent reality cannot be epistemically accessed 
and correctly conceptually described and that the phenomena we are concerned with are partly 
constructed by our forced imposition of concepts onto the manifold of the bare perception. In 
Devitt’s view one of the appeals of realism, other than its intuitive acceptance outside the 
intellectual circles (2006, p. 6) is the rational rejection of the alternatives as unsatisfactory. From our 
perspective, the downside of the alternatives to realism is Devitt’s claim that they are explanatorily 
useless. That is, accepting that there might be some kind of world out there that is behind all the 
phenomena we are struggling with, but that that world cannot be known for what it is, leaves us 
with very little else to turn to something else in order to provide the sought for explanations. If 
constructive approaches of this chapter were characterised as such their stake in provision of 
explanation sought would instantaneously vanish.  
Although particles would still have an extension, it seems it would no longer be fundamental in their 
interactions, as they can alter their properties (to the extreme point represented in teleportation 
phenomena) without respect for the constraints spatial extension imposes on physical interaction. In 
the causal accounts relying on the primacy of the physical state, such as Harré (1996) advocates in 
the next section, laws of temporal evolution take a back seat. If the laws of temporal evolution are 
to be made primary, with the property possession and exchange depending entirely on them, are we 
threatened with a slide into anti-realism with respect to how we come to explain the phenomena we 
observe?  
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Suppose concepts such as ‘redness’ (a colour concept) do not have a direct ‘isomorphic’ connection 
to some real feature of the world, but designate “a disposition to produce a certain sort of response 
in normal humans under normal conditions” (Devitt, 2006, p. 11).  Globalising the argument to all 
properties runs as follows: all property concepts, not just those of secondary properties, are 
response-dependent. So all that we take to be properties in the real world are in fact response-
dependent dispositions to produce certain sort of responses in normal humans under normal 
conditions. The abhorrence of world-making along these lines lies, according to Devitt, in the need 
to posit something even more wildly speculative than the realist metaphysics: the noumenal things-
in-themselves which are really behind the observable phenomena painted by concepts. This way, of 
course, antirealists (world-makers) expect to limit irrational speculation, put some material 
constraints on what we can actually do with words and concepts. But, as Devitt points out, these 
noumenal things only present an illusion of a constraint, we can ex hypothesi know nothing of the 
‘mechanisms’ by which they exercise their constraint, we can not explain or predict any of the 
constraints, nor can ever hope to be able to do so. For if latter were the case we would be 
overstepping the bounds of world-making and venturing into speculative scientific metaphysics 
proper. Furthermore, causality is part of the exisintg scheme of concepts and cannot be extended to 
the link between the noumenal world and the conceptual scheme, thus we don’t even have a notion 
through which to connect the world-in-itself and our supposedly constrained view of it.  
To slide into world-making is to subscribe to the view that our concepts make up the world, that the 
structure of the world is dependent on our classificatory activity and not vice versa. Then the 
conceptual requirements of the theories would not be a discovery of what there is in the world 
(however primitive and coarse a discovery), but an act of literally recreating the world. The only way 
to avoid this is to say that somehow, by blunt fact, the facts of the world impose constraints on how 
our concepts are created and interlinked but that nothing more can in-principle be said about that. 
But even here, if there had been no conceptualizers, us, there just would have been no macroscopic 
material objects as well as the microscopic speculative metaphysics. That must be a claim that the 
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anti-realist of the world-making camp must be committed to (Devitt, 2006, p. 8). Whatever the 
outcome of this debate in philosophy and linguistics in general, it is clear that world-making 
explanations will not fare well in our case, even if confronted on the other side by mere agnosticism 
about entities and structures at the micro-level on the other side.  
As the laws governing the temporal evolution are primary existents, whilst the observable properties 
of objects are just a temporary product of their operation, those properties are not in the traditional 
sense fundamental and in the objects. We are just disposed to observe them as such under the 
influence of the laws, whilst they are not really there in the world, in the same way that redness as 
experienced by us is not in-the-world. In this way, through the abandonment of separability (to be 
argued for below), among other things, the undulating-high-dimensional-goo view and the laws-are-
primary view of quantum theory become two sides of the same coin.  
The objects that we either directly observe, or geometrically project as isomorphic sustainers of 
what we observe (cf. (Sellars, 1963) and section 4. 1), the atomistic construction of the observable 
world out of the unobservable fundamental particles, are to a great extent our projections arising 
from the dispositions of the true elements of reality behind them (the goo or the bare particles 
choreographed by the fundamental laws of temporal evolutions) to produce a certain response in us 
under normal conditions. This is because even the primary properties, such as extension, or 
consequently physical separation, are not metaphysically fundamental, existing in their own right 
and in direct isomorphism to how we conceptualise them.  
Of course, it is the issue of what is fundamental that is important here. It is not that we have not had 
response-dependent concepts in the explanatory schemes before, such as the colour concepts 
introduced above might be. But that did not pose any problems because there have always been 
some fundamental property concepts that these could be drawn from, such as surface texture or 
microphysical interaction with surface particles. The latter were fundamental concepts rooted in the 
conceptual and theoretical isomorphism with material reality based on the primacy of the concept 
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of extension.90 With denying such fundamental status to all properties or to all formally describable 
physical interactions (which depended on the participating objects having certain fundamental 
properties that further predisposed them for a certain interaction) we lose the firm footing for a 
realist explanation of the observed phenomena.  
Causation  
If the troublesome phenomena are better explained by the reliance on operation of laws and causal 
processes than on unification of the phenomena into a wider world-picture held together by shared 
properties across phenomena and degrees of magnitude of extension, then we can regard 
momentary properties employed in descriptions of the phenomena as fleeting shadows of a 
classically constructed language. The onus is then to show how the non-unifying account will work 
and also that it will not rely on the classically introduced properties, at least not in crucial instances. 
Of course, properties have been known to feature in causal accounts, especially where reduction of 
causation to causal powers is introduced (cf. (Harre, 1996), but in that case we must lay them on a 
more firm account that does not slide into anti-realism proper (‘worldmaking’ in (Devitt, 2006)).  
Though causation per se is outside the scope of this thesis, it is inextricably linked with issues of 
ontology in physics, both in historical development of the mechanical explanations (cf. section 1.2.), 
and in conceptual characteristics of contemporary desirable forms of explanations (cf. introductory 
sections of Chapter 4). Essentially there are two conflicting overarching accounts of causation: one 
affirming the key role it plays in explanatory conceptualisation of reality and the other denying a 
fundamental role for the notion of causation in explanation (reducing it to either a psychological 
error or a merely heuristically useful device). In a nutshell, we expect the real ontology to account 
for causal processes, but can never strictly observe anything other than a concurrent regularity of 
physical phenomena with no inherent mark of what makes them causal. We get a pro- and anti- 
realism views of causation.  
                                                             
90 And isomorphism should be taken seriously here, it designates an easy or natural correspondence with a 
basic everyday conceptual scheme. Something a multidimensional configuration space may not be able to 
achieve.  
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The segment of history of the role of causation in science relevant here starts in the seventeenth 
century with the abandonment of the Aristotelian final causes and focus on the search for efficient 
causes through mechanical philosophy. Yet the problems immediately arose with those segments of 
reality that could not be modelled by strict mechanical contact, such as gravity. And it is here that 
divine will was often invoked in place of the mechanical essence: “Gravity must be caused by an 
agent acting constantly according to certain laws” (Newton, 1957).91 Even though such mystical 
explanations had to be grudgingly accepted, the majority of science was expected to move towards 
the ideal of a Laplacian demon where causation and the deterministic nature of laws of physics 
provided an exact mechanical description/explanation of all physical processes, past, present and 
future. This attempt for overall regularity in science, and physics in particular lost its general appeal 
with the advent of non-deterministic theories early in the twentieth century.92  
But, of course, philosophy was not to be swayed by such scientific strivings and we thus have the 
great Humean analysis of the fictional nature of causation as a mere psychological erroneous 
projection of human expectations onto the physical processes. Hume argues from the epistemic 
atomism of individual (perceptible) states of physical reality to the conclusion that all that can be 
learnt from observation alone is the concurrence of certain types of states (e.g. stone hitting, glass 
breaking), but not their necessary or physical connection through some causal process. Causes and 
effects are held to be absolutely independent in reality, and consequently must be held to be so in 
concept too (Harre, 1996, p. 311). We thus have the Humean Mosaic.  
The reliance of the Humean doctrine on ‘epistemic atomism’ is of importance for our purposes. 
Atoms of experience are held to be the experienced sensory elements that are both the ultimate 
                                                             
91 Of course, this historical problem can be resolved in the same sweep as our current ones by taking the 
fundamental laws of temporal evolutions as ontologically primitive and simply attributing all gravitational 
interaction to obedience of gravitational laws regardless of the media and details of interaction.  
92
 This is not just a case of quantum theory, the popular champion of indeterminism, but even in  
Relativity theory processes on a larger scale cannot be uniquely specified through a single causal process. In 
fact, Harré (1996, pp. 304-307) charts attempts parallel with development of mechanical philosophy that 
either argue for or against dynamism, a view that sensibly inaccessible forces (similar to contemporary field 
theory) produce and sustain causal processes across the universe, and even replace material ontology of 
spatially extended entities (in a Cartesian sense).  
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components of perception as well as of the world-as-experienced (the phenomenal world). As 
opposed to the explicit denial of the Humean Mosaic later in this chapter, if the approaches of the 
previous chapter are shown to rely on just such experiential atoms in their analysis of the 
troublesome phenomena, then they can straightforwardly be expected to be deniers of the reality of 
causation, and with it, of the causal explanations. Narrowing this down solely to their chosen field, 
namely information manipulation, could help them escape explanatory zeal for causal accounts. The 
theories presented in the two central chapters could be viewed as either affirming or denying what 
Norton (Norton, 2007) terms the ‘causal fundamentalism’: nature is governed by cause and effect (in 
the case of this chapter: a primitive law) and the burden of individual theories is to find the 
particular expressions of the general notion in the realm of their specialised subject matter.  
Harré, on the other hand, proposes arguments from psychology and epistemology to show that the 
sensory invariant in the experience of phenomena (though, material not informational phenomena) 
is not the wholeness of the phenomenon itself, but the general things, the fundamental units of 
realist ontology out of which the experience is constructed. This opens a way for him to argue for 
the reality of causal processes at least in some cases, and our two approaches can then be compared 
on the types of causal processes they propose. Harré (1996, p. 321) sees the fundamental ontology 
of science as constructed out of entities whose essential natures are given by their causal powers, 
and whose causal agency93 is well delineated. This chides well with general preference for causal 
explanations. In this case the constructive ontology and the account of causal processes are 
inextricably linked, as is suggested by the nature of causal explanation and the adherence to the 
primitive role of laws of temporal evolution. This does require, however, that the constructive 
approach recognises the equally fundamental role played by the general things, the token-type 
objects, alongside the law of temporal evolution. If such material ontological components of the 
‘troublesome’ phenomena can be found, or if the ‘information ontology’ (of Chapter 2) can 
                                                             
93 This is a more detailed aspect of Harré’s exposition that need not concern us here. He distinguishes agents 
and patients in causal interactions, where patients must be stimulated to produce actions, whilst agents need 
only be released to act (Harre, 1996, p. 322).    
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successfully replace them, then we might be able to compare the outlines of causal pictures 
suggested by either approach.  
Functionally, then, we want causation to be understood through knowing what would happen to the 
object central to our phenomenon to be explained had the relevant surrounding circumstances been 
different. The ontology that takes laws as primary and yet epistemically inaccessible might struggle 
to give a workable solution along these lines, as it would lack the details of the manipulable 
mechanism that leads to observable changes in objects. Yet quantum theory overcomes this 
obstacle surprisingly well, with the effective wavefunctions (though, necessarily statistical in nature), 
thus providing a workable manipulable mechanism. The problem is that our notion of object and its 
durability through changes is slightly altered, and we shall have to bear that in mind in the next 
chapter (sections 4.4. and 4.5.).  
Chanciness  
Our everyday (non-technical) conceptual framework views causation as part of regulated (i.e. not 
completely chaotic) behaviour of ordinary objects. This behaviour is determined by a small set of 
conditions: the object’s dispositions to respond to various sorts of interference and the listing of the 
sorts of interference the objects of that kind in fact encounters. Speaking plainly, we know for most 
everyday objects when they will break and when they will fly, and what local situations will arouse 
either behaviour. But in non-local physical theories, no small set of conditions suffices to determine 
an ordinary object’s behaviour. We need to specify the entire state of the world at one time in order 
to determine the state of even a small region at some future time (Elga, 2007). This is the nightmare 
of non-local theories, such as quantum theories examined here are.  
To wake up out of the nightmare, we might suggest, as Norton (2007) does, that the specification of 
the entire state of the universe is a task only extreme pedants ever need fulfilled. He sees the 
everyday view of causality as the approximately correct model in certain limited domains, and that 
the physicists need not ever venture into something more except when extreme precision of 
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prediction or description is required. This would mean that the pedantically formalised laws are such 
that in certain domains they can make the everyday view true, this must be their formal feature. But 
Elga (2007) argues that some laws (and these are our ‘troublesome’ ones), whilst formally perfectly 
respectable, are nonetheless such that they do not make the everyday view even approximately true 
in any domains at all.  
In the case of some of such laws Elga claims we are warranted by appropriate statistical assumptions 
to treat the law-following behaviour as intrinsically chancy. This allows us to treat the objects 
susceptible to such laws as mostly isolated and feign to hand over their supersensitive causal 
connectedness to the intrinsic indeterminacy of the physical reality. Of course, as sketched above, 
this not a very prudent position to take, and neither of the approaches presented in this thesis will 
ever fully embrace it. That would mean secretly committing to the super-connected ontology, one 
that utterly removes separability as real constraining principle, and yet develop a formal theoretical 
approach that chooses never to tackle this characteristic of reality formally. We would then have to 
claim instead that the indeterminacy predicted is not epistemic (i.e. is not an ignorance 
interpretation) but is a formal expression of the deep chanciness of nature. It is hard to imagine an 
extreme abstraction where the two extremes are one and the same thing: where chanciness just is 
the supersensitive connection of everything in the world.  
Furthermore, quantum theory makes probabilistic predictions about the chances of different 
phenomenal experiences, which are extremely well confirmed on the aggregate level. But at the 
individual level, when each phenomenon or macroscopic event is viewed in isolation, we must also 
make sense of the probabilities that the formalism assigns to each particular event (or, to be precise, 
to a set of possible events). Formally, our explanations must also account for the completeness of 
Schrödinger dynamics, as well as the quantum state. That is, we have to say whether the 
probabilities ascribed by the formalism are real chances in nature, or are a product of our ignorance 
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about the true laws of nature (and then also explain how that ignorance comes about and what is to 
be done about removing it).  
And this seems to be the point where the roles of our two approaches are reversed. It is Bohmian 
Mechanics that takes the probabilities as merely epistemic, and states that the laws of nature are 
actually deterministic. It is only a calculational opportunism that leads to describing the processes as 
chancy (Maudlin, 2002, p. 146). The principle approaches that take the non-realist route to the 
quantum state ascription, are now pressed against a wall of taking an even stronger non-realist 
stance (claiming that the formal evolution of states is also a result of human ignorance) or accepting 
that something in reality, whatever it may be like, justifies the ascription of probabilities for each 
individual phenomenon. The latter requires taking the stochastic laws seriously at the ontological 
level, and thus taking the probability ascription equally seriously. This in turn means that the result 
of admitting a basic indeterminism in reality is the acceptance of probability ascription for particular 
event as a basic physical fact (Maudlin, 2002, p. 147). One that then must somehow be a part of the 
explanatory ontology.  
Abandon separability in favour of a radical causal mechanism  
The radical proposal of Bohmian Mechanics is worth recapitulating once again through a slightly 
different formulation of the EPR situation. The quantum formalism differentiates between the m=0 
triplet state and the singlet state (just technical terms for formally different states of particle pairs). 
But the statistics for the outcomes of measurement on the separated components are the same, 
which in combination with the separability principle suggests that these formally different states are 
in fact one and the same physical state of the particles (and the wavefunction or some such 
accompanying item). The problem once again stems from the troublesome correlations we are 
pressing to explain. Although no local measurements on the individual parts of the composite states 
(either the triplet or the singlet) can yield differences between the two, a global measurement on 
the overall pair can. Namely, if we decide to measure a property closely formally related to the 
property originally used to describe the state of the composite system, the formal differences 
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between the states take on a more important role empirically. What we in fact get is quite different 
expectation statistics for the two composite states, statistics that is empirically confirmed upon 
measurement. More precisely, if the original composite state was the singlet state, upon separation 
the measurement of the related property on each of the particles will yield directly opposite results 
(say ‘up’ and ‘down’) with a 50% chance of either combination (i.e. first ‘up’ – second ‘down’, and 
vice versa). In the triplet composite state though, the results will also have a 50% chance to come 
out either way, but this time with identical outcomes for distant separated particles, i.e. either both 
‘up’ or both ‘down’.  
The conclusion is that we cannot identify the singlet and the triplet states. But in that case we 
cannot have a sensible definition of separability either, for separability requires that either the 
states be identified or that we can tell what the difference between them is.94 But neither composite 
state can be expressed as a combination of individual particle states and the spatio-temporal 
relations between, for we cannot specify the individual states of the particles with certainty, except 
as a part of a composite system. And separability required, in summation, that the whole is no more 
than the sum of the parts (including spatio-temporal relations). Maudlin (2007, p. 61) concludes that 
no physical theory that takes the wavefunction seriously (i.e. that considers the formalism to be a 
complete veristic description of the physical system) can be a separable theory. In the language used 
in the paragraphs above we may say that considering the formalism (with the Bohmian additions 
included) to provide a complete description of the composite systems requires that we do not see 
the systems as separable entities that can be described by the momentary state of the component 
particles and the spatio-temporal relations between them alone, at any given instant of time. The 
wavfunction seems to be doing serious work that violates the separability of the states involved in 
                                                             
94
 A brief recap why this is so, in the current terminology. As no detectable signals are passed between the 
states, nor are they formally expected to, we expect the differences to be borne out of the initial formally 
indistinguishable states. This is because separability permits differences to be observed experimentally only if 
there is some detectable (or at least predictable) interaction (or signaling) between them. As there is not such 
distinguishable difference between the initial states, yet the global difference is distinguishable upon locally 
performed measurements, separability is violated,  
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the troublesome phenomena. Of course, and Maudlin refers to a similar proposal in (Loewer, 1996) 
here, the state may be considered separable in the configuration space rather than the three-
dimensional physical space, but that is a further metaphysical step we have chosen not to follow in 
this thesis (cf. the initial parts of Ch3).   
The central tenet of the constructive approach states that there is no other way out but to abandon 
separability.95 Everything else is deemed instrumentalist (the quantum formalism is incomplete and 
needs more work), or idealist (the states change under the conscious intervention or do not 
correspond to real physical changes), or demanding the alteration of logic (quantum logic) to 
accommodate a metaphysical principle (separability). The Bohmian approach is, of course, not the 
only viable such constructive solution and not the only one to abandon separability, though the only 
one with initial interest in mechanical structure as required by our two explanatory models. Given 
that one of the approaches that does respect separability is presented in the previous chapter, what 
we would like to know here is what the world without separability is like. But an interesting caveat 
opens in the preceding paragraphs, and even Maudlin (The Metaphysics Within Physics , 2007) 
points to it: separability has something to do with ‘knowabilty’, more so than with necessity. What 
leads to the conclusion that it must be abandoned, as presented above, is not so much that the 
physical reality as described by the identification of the singlet and the triplet states would be a 
priori impossible, but that it would be strangely closed to epistemic access.  
That is, something, and we can’t say exactly what, would preclude us from ever determining what 
state the particles in the composite states are really in. We would assume that they are in some 
definite state, that the state of the composite overall is a combination of their states and the spatio-
temporal relations between them, but we could never tell what the initial definite states are.96 We 
                                                             
95
 Maudlin (2007, p. 62) warns that abandonment of separability is not the same as the abandonment of 
locality, for separability can be maintained by non-local theories with superluminal or temporally reversed 
causal connections.  
96 And thus we are almost pushed into neo-Bohrian conclusions that the meaning of state of the particles can 
only be given in their relation of the system as a whole, i.e. the system and the measuring apparatus and the 
measurement required to determine the states afterwards. All of these include the operation of the irrational 
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seem to be forced to choose between two evils: limiting how much we can learn (empirically) about 
the material world, or abandoning the comfortable epistemological and causal apparatus we relied 
upon to hitherto successfully gather the knowledge about that same world. If this dogmatic issue 
can be at all deconstructed and evaluated, that will not be attempted in this chapter. Let us first turn 
our attention to what else separability abandonment, and with it the supposed impossibility of “the 
postulation of laws which can be checked empirically in the accepted sense” (Einstein, 1948, p. 322) 
requires.97  
What Maudlin (2007, pp. 61-62) alludes to is that separability is an important ingredient in the 
Humean Supervenience (Lewis, 1986), and that when forced to abandon separability we might also 
forced to abandon the Humean Supervenience. This means abandoning the position that “all there is 
to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of fact, just one little thing and then another (Lewis, 
1986, p. x) 
(But it is no part of the thesis that these local matters of 
fact are mental.) *…+ we have local qualities: perfectly 
natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger 
than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we 
have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. All else 
supervenes on that.” (Lewis, 1986, p. x) 
That makes the physical state of every space/time point independent of the laws that supposedly 
govern the evolution of phenomena, and thus suggests that laws are unreal, a mere human 
projection on the sequence of total factual states. All our explanations of the observed phenomena 
had an implicit reliance on the supervenience, the completeness of the description in the state of 
material existents. Of course, in explaining a process we had to include some projections of the 
causal relations between existents, but the description of an outcome was contained in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
element and thus prevent us from inferring more than momentary outcomes of measurement and global 
relative states (cf. Chapter 2 sections on Bohr).  
97
 Of course, Maudlin (The Metaphysics Within Physics , 2007) leaves some room for the middle ground as 
well, interpreting Einstein as demanding that theories be built on some minimum set of separable states, but 
not that all properties that are empirically ascertainable must be separable or depend on separable states. 
Presumably, Bohmian particles would provide such separable entities, whilst the wavefunction provides the 
inseparable ingredients.  
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momentary physical state (primarily). And sufficiently distant states could not be essentially 
connected. With the supervenience abandoned as well, we have cleared the way for the 
introduction of laws as primary ontological entities alongside material existents.  
What would a law as a primary ontological existent be like? Conceptually, this means that “the idea 
of a law of nature is not logically defined from, and cannot be derived in terms of other notions” 
(Maudlin, The Metaphysics Within Physics , 2007, p. 15). This is to say that laws are the patterns that 
reality necessarily exhibits, an essential part of an overall structure (whether we can observe them 
or not).98 Thus, what is physically possible is what is constrained within those patterns. But such a 
status, in Maudlin’s analysis still gets us no further to determining which of the regularities (such as 
the correlations between distant events) that we observe are fundamental laws. We may be, he 
says, living in an unlucky universe, or part of one, in which random stochastic processes produce 
perfect correlation between distant measurements without any underlying fundamental law 
(Maudlin, The Metaphysics Within Physics , 2007, p. 17). This would be a stroke of extremely bad 
luck, but it is a possibility we shouldn’t lose sight of when fitting the explanation of the troublesome 
phenomena into the overall world-view.  
But supposing our luck serves us, we may take the Schrödinger equation as a fundamental law of 
temporal evolution of the universe, and thus the mysterious ‘activities’ of the wavefunction are just 
a consequence of the operation of that fundamental law on the primary existents, the particles. As 
shorthand, we may then call this fundamental law (mathematically formalised in the Schrödinger 
equation) the action of the wavefunction, but have no need for the wavefunction as the actual 
existent that somehow ‘pushes the particles about’ (akin to a potential field or some such). Of 
course, logically, conceptually and formally the law and the wavefunction cannot be identified, but 
we might (in admitted sloppiness) call this underlying law: the wavefunction.  
                                                             
98 Maudlin (The Metaphysics Within Physics , 2007) also requires that the passage of time be considered as an 
ontological primitive, accounting for the basic distinction between the past and the future of an event. There is 
no space to enter that aspect of the problem here, but it neither detracts nor adds to the problems of 
explanation we have considered in this and the preceding chapter.  
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Maudlin (2007, p. 49) admits that this still does not provide an easy (or straightforward) explanation 
of all the troublesome phenomena in quantum theory. The entangled states of multiple particles 
cannot be understood as the sum of local physical states of each particle, with fundamental laws 
governing only the epistemically accessible interactions between particles. Moreover, as has been 
indicated previously, the evolution governed by the supposedly fundamental law behind the 
Schrödinger equation proceeds in Hilbert space, and not the ordinary physical space in which the 
particles sit. But he is more prone to revise our concepts of counterfactuals, locality and causality 
based on classical physics, than the empirically confirmed quantum theory. As the concepts of law, 
possibility, counterfactual, causality and explanation are deeply connected we could infer from 
quantum theory the direction the revision should take in providing the desired explanation.  
To begin with, it is intuitively clear that laws (if correctly identified) carry more explanatory power 
than mere truth-statements (be they accidental generalisations or not). In the first instance it is not 
difficult to provide explanations of individual instances of a phenomenon by subsumption under a 
law, but such explanation cannot be achieved by subsumption under an admittedly accidental 
generalisation. But we might, and often do, seek a further explanation for the law, or at least some 
further differentiation between a law and an accidental generalisation, other than claim that it just is 
a fundamental law. Note that a request to provide explanation places a serious requirement before 
a law (and a theory it forms a conceptual and formal part of). An ‘anything goes’ law would logically 
satisfy the subsumption of all the observed phenomena, but could hardly be said to explain any of 
them. Thus, Maudlin (The Metaphysics Within Physics , 2007) concludes in criticism of van Fraassen 
(Laws and Symmetry, 1989), that science has to aim at true theories (in his view construed round 
true fundamental laws) rather than just empirically adequate ones that need not bother with the 
ontological (and hierarchical) status of their formal statements.  
Supposing that we seek theories with greater explanatory power, what should we be looking for? 
Metaphysically adequate theories, claims Maudlin. Theories whose model constructs stand in one-
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to-one correspondence with the physically possible states of affairs. And the limitations of this 
physical possibility will be provided by the laws of nature. And, the stronger the limitations the more 
explanatory the theory will be, i.e. it will have fewer model constructs that correspond to possible 
states of affairs and be close to the list of observed/actual states of affairs. But there is a hidden 
danger here of multiplying restrictions until we get a simple description of the current state of 
affairs, which would be metaphysically adequate on the above account, but would not really be 
explanatory (‘the world just is as it is in every detail and it is the only way it could have been’). Our 
troublesome phenomena then need no more explanation than any other phenomenon, or indeed 
any fact, in the world.  
But, as Maudlin correctly points out, this does not describe the scientific practice. Scientists, even 
quantum physicists, do not work on producing an unchangeable and minutely detailed description of 
the current state of affairs, but a shorthand way of understanding what states of affairs are possible 
and where the current/observed one fits in. Thus, Maudlin claims, the contents of the model 
constructs are determined by three factors: “the laws, the boundary values, and the results of 
stochastic processes” (2007, p. 50); where the boundary values presumably allow for some 
determination of participating objects and states of their properties. The regularities we observe as 
patterns in model constructs can be entirely explained by subsumption under laws, whilst the 
regularities stemming from the other two factors may just not have an explanation at all within a 
given model (and the ‘final’ ones among them may not have any explanation at all if we admit 
fundamental chanciness in the physical reality).  
Adding laws as ontologically primitive allows us to better select for the theories with greater 
explanatory power, than mere objects-only-are-primitive theories can allow for. To borrow Lewis’ 
terminology, theories with fewer world-models give better explanations. By specifying laws as 
ontological existents we narrow down the availability of the world-models compared to the 
multitude available in the only-objects-are-primitive situation. On the other hand, in the Humean 
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Mosaic, laws cannot be used to explain its particular features because they are nothing more than 
generic features of the very same mosaic themselves. What they can do is contribute towards a 
unification type explanation by showing commonalities of structure among various distinct regions 
of space-time (Loewer, 1996, p. 113). In this way they can provide explanations of some phenomena 
(isolated segments of the mosaic) through unification with a larger class of the phenomena based on 
multiple snapshots of the mosaic, but there is certainly no explanation of the entire state of the 
mosaic at any given time. Primitive as it is, in its entirety the mosaic just is. Through their connection 
with the mosaic, from this perspective at least, adherence to separability and unification model of 
explanation go hand in hand.  
What those types of explanations cannot do, on the other hand, is provide an account of how some 
phenomenon was produced for they lack the causal mechanisms between different mosaic 
snapshots. But with the laws as primitive existents we can connect a structure in one snapshot with 
causally related structures in further snapshots. In this way we could provide an explanation of the 
occurrence of some structure in those further snapshots. In our case-study instances, the 
‘production’ of the later-state structures (the narrowing down of the class of possible world-models) 
is achieved by the introduction of a fundamental law as an in-itself-unexplainable primitive behind 
the troublesome phenomena. The correlations between the object-existents cannot be further 
explained than be specifying the law that governs the correlations regardless of how far in physical 
space the objects are and what further barriers may separate them. This strategy shares some 
similarities with the principle approaches of the previous chapter in seeking to functionally reify the 
boundaries on behaviour of objects or updating of knowledge about those objects. Maudlin does not 
provide a recipe to decide between the two types of explanation available, other than to argue that 
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neither Ockham’s Razor nor the standard Inference to the Best Explanation can be used as arbiters in 
this case (Maudlin, The Metaphysics Within Physics , 2007, p. 181).99  
3. 3. Summary of the constructive approaches  
The constructive approaches of Chapter 3 fare better according to the Lipton criteria. They bridge 
the gap between knowing that a phenomenon occurs and understanding the circumstances that 
lead to its occurrence through relying on the concepts of generative mechanism consisting of the 
particle-objects and the law governing their behaviour that is capable of inducing changes in the 
objects non-locally. The problem is that the details of the actions of the law are in-principle 
inaccessible, so the best we can have is again the guesstimate encoded in the quantum formalism. 
The details are inaccessible due to a peculiar state the whole universe is in, the quantum 
equilibrium. So when the phenomena are considered globally a radical cut in the generative story 
must be accepted so that the effects of the law on the particles is not uncovered through piecing 
together local states of the particles only, but considering the holistic elements that arise from the 
glimpses of the global law, as well. This is not damaging for the separable conceptualisation of the 
world as the holistic elements are relegated wholly to the non-spatial law, and the deterministically 
incomplete predictions of the local behaviour of objects cannot be improved on due to epistemic 
limitations of the quantum equilibrium state.  
The why regress is successfully blocked by providing a description of what the material world is like, 
including the acceptance of the universal law that plays a part in its changes. The problem is that we 
have no genuine explanation of why the quantum equilibrium constrictions hold, except for formal 
statistical considerations, it must be entered as a postulate that blocks the why-regress bluntly. This 
exposes the weaknesses of the constructive approach that do not allow it to escape much further 
than the principle approach gets. Finally the explanations have a self-evidencing characteristic in 
that the introduction of the universal law was motivated by the problems caused on purely 
                                                             
99
 In fact, he says that in this case the two amount to the same principle, and again one type of explanation is 
preferred over the other on individual aesthetic grounds.  
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separable view of ‘troublesome’ phenomena. It is also clearly an ontological explanation, though we 
are justified in wondering what the ontology of laws, once they are taken as primitive existents and 
not supervening on the states of the material ontology, is like in greater detail.  
The explanation also has characteristics of a deeper explanation, at least notionally if not in practice, 
as we can construct a story of how manipulating the particles given their subjection to the law 
(which is unknown, but some aspects of its action can be derived formally, as given in the effective 
wavefunction), we can change the relevant aspects of the phenomena. Providing we have an 
independent account of how the interactions of the particles select which distant particles they 
create effects on (and we can assume a further technical notion of decoherence provides us with 
this), we can claim the knowledge of the law we have through the effective wavefunctions allows us 
to alleviate worries about unexpected effects on the state of the material ontology globally, i.e. that 
we can hone in on the ‘troublesome’ effects when they arise in reality.  
This allows the transcendental strategy to be given through reliance on the concepts of enduring 
objects and non-local laws. Yet, this seems to require that in the transcendental strategy we change 
the starting point from objects being defined in terms of primary qualities alone into objects 
conceptualised as enduring individuals subject to the universal law. This way we would be ‘cutting 
nature at its joints’ not through the selection of structure across space, but in selection of structure 
across law-permitted changes across space and time. The laws would enter our initial concept of 
objects essentially. The final problem to address though, remains in justifying the fundamental role 
of the material ontology at all, given such a structurally essential role for the universal law (or more 
of them). In terms of quantum formalism, we may ask ourselves why we need to shy away from the 
(epistemically) inaccessible universal wavefunction, if the essential properties of the objects are 
going to be dispositional on it. Are we not merely enslaved by the expectations of realist structure 
imposed by the transcendental strategy and depth-of-explanation as we know them (but which are 
both somehow anthropocentric). The real challenge might be to reconstruct the transcendental 
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strategy and deeper explanations in terms of the law alone. The latter though, is beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  
As for the ‘troublesome’ phenomena specifically, they arise out of the changes that directly 
observable objects (measurement instruments in this case) undergo. These, in turn, are reducible in 
their structure to the microscopically fundamental ontology of the particles continuously enduring in 
space and time. This structural link directly connects the continuous endurance of the macroscopic 
objects and their observable parts with the extension-based segment of the fundamental ontology. 
Yet, not all of the properties of the fundamental ontology are in this way reducible to their positions 
and space-time relations, though some sufficient segment of them are. As for the rest, and those are 
interesting properties in our ‘troublesome’ phenomena, they are dispositional on the nomological 
local proscriptions of the epistemically inaccessible fundamental universal law of temporal 
evolution. That is to say, some properties (those not reducible to position and spatial relations 
between particles) do not continuously hold of the particles at every instant.  
To us, with our limited epistemic access to the universal law governing the particles, it appears as if 
they do not have the particular property at the time (making at least some aspects of them seeming 
dispositional and subject to world-making hypotheses of the antirealists). But on the retrodictive 
explanatory account all we have to permit to accommodate the ‘troublesome’ phenomena is that 
the properties can change as dictated by the law, without the change being induced by a spatially 
continuous signal the cause of change. Though the causes can in explanatory accounts be traced 
back to the activities of the agents and their particular interactions with other particles, they are 
locally induced in the ‘distant’ particle by the nomic proscription of the universal law. Upon 
gathering more information concerning the global aspects of the situation we come to form 
conclusions about general correlations between the distant and proximal aspects of the phenomena. 
It is important to stress, though, that the constructive approaches do not permit doubts about the 
chaotic and haphazard ‘jumps’ in the intrinsic non-relational properties of the fundamental 
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ontology. But this is where our problems arise: many of the traditionally intrinsic properties of 
particle ontology turn out to be dispositional in relation to the universal law, and not truly intrinsic 
to the ontological constituents themselves. As one of the hypothetical cases examined above even 
the position of the fundamental material existents is dependent on the proscriptions of the 
wavefunction-law, making them vulnerable to charges of ultimate dispositionalism. Of course, these 
charges need not be accepted and can be carefully defended against: the position of the particles 
and their spatial extension (their ‘being’ in space) is not unreal nor explicitly denied by the theory. it 
is, in fact merely taken to be less permanent and less informative on its own. To give an account of 
the world (even its local segment such as the constitution of some directly observable macroscopic 
instrument) it is not sufficient to specify solely the arrangement of the fundamental material 
existents and the physically significant relations between them. We have to also specify the 
instantaneous local proscriptions of the universal law.  
The ‘troublesome’ phenomena then consist of special situations in which the non-local action of the 
universal law becomes acutely visible even from the macroscopic perspective. This is where the law 
order the fundamental existents to behave in way unexpected in the macroscopic realm. But, 
crucially, their identity and potential for independent re-identification are not denied, once the 
proscriptions of the primitive and universal law are taken into account. Without those proscriptions 
the situations seemed paradoxical, but the paradoxes arose from our erroneous expectation to 
reduce all physical accounts to the intrinsic and relational properties of material (extended) ontology 
only, disregarding the fundamental role laws play in the understanding of the world. The 
‘transcendental’ argument can then rest on the irreducible role of the extension in the construction 
of objects constitutive of the phenomena, provided that fundamental role played by laws is duly 
appreciated.  
Methodologically this is a constructive account, as it shows the constructive mechanism behind the 
phenomena. But it is a radical constructive account that requires that we revise some deep-seated 
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expectations of physical theories and explanatory generalisations, so as to abandon the fundamental 
status of the Humean Mosaic, and admit extension to be structurally important though not wholly 
sufficient for the explanatory connection between the standardly and regularly experienced and 
physically foundational. This is not an impossible move to make and one that still does not permit 
the antirealist to claim that simple realist strategies are bogus nor that objects in lawfully 
constrained interaction cannot be identified in the experience. Only what will identify the objects 
will no longer be their shape and spatial position, along with some other aspects of geometrical 
structure, such as texture, but also the relation the objects hold to the fundamental law of temporal 
evolution. Immediately we must ask though: what use are the objects we cannot directly observe in 
explaining the phenomena when all their identifying features are dependent on the proscriptions of 
this fundamental law? May we not explain the phenomena as consequence of the fundamental law 
at directly observable level, without having to construct the narrative of objects? These are 
important objections to be addressed in the final chapter. Finally, metaphysically it is clear that 
constructive approaches of this chapter argue for a dichotomy of the fundamental role of extended 
material ontology (just as preferred by the ‘transcendental’ argument) and fundamental though 
non-material laws of temporal evolution. But it is also clear that they place ontology on a high 
position methodologically, and a particular type of primary-qualities-come-first ontology at that. 
Here is what Albert says of chances of uniting Bohmian Mechanics with more general field theories:  
“Bohm’s theory (as it presently stands) is quite deeply 
bound up with a very particular sort of ontology; the 
trouble [is that this sort of theory is not a replacement 
for the bare formalism in general, like the Everett –style 
theories, but only for those interpretations of the 
formalism] which happen to be theories of persistent 
particles;”. (Albert, 1992 , p. 161) 
We come to wonder whether this staunch adherence to persistent particle-objects is too high a price 
to pay in order to save the simple transcendental strategy of the section 1. 4.  
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4. Common-sense concepts and explanation   
4. 1 In search of the structure of a deeper explanation  
[...] explanation is not a logical structure, [...] it cannot 
be characterised in syntactic terms, but it is rather an 
epistemological structure, and, more specifically, a 
structure organising conceptual content.” (Hansson, 
2007, p. 3)  
Setting the issues of realism and deeper attitudes to the methodologies in sciences aside (or laying 
them to rest having discussed them in the previous chapters), in this chapter we turn to precisely the 
selected problematic concepts introduced in each of the approaches and assess how well they can 
be organised into the overall conceptual scheme of our language, so as to achieve the goals of 
explanation as Hansson (2007) lies them down. Hansson shows that some degree of complexity is 
required in order to make the explanations better, and thus the critics of the scientific endeavour 
cannot rely solely on the fact that some of the introduced concepts are hard and not straightforward 
as the ‘tables’ and ‘chairs’ seem. The most general structure of the explanation will contain, in the 
most general Hempelian style a list of properties an ‘object’ before us has, and the laws connecting 
those properties to the environment/context. But when choosing the level of depth and the 
complexity of interconnection of these concepts within an explanation, we must bear in mind that 
the essential function of explanation (both unification- and causal-style) is to gain understanding by 
connecting the previously disjointed knowledge of ‘facts’ into a unified whole of a world-view.  
Usually this is achieved by connecting the observation, an experienced phenomenon to be explained 
(though this need not prejudice the choice of language or be limited solely to supposed bare 
‘observation statements’), with the highly general law known to be directing the acceptable 
variations covered by the concepts appearing in the phenomenon. The number of steps required will 
depend on the previous knowledge and understanding the explainee has, whereas the link between 
the steps is provided by the conceptual framework inherent in language. As at least one of our 
approaches to the explanation of the ‘troublesome’ phenomena contains limits to overall unification 
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of knowledge (at least temporarily), does it follow that it is immediately precluded from providing an 
explanation on these grounds? The answer is yes only for staunch Bohrians, who insist on not 
modifying the conceptual scheme in any way, whilst showing it to be insufficient to provide a full 
unification of the phenomena with the well-understood theoretical terms.  
In the cases where we have to introduce new concepts in explanation, as will be further discussed 
below (Nersessian, 1984) the new concepts have to fit with the exiting conceptual framework so as 
to help ‘cut nature at its joints’ (Hansson, 2007, p. 9), i.e. allow a better empirical (and manipulative) 
access to the phenomena they cover. This is a precursor to a more detailed debate on depth of 
explanation, but the main idea is that the new conceptual framework, consisting of the insertion of 
new concepts into the old framework, should provide explanations of the phenomena that allow 
more variability (even if all of it is not empirically confirmed) as part of the understanding of 
particular occurrence of the phenomena. In other words, they should allow wider spectrum of 
counterfactual situations involving the said concepts, but differing in the relevant way from the 
phenomena actually observed.  
Even before we look in more detail into the requirements of depth of explanation (Hitchcock & 
Woodward, 2003), it is easy to see that the explanations in terms of objects, their properties and 
causal processes they are subjected to generally fit this requirement well. Explanations of the 
causal–mechanical type are then just a more extreme example such general scheme, providing 
detailed specifications of the nature of objects and the relevant interactions they can undergo. And 
yet, Hansson warns, following exclusively this prescription, and now falling back on the idea of 
conceptual unification and organisation, would lead to us to extreme and absurd lengths in 
providing explanations of even the simplest phenomena. Where the operations of nature are 
complex, and they more often are than aren’t, conceptual economy goes a long way in providing 
explanation and thus allowing meaningful interaction with the world without having to adopt a 
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God’s eye view. Variable depth is required of every explanation, and “concepts are more flexible 
than properties” for this purpose (Hansson, 2007, p. 10).  
Thus, Hansson concludes, good explanation is like an exercise of proof in mathematics, an 
epistemological exercise of linking concepts under objective constraints. Of course, such internally 
consistent, but somehow irrelevant conceptual networks can be created ad lib (cf.  for example the 
works of Duhem, Quine and Feyerabend) and accepting such a strong linguistic turn will play well 
into the hands of the critics of the explanatory potential of science. In order to avoid that it is 
advisable to rely on the conceptual networks that already exist, that form the well connected global 
system of orientation in the material environment and function well in a variety of contexts. But in 
this position, which is a kind of unificationism, unification should not be sought for in and of itself, 
but as a consequence of other goals on the conceptual level. “While the classical unificationist is 
right in asking for intellectual and epistemological economy, she is wrong if she identifies this with 
having as few premises or beliefs as possible. Rather, global economy concerning what concepts are 
needed to make the world intelligible is more basic than either global or local economy of 
assumptions or premises” (Hansson, 2007, pp. 10-11). From the perspective of provision of 
explanation this seems to agree with the starting point of the transcendental strategy of section 1. 4, 
as much as possible rely on the readily available concepts.  
In the troublesome cases under consideration here appearance of some properties of objects or 
general characteristics of situations are seen as at first glance improbable, or are at least unexpected 
on the straightforward account of the phenomenon. We thus have to do extra work to connect them 
to what is ‘expected’ in the conceptual scheme that we start with. Weber and Van Bouwel (2007) 
argue that explanatory depth has intrinsic value in such instances and those explanations that can 
provide the required depth will be considered better explanations in such cases. Explicitly, the 
contexts in which explanatory depth is seen as useful are those in which we ask whether the 
occurrence of some property ore event is a predictable consequence of some other, more familiar or 
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more widely expected events. More generally, Weber and  Van Bouwel (2007) argue that contexts of 
asking explanatory questions have to be taken into account in assessing explanatory worth. What is 
important for us is that on their analysis, given that the troublesome phenomena we are concerned 
with fall under the right context, explanatory depth (to be explicated in the following section) will be 
of intrinsic value. Troublesome phenomena are seen as anomalies from the perspective of the 
plausibility of the transcendental strategy of section 1. 4 and explanatory depth will prove as a useful 
heuristic in comparing the explanatory potential (i.e. their potential for deeper explanations) of our 
two approaches.  
Sellars (1963) reminds us how we needn’t view the claim that behind the perceptible appearances of 
objects and phenomena there lie fundamental explanatory physical ontology, as a claim that 
‘everyday objects’ don’t exist. He claims that by reducing the perceptible to the physical explanatory 
ontology we are not challenging the claims about tables and chairs within a framework, but are 
trying to replace the whole framework with one that can support and explain it, but goes further in 
providing understanding of the wide range of perceived phenomena (Sellars, 1963, p. 27). This is in 
line with the strategy traced back to Descrtaes in section 1. 4, the ontological projection should not 
only provide an explanation of how the phenomena arise but also how our appearance of them has 
the peculiar features (including those that lead to prima faciae erroneous ontological projections) 
that it does. This was his famed replacement of the manifest image by the scientific image which 
both supports and explains our use of the conceptual framework of the manifest image (as it was 
ideally posited by Sellars).100 Swoyer elucidates that we are using the analogy of length 
measurement formalisation, where “an isomorphism of an appropriate sort explains the applicability 
                                                             
100 Immediately this might invite the question of replacing one paradigm with another (cf. Chapter 1), however 
the two supposed paradigms here do not compete but rather one encompasses the other. For this to present 
an effective criticism a further charge of incommensurability of the two supposed paradigms would have to be 
levied. Sadly, Sellars is difficult to pinpoint on this matter (DeVries & Triplett, 2000), and for the sake of brevity 
we will have to work on intuitive understanding of the proposal here. The scientific image grows out of and 
replaces (though this is not strict reductionism) the manifest image, and has to be able to “deal with the 
questions raised in the manifest image and the phenomena familiar to it” (DeVries & Triplett, 2000, p. 114). 
What is clear though is the permanent request in Sellars for the continuation of postulational reasoning with 
ordinary modes of explaining and understanding our world.  
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of mathematics [i.e. mathematical formalism] to reality” (1987, p. 284) to outline the way that 
conceptual frameworks (though not nearly as formally coherent as Swoyer’s formalised 
measurement theory) when seen as somehow isomorphic or homeomorphic to relevant aspects of 
the world can provide an explanation of the applicability of thought to reality (which is just what we 
needed in section 1. 4 of the introductory chapter).  
But for the said replacement to go through the manifest image must already possess ‘the germ of 
the solution’ of how the two images are linked and can conceptually coexist. It is suggested here 
(with special reference to Descartes in section 1. 2) that the wanted germ is given by the geometrical 
regularities based on the foundational role of extension. If our ‘scientific’ image, i.e. the explanatory 
frameworks stemming from our two approaches, are forced to somehow deny that foundation, i.e. if 
the replacement of the images goes so far as to deny the very link of the replacement-route can we 
still use Sellars’ programme?  This is a question we come to pose in light of the conclusions of 
Chapter 3, where the details of the law seem to be more informative than the bare positioning of 
the particles. Alternatively we may ask whether the notion of laws contains enough conceptual 
stability to be the sole new provider of the link with the geometric isomorphism of primary qualities 
becoming taking a back seat. Addressing these problems will have to await some further stage-
setting.  
One route left open is to criticise Sellars’ view in the context of this thesis as simply presupposing the 
predominance of the mechanistic views (in fact we might accuse Sellars himself of helping establish 
such a dominance in the philosophy of science), and thus trying to show that the approaches which 
are aware of a link between preference for causal mechanical explanations and the conceptual 
primacy of the geometrical isomorphism will not be threatened by the consequences of the 
‘troublesome’ phenomena for the passage from manifest to scientific images. They might either 
claim that the separability violation is an illusion, an error, in the case of ‘troublesome phenomena’, 
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or might claim that for the route from the manifest to the scientific that they are building 
separability violations do not present as much of a threat as is portrayed above.  
Metaphysics of deeper explanations  
Hitchock and Woodward (2003) note the paucity of literature on systematic account of this notion. 
In such context it is worth merely surveying their own cited attempt for the ontological features that 
might provide pointers in the desired direction, with the proviso that the previous chapters were 
supposed to point towards the depth-providing characteristics of the specific case-study instances. 
On their account (Hitchcock & Woodward, 2003) greater depth is achieved by explanations which 
depend on more variables changes of which lead to more significant interventions in the 
phenomenal outcome. But they have to be those variables interventions on which can produce 
variation in the observable effects within the explanandum, and not some related concepts. Thus, 
deeper explanations depend on (not just contain) more elements which can observably alter the key 
segments of the observed phenomena, that can pander to the greater range of the relevant what-if 
questions. But, and this is the key point Hitchcock and Woodward are trying to make, this does not 
mean taking the most general account of the situation to be explained, inclusion of the widest 
possible set of background conditions, but selecting those features of the situation that can be 
identified as possible properties of the very object or system that is the focus of explanation. To avoid 
going round in circles here as to what really carves nature at joints, and how to recognise, it is worth 
reminding ourselves of the purpose of the transcendental strategy connecting the everyday 
conceptual scheme with the specific one employed in the explanatory account. To avoid the dangers 
of general syntactical game-playing that wreaked havoc of the general deductive-nomological 
explanatory account, clear conceptual unification with the wider conceptual scheme is required. As 
Psillos (2007) warns the counterfactual variations can be superficially achieved by any law abiding 
account, and the real mettle of some explanatory construction is proven through the unification 
with the wider conceptual scheme. We must thus aim to identify the object that is the focus of 
explanation and see how its properties relate to what is more directly experienced.  
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This may seem an obvious point, but one that is not readily adopted in great many scientific 
explanations, for it is precisely the difficulty of identifying those possible properties of the system 
which make the focus of explanation that proves most difficult. It also reintroduces the chicken and 
egg problem of what is to guide our selection of those properties, i.e. is the explanation the 
prerequisite or the consequence of the featured ontological entities. And it is here that we can see 
firmer foundation for preference for the causal-mechanical model of explanation over unificatory 
and other models.101 That is, the ontological primitives, explicitly named as such, of the causal-
mechanical model are postulated as the very objects whose properties (or their changes) lead to the 
desirable observable variations in the phenomena that are the focus of explanation. Namely, 
according to Hitchcock and Woodward (2003) generalizations (which is what all explanations based 
on theoretical framework come to be) provide deeper explanations than others if they provide the 
resources for answering a greater range of what-if-things-had-been-different questions, i.e. are 
invariant under a wider range of interventions. But, crucially, the interventions must be of the kind 
that focus on the hypothetical changes in the “system at hand” (Hitchcock & Woodward, 2003, p. 
198), and not the changes in the systems adjacent to the one whose features are to be explained. 
This, again, stresses the importance of appropriately hypothesising the ontology in advance.  
Though this confirms the popular preference for the causal mechanical explanations, it does not 
preclude further investigations in our case-study instances, as there are considerations of conceptual 
unity and efficacy to be taken into account also (cf. (Hansson, 2007) above). But it does point 
towards what the minimal ontological requirement for greater explanatory depth is, namely the 
identification of variant properties of the system/object that is identified as the element of reality 
under investigation, the subject of explanation. What we must bear in mind then is that our case-
                                                             
101 It is worth bearing in mind here that Woodward and Hitchcock present their account as part of a wider 
scheme to provide a model of explanation that is nether the standard causal nor unificatory model, and that 
can satisfy the requirements of explanatory depth better than the two traditional rivals. This need not concern 
us here, though, as their account of explanatory depth still provides criteria of evaluation (that need to be 
further explicated when we encounter individual instances of attempted explanation), without necessitating 
adoption of their model in particular instances. In other words, they are searching for a general model of 
explanation in science, which may be insensitive to the particular difficulties we are trying to respect here.  
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study instances of explanation must be able to at least name the elements of reality (objects or 
systems) that are the focus of explanation102, and attain explanatory depth through explication of 
interventions on those that produce effects that can be conceptually accounted for (i.e. described or 
predicted).  
Psillos (2007) criticises the above account of depth of explanation for failing to provide clearer 
guidelines about the truth-conditions of the counterfactual situations, whilst distinguishing them 
from the relevant evidence-conditions. The latter distinction is important for the counterfactual 
musings to be explanatory, i.e. to be able to tell how phenomena would have turned out differently 
due to counterfactual interventions on them. Of course, the interventions can be, and in the 
interesting cases are, hypothetical, i.e. we can provide explanations of this sort even in the situations 
in which the direct evidence conditions for the counterfactuals are empirically inaccessible. This is 
the weakness of the depth-of-explanation account of Woodward and Hitchcock (2003b) in the 
situations that are far removed from the simple past events or simple accounts involving 
unobservables. As Psillos (2007, p. 99) notes in the latter situations there are well-known stories to 
be told as to what the difference between truth- and evidence-conditions in counterfactual 
situations is. This taps into the important psychological underpinning of the satisfaction with deeper 
explanation: we want to know what it is that makes the explanatory account true, not just how we 
verify its truth; what the conceptual structure that generates truth of the explanatory account is. 
The safest route to provision (at least notional) of the required truth-conditions is, in Psillos’ (2007) 
view, to rely on the laws of nature. That is to include the laws of nature in the truth-conditions for 
the relevant counterfactuals. Laws have to be in place before we construct, by relying on 
counterfactual interventions, an account of what is and what is not invariant under relevant 
interventions on the objects.  
“Without independent account of what laws are, there is 
no clear way in which we can deem some 
                                                             
102 Though, crucially, not necessarily the primary existents, the fundamental ontological entities.  
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(interventionist) counterfactual assertions true or false. 
Which interventions are physically possible and which 
interventions leave certain relations invariant depends 
on what laws there are. The latter cannot be fully 
understood as relations that remain invariant under 
interventions since they specify what interventions are 
possible.” (Psillos, 2007, p. 105) 
This is important for us in two ways. Firstly, it suggests that our ‘transcendental strategy’, coupled 
with desire for deeper explanations from the two case-study instances, will not go far enough in 
providing the conceptual link through the selection of ontological elements and the ‘geometrical’ 
structural isomorphism between the fundamental ontology and the everyday material objects. What 
it needs to have added is the minimum set of laws of nature that are expected to hold between the 
fundamental and everyday account of the phenomena. In most cases this is not a problem, and 
largely the minimum set consists of the fundamental logical connections, and in many other cases 
we have enough uncontroversial information about the conceptually supportive causal structure. 
Thus, Psillos (2007, p. 106) says that when we are dealing with stable causal or nomological 
structures interventionist counterfactuals are meaningful and have truth values. The problem is that 
our ‘troublesome’ phenomena may not be supported by enough of such structure to let us construct 
a convincingly deeper explanation, and thus provide for the comparison of our two case-study 
approaches. In any case, it calls for an explicit justification of the stability of whatever nomological (if 
not always causal) structure the approaches can rely on, alongside the material ontology they 
employ, in order to provide them with sufficient grounds for the construction of the ‘transcendental’ 
argument ( (Luntley, 1995); cf. section 1. 4 above).  
Secondly, the account which provides a separate account of laws relevant to the situation will be 
better prepared for the task of providing a deeper explanation. Psillos worries, though, that the 
depth-of-explanation account as constructed by Woodward and Hitchcock (2003b) above highlights 
and employs the symptoms of good explanations (in particular of good causal explanations) without 
being able to provide a fully fledged theory of what an (causal) explanation consists in. “Invariance-
under-interventions is a symptom of causal relations and laws. It is not what causation and lawhood 
171 
 
consists in” (Psillos, 2007, p. 106). In our case both accounts can use the pragmatic virtues of the 
depth-of-explanation account provided they are explicit about how they will overcome the problem 
Psillos raises. The principle approaches can claim not to aim for a causal account at all, and search 
for deeper explanations through supplying the relevant laws as directly observable empirical 
generalisations not justified, nor accounted for, through their role in the ‘troublesome’ phenomena 
themselves. Due to their supposed simplicity these can then be easily linked with the wider 
unchallenged set of laws governing the behaviour of material reality. The problems arise, though, 
when the phenomena are interpreted as constitutive of ontology that is not easily linked with the 
material ontology of the everyday conceptual scheme. The constructive approaches, on the other 
hand, have (cf. Chapter 3) provided an independent account of relevant laws, most notably the 
universal law governing the behaviour of the ontology, through abolishing the Humean Mosaic and 
making laws primitive existents alongside the ontology. Each of the accounts then has to show that 
this general model can be applied to the ‘troublesome’ phenomena and the potential consequences 
they can have for the ‘transcendental’ argument.    
Yet, one might object that on this reading preference is given to the causal-mechanical model of 
explanation right from the start. How could a unification model satisfy the requirements for 
hypothetical manipulations on system at hand, accompanied by a network of stable laws that 
provide the truth-conditions for the counterfactual situations? The answer is simple, if not directly 
applicable to our principle approaches: take the uncontroversial objects that feature in the 
phenomena and show the limits of manipulations possible (the hypothetical situations where only 
the relevant aspects of the central objects are changed or affected). In the troublesome phenomena 
this would involve showing how the objects central to the phenomena would have been different 
had relevant changes in them been instigated, whilst the remainder of the context (this includes the 
laws and the other objects) had been kept unchanged. It is hoped that the principle approaches can 
in this way provide sufficiently deep explanations (though not expose the ‘mechanism’ that gives rise 
to the phenomena) without having to construct awkward connections between the central tenets of 
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the explanatory account and the everyday conceptual scheme. They would gain the upper hand over 
the causal mechanical accounts if the latter were forced to do just that, to add entities and change 
qualities of the core conceptual scheme in order to satisfy the construction of the explanatory 
account.  But we must bear in mind the impermanence of objects on principle approaches, where 
precedence is given to universal applicability of generalised principles to all and any ‘thing’ featured 
in the phenomena.  
4. 2 Principle approaches and the depth of explanation  
It remains an open methodological problem for the principle approaches, one that ties in well with 
the overall overview of the role of physics and the requirements of arguments for simple realism, 
whether all the possible formal models that the principle approaches can derive (and that agree with 
the constraining principles) should be excluded from considerations by further modifications of the 
choice of the suitable mathematical framework for quantum theory (along with the implicit 
metaphysical assumptions that might come along with them), or whether we should find reasonable 
general methodological constraints (these are not our constraining principles) for the formulations 
of the physical theories and rule them out on the grounds of those. We shall proceed in the 
following sections on the latter assumption, i.e. that the provision of deeper explanation suitable for 
the ‘transcendental’ argument is a reasonable criterion to adopt. We are no longer worried about 
the details of possible common formalism inherent in all quantum theories as those with deeper 
explanations will be preferred overall. It is another issue whether this equivalence is the very 
assumption that Bub is relying on when using his deep methodological principle.  
In light of the above it remains to be seen how Bub’s ‘deep methodological principle’ ( (Bub, 2004); 
cf. Chapter 2 as well) aligns with the requirements of provision of deeper explanation and upholding 
of the ‘transcendental’ argument. Following Bub’s principle we must refuse to venture further than 
macroscopic ‘records’ of the inputs and outputs of the measuring processes, effectively making their 
conceptual framework reliant on the epistemic atomism of the momentary states of the input and 
output status of the macroscopic apparatuses. Even when given in terms of the information 
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concepts this remains a Humean Mosaic view of the phenomena as causally independent sequences. 
But, though all physical processes can be given in such terms, in the past we have been able to move 
beyond this timid generalisation of the world.  
It seems historically heuristic to view the principle explanations as a step towards novel, as hitherto 
unexpected constructive explanations. Explanations from principle approaches (principle 
explanations) are primarily concerned with exposing the competing explanatory approaches as 
focusing on a pseudo-problem, striving to explain something that essentially does not require an 
explanation over and above that it stems from an erroneous perspective on the phenomenon to be 
explained. In that they have to stay away from the thin line of slide into a full blown 
instrumentalism, whereby no steps towards a future new explanation are offered but every route to 
explanation through ontology is effectively closed. Fine (1989) suggests as much in denying that we 
are forced to accept “the explanationist challenge” (Fine, 1989, p. 191) and speculate about the 
hidden hands and propensities that guide the ‘troublesome’ correlations. Fine claims that the 
demands of explanatory adequacy come a priori from the outside the quantum theory, and are a 
remnant of a different kind of physical thinking. As much as this would rid us of the struggle to 
provide an explanation from the principle approaches, it lands us squarely in the neo-Bohrian (but 
what is worse neo-Bohrian with an extreme slant that even Bohr is likely to shy away from) camp 
characterised by abandoning all hope of understanding the processes that give rise to the 
troublesome correlations in material terms, as well as all hope for the unified knowledge of the 
macro- and the micro-physical realm.  
Fine shies away from constructive steps and advocates firm adherence to the establishment of 
principles that expose what is prohibited in the correlations, whilst quoting a statistician Moses 
when accounting for the non-local influences, mysterious background guidance, mutual 
dependencies and passions: “Much less is true” (Fine, 1989, p. 194). Hughes (1989), in the same 
volume, is supportive of this view. It is his argument that if the elements of our standard conceptual 
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scheme cannot find a suitable home in the explanations of the troublesome phenomena, and yet the 
phenomena are taken as real, empirically verified, then we must abandon the use of the conceptual 
scheme or seriously modify the key elements of the conceptual framework. Hughes wants the 
elements of the new conceptual framework to be clearly identified within the mathematical 
structures used by the theory. An obvious problem for our principle approaches is to show how the 
new conceptual scheme unifies conceptually with the standard one of extended matter, so as to 
achieve our goal of avoiding anti-realist criticism of the possibility of scientific explanation in general. 
This would in fact be a route of making the entire material conceptual framework dispositional, 
emergent from the new ontology (such as information-ontology might be). Though Hughes argues 
that the new metaphysics would have stronger resistance from refutation by emerging ‘naturally’ 
from quantum theory itself rather than being artificially tacked onto it by metaphysical demands 
external to construction of physical theories, he admits that may not be able to do any useful 
explanatory work. “However, it is not clear what useful explanatory work this interpretation would 
perform over and above that provided by a full articulation of the models the theory presents” 
(Hughes, 1989, p. 207).  
The CBH programme (of Chapter 2) can then shift the explanatory focus to a different realm, that of 
information manipulation. This is admittedly a risky route to take in provision of explanation, as it 
explicitly shies away from providing the explanatory account in terms of the conceptual framework 
that we initially required for the transcendental strategy.103 Though risky, here is how the route 
might proceed nonetheless. When asked to provide an explanation of the ‘troublesome’ 
phenomena, the principle approach advocates might proceed by pointing out that nothing is neither 
exchanged nor travels, and no explicit mysterious connection is established between the material 
existents characterised by the primary qualities. We have come to have an erroneous view of the 
situation and have thus entangled ourselves in a pseudo-problem. We must, fully and truthfully, 
                                                             
103 As Timpson (private correspondence, but cf. also (Timpson, 2008)) puts it we want to know what the 
physical processes behind the phenomena are, not what the experimenters can know about them or in what 
ways we can interpret the supposedly correlated signals from the ‘epistemological black boxes’.  
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suspend all speculative expectations and return to the conceptual scheme of material existents at 
hand in the situation. Alongside, we must dissolve the troublesome characterisation of the 
phenomena and relieve any worries that the ontological separability of material objects is 
threatened. The principle approaches are asking us to take a step back: leave the material existents 
as they are in the standard conceptual scheme, connected only by the physical interactions that 
respect the space-time extension and separation. That part of the conceptual framework remains 
intact. And that part of the conceptual framework plays no role in the establishment of the 
phenomena. What does then? Here we have to be presented with the phenomena in the new light. 
Bear in mind though, that a small but important constructive step has implicitly been made: 
separability has materially been upheld, i.e. whatever the appearances nothing is expected to 
characterise the macroscopic material existents over and above what characterises them locally in 
their space-time region. Likewise, all the changes they can be expected to endure must be 
understood as local phenomena, requiring no knowledge of distant states or some global set-up.  
According to Sklar (1990) the greatest contribution of the principle approach in physics is to remove 
the need to adjudicate between the equally empirically adequate, but metaphysically divergent, 
explanatory constructions. When the difference between such constructions cannot be adjudicated 
empirically, it has sometimes been useful to present the difference as a pseudo-problem, to show us 
how we could account for the phenomena (again, without the explicit constructive mechanism) by 
ignoring the constructive conflict and looking elsewhere whilst holding on to what is 
phenomenologically unalterable: the constraining principles. Again, drawing on Einstein’s derivation 
of Special Theory of Relativity, Sklar claims that the latter exposes what were considered rival but 
empirically equivalent descriptions of the universe as equivalent descriptions of the same state of 
affairs (as the search for absolute motion is abandoned). Again, we must bear in mind the warning of 
the sinful constructive step Einstein makes (cf. Chapter 2 above), but also that it is not damaging for 
the kinematical considerations of the theory. But what are the explicit advantages of the principle 
approach over the rival constructive approaches? According to Sklar they are supposed to be 
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speculatively more cautious through abandoning the metaphysical expectations that cannot be 
directly verified. They are also supposed to unify a greater range of phenomena under one 
explanation, rather than requiring a range of respective different explanations (i.e. not just instances 
of one basic explanatory conceptualisation tailored to individual situations). Finally, the explanatory 
power of the principle approaches is supposed to be greater by avoiding what would otherwise be 
mere coincidences in agreement of different explanatory constructions.  
In other words, the greatest power of the principle approach should come from telling us how come 
the phenomena consist of the same appearances even when we approach them along different 
constructive schemes. This goes further than strictly explaining the phenomena, but aims to explain 
the occurrence of the illusion. Of course this can immediately be charged with criticism of pragmatic 
shiftiness in the choice of observables. We open up to the possibility of re-examination of the 
fundamental concepts we implicitly take for granted in the transcendental strategy. Everything is 
suddenly thrown into doubt, and the principle approach takes liberty in choosing what to call 
observable and non-speculative. And Sklar says as much in his analysis. He says that our theory, 
however conservative on speculation, must carry with it some metaphysical baggage that does the 
explanatory work. Rather than being per se simple, the supposedly sturdy conceptual structure must 
do extra work to explain how it fits with that which can still be held as well-understood and free 
from illusion. He sees the spacetime structure of Special Relativity to be such minimal baggage, a 
replacement for the aether and the absolute velocity. “*A mere set of observational consequences 
taken as a theory], unlike the special theory with its theoretical space-time structure, fails to offer 
genuine explanations of the observable phenomena.” (Sklar, 1990, p. 155) Principle theories have to 
supply that extra weight that distinguishes them from bare phenomenalism and instrumentalism, so 
as to provide explanations. That is the most important lesson for our principle approaches of 
Chapter 2. But a serious caveat is immediately put forth by Sklar: this is increasingly difficult to 
follow in the cases where the considerations strike at the very foundation of our conceptual 
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schemes.104 Again, Einstein’s sinful constructive step can be seen as just the required avoidance of 
the tinkering with the foundations of the conceptual scheme. Though principle approaches drag with 
them a constant risk of sliding into excessive instrumentalism or phenomenalism by their adherence 
to almost primitive empiricism, the risk is worth taking when our pragmatist (explanatorily too weak) 
and realist (conceptually threatening and observationally underdetermined) accounts strike at the 
very heart of our well-entrenched conceptual scheme.  
On the metaphysical side there is no clear suggestion in the literature as to how the ‘information-
stuff’ (provided we can argue there is such a thing) and the extended material stuff can coexist at 
the fundamental level of reality. The notion of depth-of-explanation above stresses the importance 
of the detailed account of the controllable variations in objects that the changes to be explained 
happen to. This is the most serious of weaknesses attributed to the principle approaches and one 
that can only be avoided if we can somehow show that the ‘transcendental strategy’ can be more 
effectively constructed with principle approach concepts even without the prima faciae concerns for 
the depth of explanation. This is to show either that:  
1. the ‘extended stuff’ can be modified or replaced in the explanatory conceptualisation 
required for the ‘transcendental’ argument (perhaps by presenting the ‘extended stuff’ as an 
illusion reducible to something else); or  
2. there are ways to reduce the properties of the new stuff (presumably, information entities) 
to those of the primary qualities of the ‘extended stuff’ making the former a dispositional 
                                                             
104 In Duhem’s (1991) insightful criticism of the declarations of methodological superiority of the principle-like 
approaches advocated by Ampere, we see that even in the less conceptually troubled domains, researchers 
are forced to make implicit (and in a way operational) constructive hypotheses by borrowing analogies from 
existing constructive disciplines and operationally objectifying hypothetical entities. This is a declaration even 
before Einstein’s qualms about the structures behind Special Theory of Relativity of the implicit constructive 
theorizing in the declaratively simple principle approaches. I am grateful to Simon Saunders for pointing out 
this case.  
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illusion to be removed from the conceptualisation of the ‘transcendental’ argument that 
respects the occurrence of the ‘troublesome’ phenomena.105  
But if the latter strategy was adopted we might ask ourselves what the contribution of the principle 
approaches is, other than providing an alternative way of looking at things, i.e. we would be at loss 
to identify the exact pseudo-problem that principle approaches have helped us out of. We must 
constantly be asking ourselves what it is that the principle approaches can hope to achieve (other 
than satisfy Bub’s methodological principle) given that we already have empirically adequate 
constructive attempts. If we are to go beyond all of them, what is the direction that the principle 
approaches are suggesting? On such reading the preferred direction seems to be to establish the 
novel ontology that does not threaten separability violations, but the question is then how to 
combine it with the material ontology of the ‘transcendental’ argument.  
The principle approaches then can rely on diffusing the threat of teleportation phenomena, along 
the lines advocated in Timpson (2004), where it is claimed that the conceptual puzzles arise when 
information is mistakenly taken to be a substantive, rather than an abstract term.106 What is in fact 
phenomenologically the case, is that Bob can extract only one bit of information from his black-box, 
upon the successful run of the protocol in which Alice has sent him 2 classical bits. If there is no 
material substratum to the phenomenon assumed, or at least none is speculated about, then there 
is no great quantity of information (which was physically meant to be stored in the material referent 
of the quantum state) transmitted in the protocol. For if things had been otherwise the no-signalling 
theorem would be violated. What remains puzzling is the role of the quantum formalism in the 
whole situation. It seems to allow for some counterfactual situations involving the distant 
experimenter, Bob, which would not be possible in the pure-black-boxes case.  
                                                             
105 The latter seems to be exactly the strategy that the constructive approaches follow, so in this way the 
principle approaches would in the end be reduced to the constructive ones in terms of explanatory ontology, 
and would thus be making that step towards the more explanatory constructive theories, as Einstein required 
(cf. Chapter 2, above).  
106 Timpson (2004) is adamant that information cannot be understood as any kind of entity (even an abstract 
one) at all, and that this is where the error of the principle approaches lies. They should instead turn to the 
material foundations of the concept of information.  
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What role do the general constraining principles play then, in an overall understanding of reality as 
required by starting point of the simple transcendental strategy? The principles must stand for 
something explanatorily, even if just to say that Bob cannot in reality obtain more than 1bit of 
information from his black box. To be a constraining principle, no-signalling theorem tells us that 
things could have been different and that the fact that they are not is significant for our situation. 
But unless we assume that the situation is characterised by the potential for a larger information 
extraction, the 1bit (without the constraining principle) is not the least surprising nor ‘troublesome’. 
As soon as we bring the principles in, we are assuming something more about the ontology behind 
them, an ontology that does refer to the potential for large quantities of information to become 
available to Bob conditional on the distant actions Alice takes.  
The constraining principles must constrain something, and the interesting question immediately 
becomes what it is. One option is to follow Timpson’s suggestion (2004, p. 72) and to rephrase the 
question in terms of the material ontology behind the phenomenon (thus abandoning the black 
boxes, and falling prey to the traps of non-separability). The other is to simply admit that when 
manipulating the black boxes we are constrained by the general principles, and then seek an 
explanation of those principles in terms of the structural familiarisation with the new entity. Of 
course, that is just moving the game to a different playing field, but it still remains a hot task to link 
the information ontology to the material ontology that is the major supplier of our experience. Now 
this needn’t be an entirely obsolete route, as the investigation of new entities, even if abstract and 
non-material can still tell us something about the world we inhabit. For if we were to take 
information to be an abstract entity, such as a mathematical triangle might be taken to be (cf. 
suggestions in (Duwell, 2008)), we can still learn something about the ‘geometry’ of our world even 
if we do not talk directly about the material objects affected by that geometry. Suppose information 
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should not be understood in either of the Timpson (2004) senses107, but as an entirely new entity. 
Nersessian’s (1984) analysis investigates a precursor for such an approach from history of physics. 
In (Faraday to Einstein: Constructing Meaning in Scientific Theories , 1984) Nersessian aims to 
present how a new concept of a ‘field’ was introduced into scientific parlance (with respect to theory 
and observation) (Nersessian, 1984, p. 27). She suggests that new concepts change from being a 
heuristic guide to other ends, through a stage of elaboration, into being full-blown philosophically 
justifiable concepts capable of sustaining rigorous analysis. This does not mean we can form a clear 
definition through a set of sufficient and necessary condition for some phenomena to be 
characterised by our chosen concepts, but that they feature a set of family resemblances where 
each instance varies in the degree of qualitative conformity to the lot. First a primitive qualitative 
concept is introduced, with no clear mathematical structural unification into formalism, as an 
operational alternative to the existing explanatory view. Further development through a series of 
analogies to furnish additional detail to the new concepts, with analogies serving as explanations (or 
in the Hansson view above: conceptual links into the wider explanation) of the newly discovered 
details. Nersessian’s ‘analogies’ provide a function similar to Cao’s metaphors (cf. Chapter 1) of 
carrying over understanding from a familiar domain (most notably that covered by the everyday 
conceptual scheme) to the ‘troublesome’ one containing the explicit descriptions of the phenomena 
under consideration. In other words, they carry the transcendental step, through sufficient structural 
isomorphism.  
Finally the new concept can adopt the role of substance (the practice Nersessian bases her analysis 
carries over more easily to the case of principle approach’s information, than the constructive 
approach’s fundamental laws in this case, but that needn’t concern us at this stage) in the 
conceptual scheme. At this stage it is possible to consider a wide range of problems and objections, 
                                                             
107 The two sense of the term information, supposedly confounded in the principle approaches are the 
common-sense ‘type information’ sense and the technical (in terms of Shannon’s (1949)) communication 
theory) ‘quantity information’ sense.  
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to address them and to clarify the links of the new concept to the existing conceptual scheme (which 
may have been partially changing alongside it, or even with it). Now a clear understanding of the 
new concept is achieved and it is successfully unified with the prevailing conceptual scheme.  
Signs of that understanding are provided precisely by the ease with which it playes the explanatory 
role and addresses the questions such as: “What does it do? How does it do it? What is its function? 
What effects does it produce? What kind of ‘stuff’ is it? How can it be *(sic)+ located?” (Nersessian, 
1984, p. 156). Some of these questions our candidates will have to start grappling with, other may 
not be applicable to them. What is important is that we can start building explanations from them, 
and comparing them to each other and existing explanations even at the early stage, working all the 
way to complete the steps towards the next stage or opening up new questions. Thus we do not 
have to have a demonstrable reference bearer at the outset for each concept we introduce, nor do 
we need to be clear about all aspects of its connection into the conceptual scheme in order to work 
on an explanation of the ‘troublesome’ phenomena.  
But the principle approaches of Chapter 2 are a long way away from understanding the new concept 
in this way. Moreover, Nersessian’s paradigm concept of a ‘field’ relies on the same essential 
qualities of extension as does the common-sense concept of an extended object (though there are 
important differences as well) and interaction ‘by contact’, unlike the entities of information 
ontology. Other elements of our ordinary conceptual scheme are also present in the defining 
questions that Nersessian poses: such as “What does it do?”, “What effects does it produce?” Those 
causation-related elements are not even hinted at in metaphysical extensions of the principle 
approaches of Chapter 2.  Thus such alternation of conceptual framework has a long way to go, and 
as yet there are no clear indications that it is going in the right direction.  
Duwell (2008) attempts to construct a starting point for the novel ontology behind the ‘troublesome’ 
phenomena. To a degree it relies on partially dissolving the ‘troublesome’ nature of the phenomena, 
but also strongly argues for the existence of information not as substance (which must be spatially 
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located, and then subjected to generation of ‘troublsome’ aspects of the phenomena), but an 
abstract entity outside the constrictions of the material ontology. The details of this account need 
not concern us, but the general potential for explanation, and most importantly for the 
‘transcendental’ argument, will be of interest. Duwell (2008, p. 215) advocates seeing the 
explanations resultant from this metaphysical extension of the principle approaches as those of a 
specific unification type: the deductive-nomological explanations. That the latter have been severely 
criticised in the philosophy of science, and often in the end amended through addition of causal 
aspects, should be a sufficient pointer of their explanatory worth for our purposes. Yet the criticism 
often centred on their overly syntactic aspects, and what we are primarily concerned with is the 
conceptual explanatory potential Duwell can generate from their content.  
Unfortunately, Duwell’s account is abruptly cut short here, and beyond advocating the “unificatory 
view of explanation” (Duwell, 2008, p. 215), he fails to tell us how the experienced phenomena will 
be explained in terms of lawful behaviour of quantum-type information distribution. There is a 
legitimate suspicion that two plains of being will be introduced, one of material ontology and one of 
quantum-information ontology, with all the supposed ‘troublesome’ aspects of the phenomena 
relegated to the latter. If this allowed adherence to the principle of separability at the level of 
material ontology then our ‘transcendental’ argument may still be able to survive the antirealist 
charge, but there is no indication that this is so. The original ‘troublesome’ aspects will be generated 
in the conceptual scheme of the quantum-information ontology, but we are told nothing about how 
they connect to the material ontology. The issue is simply swept under the carpet. The legitimate 
worry then remains that to produce the phenomena, wherever we consigned their ‘troublesome’ 
aspects to, violations of separability must be accepted at the level of material ontology (not that 
material ontology is dispositionally reliant on the quantum-information ontology, the two simply 
exist side-by-side). Yet the transcendental strategy, that aims to include the ‘troublesome’ 
phenomena too, needs the account in terms of material ontology also, as it forms the grounds of our 
epistemic access to the quantum-information realm.  
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So what happens when direct consequences are drawn from the principle level generalisations to 
the material ontology? The first of our principle approaches (tentatively abandoned even in Chapter 
2) does not fare well in this respect. As Timpson (2008) shows, Fuchs’ approach faces a severe 
explanatory deficit: “it is unclear how what is explanatory could be so” (2008, p. 607). This poses 
problems for our transcendental strategy of section 1. 4, also. The extreme sensitivity of the 
fundamental ontological realm delineated in Fuchs’ principle approach denies that there are any 
“facts about the world, prior to the measurement outcome actually obtaining, which determine 
what the outcome would be, or even provide a probability distribution over different possible 
outcomes” (Timpson, 2008, p. 595). In that we lose the structural connection providing for re-
identification of objects at the fundamental ontological level (this is not an epistemic, but a 
metaphysical deficiency now). When constructing the full-blown dispositional account of the 
fundamental ontology, we cannot provide a stable foundation for the repeatable, regular behaviour 
of objects in interaction, “the rules of composition of the powers are too loose (or are non-existent) 
[...], giving rise to the lawless pattern of events” (Timpson, 2008, p. 597). Our transcendental 
account of section 1.4 not only loses the ground of separable ontology, but an altogether greater 
one of anything that can be said about how things are “occurrently” (Timpson, ibid.). This plays into 
the hands of the postmodern critic, when Timpson (2008) recalls Wittgenstein’s claim that nothing 
would do as well as something about which nothing could be said. Any hope of the depth of 
explanation is likewise lost.  
However, even Bub, as one of the proponents of the CBH programme, seems intent to follow some 
way down Fuchs’ route in suggesting the possible metaphysical glimpses beyond the principle 
approach. In Bub and Pitowsky’s (2008) exposition a principle theory is the best epistemic account of 
a metaphysically fundamentally indeterministic universe. In that they block the route to any deeper 
explanation beyond what can be given by the acceptance of the constraining principles of 
information manipulation. This we take to be the meaning of their claim that there is no explanation 
of the series of observed events through real change in the correlations between separated events 
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at the micro-level, as opposed to other possible observed events in a quantum measurement 
process – the occurrence is constrained by the generalised principles of information manipulation, 
and only by those. Even if this does not directly damage neither the separability expectations for the 
fundamental ontology nor the structure that is meant to connect it to the observable ontology, it 
nonetheless denies any possibility of a deeper explanation by making senseless any truth-conditions 
for conceivable counterfactual situations.  The consequences for our transcendental strategy are 
simply that even if the supposed damaging separability violations are an illusion, we await to be told 
what the connection is between that which is constrained by the generalised principles and the 
fundamental ontology of the world. In historical terms we must have at least a possibility of finding 
the Lorentz-style constructive explanation of length contraction, for it is the conceptual prerequisite 
of a framework (of Special Theory of Relativity) in which the rods demonstrably contract and clocks 
slow down.  
4. 3. Non-separability and the derivation of fundamental physical laws  
One possible route to be taken as a lesson from the principle approaches to enlighten us any deeper 
on the potential separability-violation issues is to try and find the ways of holding on to the 
transcendental strategy whilst admitting non-separability as an explanatorily benign feature of the 
material world. This marries the principle approaches’ attempts to dismiss threatening separability 
violation as an illusion with the (hard-core) realist approach of the constructive approaches in 
assigning the essential characteristics of the ‘troublesome’ phenomena to material ontology. That is 
to argue against Howard’s contention (1989) presented in section 1. 4., that separability violations 
threaten the very core of our foundational conceptual scheme, the isomorphic connection between 
the physically fundamental ontology and the objects of everyday experience, through the primary 
qualities of material existents. In fact, if Newtonian physics could (albeit uneasily) live with the non-
local laws and yet account for the everyday experience, maybe quantum theory can find ontological 
elements to bear the brunt of the separability-violation without denying the realist firmament of the 
stable extended material existents.  
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This is precisely the position Dickson (1998) advocates, arguing against the problems put forth by 
Howard (1994) in section 1. 4. Dickson claims that it is ontological holism that is threatening to our 
core conceptual scheme (the latter featuring in Luntley’s transcendental strategy) and not simple 
action at a distance. He proposes to align (if not identify) what Howard calls separability-violation 
with holism (i.e. to claim that holism implies violations of separability and vice versa), and what 
Howard calls locality-violation with action at a distance (again: violations of locality imply action at a 
distance and vice versa). His conclusion is then that quantum formalism in the troublesome 
phenomena requires accepting action at a distance (i.e. violations of locality), and that that in itself is 
not damaging to our conceptual scheme as it can be accommodated in a way similar to 
accommodating existence of gravitational influences in the conceptual scheme of Newtonian 
physics. Maudlin (Completeness, supervenience and ontology, 2007) was also presented above as 
arguing for a similar point, by requiring the ontology of beables to be local whilst the laws (also a 
part of ontology, or at least the physical world-view) could be non-local. Yet the initially plausible 
analogy has to be further addressed before the end of this chapter.   
So here is a possible middle ground to be extracted from the multiple presentations of the problem 
above, and cast in the light of our second case-study instance: the constructive approach of Bohmian 
Mechanics (below, cf. also Chapter 3 above). We are in fact looking for a way to show that though 
notionally separability is violated, the violation is not such as to threaten our entire conceptual 
scheme based on the extended matter (as suggested in section 1. 4 above). This is effectively arguing 
for the violation of locality, i.e. showing that separability as a deeper principle can be conserved if 
we allow only some aspects of our foundational ontology, and not those central to the suggested 
transcendental strategy (of (Luntley, 1995) and section 1. 4 above), to display action-at-a-distance 
and thus violate a weaker principle of locality. 
In their analysis of the issue Timpson and Brown (2003) claim that separability in Einstein’s works 
takes the form of a transcendental strategy, with somewhat different purpose of the one we had 
186 
 
been considering above, argument for the possibility of framing empirical laws. This can be seen as 
part of the Luntley’s transcendental strategy sketched above, as along the stable ontology the 
argument implicitly requires a possibility of grasping the laws that govern the changes of the 
material ontology. Again the primary qualities of ontology can be said to give the laws their 
understandable form, i.e. when referred to those features the laws can be seen as contributing to 
the isomorphism between the ‘real’ processes and the experienced phenomena. But Timpson and 
Brown (2003, p. 7) go on to push for a distinction within Einstein’s ‘original invocation of 
separability’ in (Einstein, 1948) into separability-proper (“requirement that separated objects have 
their own independent real states (in order that physics can have a subject matter, the world be 
divided up into pieces about which statements can be made)” (Timpson & Brown, 2003, p. 7)) and 
locality (“requirement that the real state of one system remain unaffected by changes to a distant 
system” (Timpson and Brown, ibid.)). The transcendental strategy can then go through, and not have 
to adopt empirical adequacy of the quantum formalism as its scientifically derived counter-example, 
if we take the ‘troublesome’ phenomena to be violating locality, but not violating separability.  
For as quantum formalism (with is generalising principle of no-signalling) shows we can formulate 
empirically adequate  laws governing the locally observed phenomena without having to take into 
account the state of affairs at a set of unspecified distant locations. This does imply that the 
formalism of the theory will not be as precise as we might have wished it to be (though this need not 
imply that it is formally incomplete), but it does not imply that in order to make it more precise we 
must take into account the state of affairs at various distant locations. When we use the laws to 
predict the occurrence of phenomena the general prohibition of superluminal signalling (respected 
in both our principle and constructive approaches) guarantees that whatever phenomena occur at 
distant locations, our predictions concerning our local phenomena cannot be improved. Of course, if 
we include the classical signal improvements can be achieved, but that very signal is not even a 
locality violating process. Thus if we take the empirical testing of laws to be achieved through correct 
predictions of the phenomena, then “*it+ is established by the no-signalling theorem [that] the 
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probabilities for the outcomes of any measurement on a given sub-system, as opposed to the state 
of that system, cannot be affected by operations performed on a distant system, even in the 
presence of entanglement. Thus the no-singalling theorem entails that quantum theory would 
remain empirically testable, despite violating locality” (Timpson & Brown, 2003, p. 8).  
Due to no-signalling we can then not predict locally the changes our system is supposed to have 
undergone on the subsequent explanatory account, but that also allows us to rest all local 
explanatory accounts on what we can predict without fear that they will be falsified by such 
changes. In other words we need not open the possibility of ontological holism. We do import from 
the principle methodology the acceptance of the generalised no-signalling prohibition (modified so 
as not to be expressed in terms of information-ontology) which of necessity skips over the 
contentious issue Einstein raised: how come we can reliably formulate laws when we cannot 
satisfactorily conceptually isolate our objects of experiment from the rest of the universe. And 
admittedly this element remains mysterious, though the constructive approaches’ notion of 
quantum equilibrium aims to give some account of it. If we consider Einstein’s stronger version of 
separability as an epistemic condition on formulation of laws then blunt acceptance of the no-
signalling theorem (regardless of its subsequent constructive account through the complex notion of 
quantum equilibrium) provides us with effective epistemic separability as required. Bub’s deep 
methodological principle suggests we should not go further than that, but in search of the 
explanation that can be united with the transcendental strategy we have already forgone that 
prohibition. Now we view one of the CBH generalising principles as an epistemic, not metaphysical 
limitation. This certainly weakens the ideal account that the realism of the transcendental strategy 
would want, but as we shall aim to illustrate below it does not prohibit all possibility of ontological 
explanatory connection between everyday experience and the troublesome phenomena.  
Prediction should not be directly equated with explanation, and in fact some of the grounds for 
Luntley’s transcendental strategy against the antirealist criticism is provided precisely by that 
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asymmetry (this is in the cases where the prediction is imprecise). So one might object that when 
giving an explanatory account of the micro-physical phenomena violations of locality will still provide 
difficulties for provision of a complete and precise account. But Timpson and Brown (2003) claim 
that this is a problem of a different kind, a problem that may be resolved by appeal to different 
measures, from the objections that empirical laws cannot be determined due to doubts about 
underlying ontological holism. In our case, a defender of Luntley’s transcendental strategy would 
claim that though troublesome phenomena require additions to the conceptual scheme that 
encompasses the common sense core and classical physics, the very conceptual scheme is not 
throwing up inconsistencies between requirement of primitive individuation of the segments of 
material reality (the basic ontology of objects) and the ontological holism of the same material 
substratum. It is the empirical generalisation of no-signalling, or its deeper constructive explanations 
in terms of quantum equilibrium, that secure the viability of the quantum formalism alongside our 
common-sense understanding of the world. In other words, we can argue that neither the formalism 
itself, nor the constructive renderings of it, force us to a view of ontological holism (and it is worth 
bearing in mind that this is a stronger threat than the notion of an all permeating field, for the latter 
still allows for a local individuation of characteristics of the foundational ‘element’ of reality) that 
forbids the individuation of objects in local regions of space-time.108  
But it does impose some demands on the explanatory conceptual framework of our case-study 
constructive approach. Most notably, though predictively this was not required if we stay at the level 
of quantum formalism and its statistical character, in terms of explanation it must account for the 
violation of locality (i.e. account for the no-signal action-at-a-distance), whilst showing how 
ontologically separability is maintained in the ‘troublesome’ phenomena. We can permit that 
separability to be of the weaker form (out of several possible forms considered in (Healey, 2004)): 
                                                             
108 It is worth bearing in mind here, and this is also further explored in Timpson and Brown (2003), that Everett 
interpretation, missing from this analysis, is not forced to adopt ontological holism either as it outright 
excludes the notion of collapse which Einstein used alongside that of entanglement in exposing the tension 
between the completeness of quantum theory and principle of separability.  
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physical processes behind phenomena in a spacetime region R supervene on an assignment of 
intrinsic physical properties to extended objects (again this can include fields as well) and the local 
proscriptions of the universal law governing the changes of the intrinsic properties at points of R 
and/or in arbitrarily small neighbourhoods of those points. But we must give some account of how 
changes to the overall entangled system (as implied in what Maudlin (2007), in Chapter 3 above, 
termed abandonment of separability) are communicated into changes (even if locally unpredictable 
and imperceptible, as in the case of symmetric and anti-symmetric triplet and singlet states) of the 
local separated extended material ontology. In essence we have to show whether, and if yes how, 
Luntley’s transcendental strategy can survive the ‘troublesome’ phenomena on constructive 
account. Though separability is not violated in a sense that we can’t formulate any laws governing 
the behaviour of a localised group of objects, that law itself cannot be taken to supervene at all 
times solely on the structured arrangement of the intrinsic state of those objects alone. Our 
empirical equivalence then results in alternative views of the problem of whether a primitive 
thisness of objects or supervening generalisations should be maintained.  
Constructive approaches in the light of non-separable laws  
How does the universal law ‘transmit’ (or even record) the local mechanical interactions that the 
proximal particle undergoes to the distant one? Correlations in measurement outcomes on our 
separated particles cannot be attributed to a common cause (cf. Maudlin (2007) exposition of 
separability violation in 3. 2. 2 above), but neither can they be attributed to the transmission of 
directly detectable signals between the particles. They are taken to simply come about without a 
contact-interaction causal mechanism, through an unknowable nomic prescription (encoded in the 
universal law) that they should. A serious question arises: how does this explain them? Is this not 
simply hiding the lack of separability-respecting explanation under a carpet, a carpet imprinted with 
a neo-Bohrian pattern similar to the epistemic limitations of principle explanations?  
In terms of comparison with the principle approaches of Chapter 2, we have to ask whether 
allocating the occurrence of the ‘troublesome’ phenomena to the universal law capable of affecting 
190 
 
locally the distant particle, based on changes the proximal particle undergoes at a separated 
location, is not just a return to the ‘black box’ explanatory agnosticism about material processes as 
given by the principle approaches. Bohmian mechanics is forced to explain wherefrom comes this 
limit on what can be learnt about the universe in a theory so precise, with precise motion of spatially 
located, almost tangible, particles. This is, so it seems, where the constructive approach leans close 
to the principle one.  
Finally, when explanation of the ‘troublesome’ phenomena is offered by the constructive 
approaches how well does it tie in with the requirements for durability of individuation of spatial 
entities seemingly behind the ‘transcendental’ argument? Most notably, if all the relevant 
information for dissolving the ‘troublesome’ aspect of the said phenomena as required by the 
transcendental strategy comes from the universal law (wavefunction) alone, how fundamental us 
the extended material ontology?  
The constructive approaches of the previous chapter, most notably the ultimate suggestion to treat 
the wavefunction in Bohmian Mechanics as the universal law of temporal evolution governing the 
behaviour of the fundamental primitive ontological entities, the particles, aim to outdo the principle 
approaches in the provision of explanation compatible with the ‘transcendental’ argument by 
specifying how empirical adequacy of the theoretical formalism is achieved in terms of the material 
existents, the very same entities that physically construct the objects that our everyday concepts 
refer to (Goldstein, 2007). They specify what ontological elements of the real world make the 
quantum formalism empirically successful. They aim to not only uphold the same constraining 
principles that the principle approaches put accent on, but to show how those principles arise in the 
world of ontology that is supposed to support explanations required by the ‘transcendental’ 
argument. In that they encounter problems of their own, most of which we shall try to address in 
the following sections, but more importantly they shed light on the nature of explanation required 
to accommodate the ‘transcendental’ argument and the ‘troublesome’ phenomena.  
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With the postulation of the primitive ontology of particles and the kinematic guidance they receive 
from the wavefunction, elaborate arithmetical proofs are employed (as surveyed in the previous 
chapter) to show that the slightly modified formalism of Bohmian Mechanics is empirically 
equivalent to the bare quantum formalism. Now if the latter is capable of generating empirically 
testable situations, as suggested in the previous section, despite not being able to guarantee 
ontological separability of all elements of nature, then we have a way of dissolving the worries about 
potential consequences of the implications of violations of separability for the ‘transcendental’ 
argument. Bohmian Mechanics, just like the minimal versions of quantum theory focused on the 
predictive manipulations of the formalism alone, can support enough stable empirical structure for 
the postulation of existence (and tentative guesstimates of) laws of nature.  
The problem is, though, that it must treat the fundamental element of the bare formalism, the 
‘system’ wavefunction featured in the Schrödinger equation, in the same way as principle 
approaches do: as a rational guesstimate of the state that the particles of interest are in conditional 
on the state of the remaining particles in the universe and the universal wavefunction. Great deal of 
mathematical derivation is employed to show that this can be done (cf. references in Chapter 3), but 
even more is required to show why this must be so: i.e. why we cannot simply directly read off the 
state of the universal law and its effects on the local particles (the ‘objects at hand’ required for the 
depth-of-explanation). The latter is enshrined in the assumption of the quantum equilibrium 
hypothesis, a constructive version of the constraining principles. Given this hypothesis which limits 
in principle what we can epistemically access concerning the fundamental ontological elements, the 
ordinary system wavefunction is the best information109 we can have about the system at hand 
                                                             
109 It is important to note here, though, that the marriage between the principle approaches and this particular 
constructive approach is not as straightforward as suggested by Goldstein (2007) in the light of the lengthy 
discussion above. Most notably, what Goldstein and our answer to questions posed above are referring to is 
the qualitative sense of information (‘type information’ along the lines suggested by Timpson (2004) above), 
and it remains to be seen what its relationship to the quantitative sense that the principle approaches employ 
is. It is a further task for the constructive approach along these lines to show how the principle approaches can 
methodologically arise, given the nature of reality as suggested by this particular constructive approach. This is 
not necessarily an impossible task, but is one requiring further elaboration than is given in simple equating of 
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(Goldstein, 2007, p. 13). Though this seems to play into the hands of the principle approaches of 
Chapter 2, it needn’t be seen as such. The further step is provided by allowing us to draw inferences 
about the nature of reality that operates in a regulated and understandable manner even with this 
epistemic limitation.  
Goldstein (2007) claims that this is by no means putting the cart before the horse, because the 
analyses cited in Chapter 3 (most notably (Dürr, Goldstein, & Zanghi, 1992)) show that we are 
justified in treating these rational guesstimates from the postulations of fundamental ontology as 
genuine probability statements about real-world events, statements that are relevant to 
characterisation of what phenomena we actually expect to experience (and can experientially 
verify). Our survey of the issue above should also convince us of the conceivability of this claim. 
Moreover, Goldstein draws on formal analyses that show that no more detailed information can be 
available about the changes in the fundamental material ontology than is given by the system 
wavefunction which respects the constraint of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis.  
Thus the gap between the knowledge of the occurrence of the phenomena and its understanding is 
bridged by claiming that the phenomena arise (through a structural isomorphism) out of the spatial 
configurations of the fundamental ontological elements, when governed by the universal law of 
temporal evolution. As the law itself is not directly epistemically accessible to display this governing, 
we rely on the informationally as-complete-as-possible guesstimate of its proscriptions given by the 
system wavefunction that is formally conditional on the state of all the particles in the universe and 
the universal law governing them. The further why regress, as to why the universal law proscribes 
what it does, is stopped by its fundamental ontological status: the (epistemically unattainable) 
universal wavefunction just is the formal expression of the universal law governing the spatio-
temporal changes of all fundamental building blocks of material objects.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
the effective system wavefunction with as-complete-as-possible information about the state of the particles of 
interest.  
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Despite the objections of the anti-realist critic we peacefully accept a certain form of ontological 
holism when we employ the equilibrium-conditioned guesstimation of the ‘universal law plus 
particles’ mechanism (i.e. information codified in the universal wavefunction) in our experimental 
situations. But the said holism is not threatening as it still allows us to formulate empirically 
adequate rules (though not themselves the fundamental laws of nature but conditional on them) 
regulating the occurrence of the phenomena. Goldstein claims that there are further mathematical 
guarantees that “the observed deterministic regularities would be classical” (Goldstein, 2007, p. 16). 
That is to say, formally we can expect all the observed regularities to be obeyed, just as our core 
conceptual framework requires. Through the notion of “local beables”, the fundamental extended 
entities of the material reality, we have a direct structural and conceptual isomorphism with the 
core concepts of the everyday conceptual framework, such as are given by the primary qualities of 
directly identifiable objects. But, our explanation of the troublesome phenomena, requires that we 
admit into the ontology another essential element: the universal law that allows (in fact instigates) 
the elements of the material ontology to behave in a non-separable way the macroscopic effects of 
which we observe in the troublesome phenomena. Nonetheless, given the constraining principles 
(and the constructive account of their origin) the foundation of the conceptual framework is not 
jeopardised as its elements are not shown to be illusory: we can use it as the starting point of the 
transcendental strategy. Moreover, the beables give us a straightforward way to identify the object 
that undergoes real and counterfactual changes in the situations that we aim to explain. Still we will 
have to say more below about how exactly this proceeds, i.e. what kind of explanation is required to 
marry the partially non-separable ontology with the seeming expectations of separability from the 
everyday conceptual scheme.  
Yet, does this legitimise us saying that we understand the interactions between separated formally 
entangled objects, any more than the establishment of limiting principles for information 
manipulation does? We have to be careful not to use this question to slide back into the view of 
universal wavefunction as the all-permeating field that takes on to itself the mechanical influences 
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from the local particles and transmits them in a non-separable way to the distant set of particles 
(and vice versa). This was shown to be an erroneous view from the beginning as even the formalism 
does not encode any influences from the particles to be ‘recorded’ in the effective wavefunction. 
We might, though, expect them to be recorded in the fundamental one, only not expressed in its 
derivative – the manipulable effective wavefunction. Goldstein is adamant that we must never 
confuse the effective with the universal wavefunction, although the former is dynamical and 
manipulable, the latter is not even expected to be.  
“But for Bohmian mechanics, that the [universal] wave 
function does not change is, far from being a problem, 
just what the doctor ordered for a law, one that governs 
the changes that really matter in a Bohmian universe; of 
the variables Q describing the fundamental objects in 
the theory, including the 3-geometry and matter.” 
(Goldstein, 2007, p. 18) 
Yet, the universal law itself, upon which so much hinges in this explanation, is in-principle 
unknowable and directly susceptible to be ostracised by Bub’s ‘deep methodological principle’ for 
example. The answer to this requires drawing on the realist traditions that claim that we can know a 
law exists even if we don’t know exactly what it is (Bhaskar, 1978). This is to widen our 
transcendental strategy to include the causal ascriptions of reality alongside structural durability of 
objects. This, in turn, was argued for by the abandonment of the epistemic atomism of the structural 
state of matter in phenomena, and shifting the focus on the atomism of an enduring object that 
undergoes changes in the phenomena (Harre, 1996). That is, we have to permit ascriptions of reality 
that result from a causal natural (not logical) necessity, as well as what is mediated by the bare 
structure of extension alone.  
Our second worry might be that in explanatory sense elements of this constructive approach are 
pushing us back to the disregarded world-view of pre-established harmony. Namely, if there is no 
mechanism through which the material ontology (the particles) affects the effective influence 
transmitter, the universal wavefunction, are we not consigned to the blunt view of individual 
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particles locked in a monadic dance choreographed by the universal law? The picture is one of 
perfect clockwork, but clockwork where no hands can be stopped as there are no influences actually 
transmitted between different elements of the mechanism. But to accept this criticism is to be too 
attached to the mechanistic world-view as the only form of causal world-view. As the discussion in 
Chapter 1 showed, this can be historical mistake also, and there are precursors even in classical 
mechanics where we have been forced to accept the action-at-a-distance without the mediating 
mechanism. The question is how we were not pushed to considerations of pre-established harmony 
then. And the answer is, some, like Leibniz, were, but the rest of us just took it to be a non-explicable 
(and thus foundational) fact about the world that objects with mass will affect each other at a 
distance. The effective regularity was there (even in the absence of the mechanism) and that was 
enough. It had to be.  
Likewise, we can allow that the universal law specifies (but not transmits) how the fundamental 
objects will affect each other in interactions. Moreover it tells us how the relations established 
between the objects will reflect in their local states, by having some glimpse of the law we can learn 
more about the states of the objects than we can simply from observing each of them in isolation 
(i.e. locally), because the law provides a rule by which such inference is legitimised. The law, or what 
we can derive from it, will also tell us what to predictively expect of the objects, but due to 
limitations of derivation, will not tell us exactly what will become of them in the future. The 
derivation on the other hand should be sufficiently formally regulated to alleviate fears of chaotic 
modification (most notably those affecting the possibility of reidentification) of the structured state 
of the primary qualities of the said objects. Thus in our troublesome phenomena we can generate 
counterfactual situations in which we can show how the interventions on one of the particles 
produced ‘regulated’ effects on the distant one (for example by ‘providing’ the local conditions 
required for informationally rich future measurements on a distant particle in teleportation – 
without actually instantaneously moving the particle itself; as well as allowing the proximal 
experimenter to predict the results of potential measurements on the distant one by ‘reading off’ 
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the conditions set up in the universal law and the states of the local particle – previously coupled 
with the distant one).  
The fundamental material objects will undergo changes in such circumstances that cannot be 
predicted from the state of their local environment (even from the limited local derivation of the 
limited conditional wavefunction – the mini-law), but that can be predicted – and what is most 
important for us, can be explained – when a more global perspective, better conditionalised on the 
universal law specifying their changes in time. Just as in Newtonian mechanics taking increasing 
number of distant masses into consideration (but under a rational guidance of what is sensible for 
the given situation) increases the predictive capabilities of the change in non-inertial motion of the 
local mass. We gain better understanding of the mass’ behaviour when seeing it as a system of 
‘gravitationally’ (i.e. regulatedly) interacting object, then when trying to account for potentials for 
re-identification of a single isolated massive objects seemingly irregularly undergoing changes of 
inertial motion (most notably the changes of the rate of change of position). The depth of 
explanation is provided by showing how potentially varying the state of the objects crucially involved 
in the interaction changes the phenomena in a regulated way, by showing how adding or removing 
the masses and altering their relative positions affects the phenomena in the way that simply 
altering the position of a single mass in isolation cannot. Yet we have to see how this explanation is 
better for the ‘transcendental’ argument than the one in which no significance is attributed to the 
mass of the objects themselves, but rather to the general constraining principles governing their 
interplay.  
Of course, just as is the case with the principle approaches, there are further technical difficulties to 
be resolved, most notably those of rigorously showing that given all that we can rationally infer 
about the universal wavefunction we are justified in holding the conditional wavefunction to be 
behave just as expected from the empirically successful bare quantum formalism. That is we need a 
formal demonstration how the system can be for the purposes of many versions of the 
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transcendental strategy suitably decoupled from the totality of the universe and that most complete 
Schrödinger equation for the totality of the ontology in the universe can at least have an appropriate 
form (given that it can’t be specified exactly) (Goldstein, 2007, p. 19). Still the arm-waving 
information provided above should allow us enough insight to compare the potential for deeper 
explanations concordant with the transcendental strategy of section 1. 4 and the occurrence of the 
troublesome phenomena. We are also interested in addressing the general structural components of 
such explanations to be applied to the common-sense conceptual framework. The starting point, 
though, should by now be clear; we should be able to see what Bohmian Mechanics on the final 
rendering from the end of Chapter 3 says about the nature of independently existing reality.  
4. 4 Explanation and the two approaches   
From the perspective that accepts Bub’s ‘deep methodological principle’, the perspective of 
empiricism, even though the local beables enable us to make an easy and intuitive connection with 
the fundamental structural features of the direct experience they cannot furnish a deeper 
explanation than the explanatory models that don’t contain the right sort of beables at all (the 
principle approaches in our case). Though on the face of it, the constructive approach seems 
appealing because of its structural similarity to the much preferred causal mechanical model, at the 
present stage of development the appeal is a result of an illusion. The reason for that is that with 
committing to metaphysical postulates the constructive approach cannot avoid the dangers of the 
separability violation in the right way. If it consigns them to an action of non-spatial entity, such as 
the universal law, it is merely hiding behind another cloak the bare phenomenological generalisation 
of no-signalling prohibition: we cannot know the exact mechanism by which the action-at-a-distance 
phenomena come about. The mechanism is there, it does not involve transmission of influences 
along space-time paths, but we are forever prohibited from knowing exactly how it works (how the 
proscriptions of the law in a limited region relate to all the relevant proscriptions in other regions, 
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i.e. what the global wavefunction is).110 What they effectively say is that though the ultimate 
universal wavefunction is informaitonally complete (though, crucially, not ontologically complete in 
the terminology of (Maudlin, Completeness, supervenience and ontology, 2007)) in-principle limits 
of knowability prevent us from making explanatory use of the completeness. 
So we end up in the same mess as those who claim that effective wavefunctions are informationally 
incomplete (e.g. the Fuchs principle approach as presented above) and then have to search for the 
ontological account of the limits of knowability. What constructive explanatory account in fact 
presents us with is the pre-established harmony situation, where distant elements of reality 
sometimes affect each other without any (epistemically accessible) intervening mechanism 
established between them in space. The effect is ‘transmitted’ (and that term has to be taken with 
great caution here) through the causal action of a fundamental law, the universal wavefunction, so 
as to allow for some visible correlations between the states of the separated and separable 
elements of reality. And this, warns van Fraassen ( (1989, p. 112), original emphasis) can only 
accomplish two functions: to postulate an entity that has either predetermined all our supposedly 
free interactions, or simply coordinates what we call an interaction ‘externally’ to both parties; or 
“to admit that we have no explanation but to refuse to consider the correlation mysterious 
nonetheless”. Pre-established harmony is just not a token causal-mechanical type of explanation, 
and cannot pride itself on having its traditional virtues. Yet as we have seen, the principle 
approaches struggle to even get a deeper explanation off the ground as they refuse to rely on any 
causal structure that is not a product (and not a pre-requisite) of our explanatory conceptualisations 
of the phenomena. Due to ‘troublesome’ nature of our phenomena of interest they cannot find any 
such stable structure and are forced to relegate explanation-stumps to the unfamiliar territory of 
abstract entities that are strongly mind-dependent.  
                                                             
110
 This, of course, holds for the case-study instance as presented here for the specific purpose of comparison. 
There are in fact suggestions in the literature (cf. (Valentini & Westman, 2004) for recent suggestions) how the 
limit of knowability may be circumnavigated or removed, and suggestions for empirical verification should 
certainly be explored. In the present case, however, we take them to still be lacking and that the in-principle 
unknowability as resulting from the quantum equilibrium state holds.  
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The difference between the approaches in the end lies in the philosophical position adopted, as 
might have been expected from the initial empirical equivalence of the different ‘quantum theories’. 
From the perspective of trying to provide an explanation sufficient for the transcendental strategy 
but limited to the epistemic accessibility of the ontic concepts employed, i.e. the perspective where 
ontology is largely reducible to epistemology, the two approaches come strikingly close together, 
despite explicit methodological differences. The principle approaches are forced to admit a 
dispositional aspect of the properties they venture to ascribe to the elements of material reality (the 
‘be-ables’ instead of ‘beables’; cf. (Howard, 1989)). These properties, despite quantum theories’ 
success in providing predictive laws, cannot supply sufficiently firm grounds for the ‘transcendental’ 
argument. Nothing can be known about reality-in-itself, as it is so unpredictably sensitive to 
observation-intervention. The principle approaches are forced to this position because they are 
unable to say what the ultimate nature of ontological elements is, beyond their dispositions to 
exhibit certain properties when prompted to do so by experimenters’ actions. They start off with 
what is directly epistemically accessible and happens to be enshrined in the conceptualisation of 
persisting objects, but there is no possibility of linking (in the present state of the development of 
the programme) the potentially dispositional concepts employed in the explanation of the 
‘troublesome’ phenomena to this conceptual framework as conformant with minimal realist 
structure in the transcendental strategy. Their explanation of the phenomena (including the 
‘troublesome’ ones) in terms of fundamental ontology cannot provide truth-conditions for 
counterfactual situations centred on the ontological elements to provide an explanation that goes 
beyond the regularities predicted and observed. They leave the changes the ontology undergoes as 
mysteriously holistic and essentially indescribable. In that they struggle to both bridge the gap 
between knowing that the phenomena occur and why they occur as they do. Furthemore, the why-
regress cannot be easily stopped.  
The constructive approaches overcome this problem, by speculating on the nature of the universal 
law that governs the changes (thus making the changes be real alterations from one state of the 
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exiting property to another such state, not from a collapse from a spectrum of dispositions into a 
concrete state). They view the phenomena as a wholesome process of an operation of a really 
existing law on a really existing ontology, with occasional disregard for the spatial and mechanical 
structure relating the existents. Yet they are forced to admit an in-principle epistemic inaccessibility 
of this law and rely on elaborate mathematical speculation as to how we can gain incomplete 
glimpses of the requirements of the law. By philosophical commitment to viewing the phenomena as 
more than a series of events, they venture to offer grounds for the transcendental strategy of direct 
structural connections between the fundamental ontology and the common-sense conceptualisation 
of the world. But for the argument to succeed they have to modify the starting point of the 
transcendental strategy to recognise more structure in the common-sense conception than was 
originally envisaged. Through this loophole they can make the requirement acceptance of what is in-
principle forever epistemically inaccessible as real. For it to be acceptable, the anti-realist critics 
would have to be convinced of sound reasons to abandon empirical realism in general analyses of 
the conceptual framework, to replace it by so-called transcendental realism.  
Instead of seeing the principle approaches as conservatively limiting speculation to the merely 
epistemically accessible, we could view them as committed to the ‘epistemic fallacy’, when shying 
away from the ontological investigations behind the apparent phenomena (especially, ‘troublesome’ 
phemomena). In that way they commit to the Humean Mosiac of series of appearances, such as the 
informational relations that are established between the separated ‘black-box’ instruments, but that 
do not inform us of the laws governing the objective non-instantaneous behaviour of the black 
boxes. The laws that they do establish as the principle generalisations cannot be understood as 
causal laws in the material domain at all. They can at best concern the information-ontology. And 
this is to be expected of efforts to stick to the metaphysics that is always reducible to epistemology: 
it creates its own ‘implicit ontology’ and ‘implicit realism’ (Bhaskar, 1978) only in special domains. So 
we get the ontology based on the category of experience and a realism based on the presumed 
characteristics of the objects of experiences, in this case the expected informational content of the 
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formal quantum states. Bhaskar claims that such strategy leads to the generation of methodology 
that is either irrelevant to science, or relevant to science but inconsistent with epistemology. We can 
see this well in the information-ontology speculation, where we are either waiting to be told of what 
the relevant connection to the material objects of science is, or we have to establish the new science 
of information-manipulation but one that is difficult to connect to the conceptual scheme of our 
everyday (but also experimental in this case) experience of objective laboratories and ‘black-box’ 
machines.  
The greatest weakness of the principle approaches, despite the expectations we might have had of 
them at the outset is that they struggle to connect the abstract novel ontology to the foundational 
elements of the core-conceptual framework. The ease of unification of concepts was meant to be 
their greatest strength, but in the light of the conceptually challenging ‘troublesome’ phenomena its 
advantages have been lost and the principle approaches have been left with inadequate resources 
to connect the structures of the two ontological realms (the informational and the material). On the 
other hand, when they venture to establish this connection they jeopardise either then separable 
‘individuality’ of elements of material objects (as in instrumentalism) which their particular 
methodology aimed to preserve, or the requirement of the transcendental stem that there are 
epistemically accessible facts about the world. In the light of the world-making charge, they don’t 
provide a way to successfully conceptually connect the novel ontology (at this stage this can be 
entities or properties) with the foundational aspect of the common-sense conceptual scheme 
required for the transcendental strategy for simple realism. The novel ontology on its own though, is 
not sufficiently well understood to be able to enter the common-sense conceptual scheme (and 
there are claims that it never will be able to aspire ro such status; cf. Timpson, 2004; 2008) without 
this mediation via matter as extended substance.  
In the light of explanation of the ‘troublesome’ phenomena’ required for the successful universal 
application of the transcendental strategy, the principle approaches lack a foundation for a 
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formulation of a causal law that can abandon the perspective of the Humean Mosaic. Such mosaic, 
when featuring elements otherwise included in the ‘troublesome phenomena’, does not on its own 
provide enough structure to extract concepts of enduring objects that play essential role in the 
starting point of the transcendental strategy. The general constraining principles of information 
manipulation do not provide sufficient conceptual ground for a causal law ‘limiting’ changes in 
matter, and a parallel notion is not offered in the information ontology, so the transcendental 
strategy cannot be constructed. That is their weakness as compared to the constructive approaches 
when providing the explanation needed for the transcendental strategy to succeed given the 
apparent separability violations in the ‘troublesome’ phenomena.  
Humean Mosaic as presented above fails to account for the necessity and universality of laws which 
in turn, given our empirical experience of the ‘troublesome’ phenomena, requires an explanatory 
ontology that cannot sustain the transcendental strategy for its very existence. The ‘troublesome’ 
phenomena teach us that we can come to know more, and manipulate more, of the real world when 
we take it to be a structure of material ontology (with essential features related to separability) 
coupled with (at least partially epistemically accessible) causal laws that govern the changes under 
which it still maintains identity as the fundamental object of experience. Reality is on this strategy 
attributed to (initially) speculative ontology on the basis of causal lawfulness as well as direct 
perception of states of objects.  
Explanations aim at global economy of concepts, but such that provides for a greater variety of 
changes in characterising the object enduring through the phenomenon. In fact, the phenomenon is 
to be set in the conceptual network as the regulated change of the enduring object. Through this 
object-concept link such explanations connect to the transcendental strategy which rests on the 
universal acceptance of central role of the concepts of individual enduring material objects. If the 
concepts taken as central in explanation of the phenomenon are not characterised as enduring 
identifiable entities (and re-identifiable through further development of the situation) then such 
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explanations struggle to connect to the realist attitude developed through the transcendental 
strategy that is seen as the background securing superiority of such explanations over provisionally 
constructed narratives. Traditionally, primacy of extension was seen as a possible straightforward 
connector of the speculative elements of explanatory narratives and the segment that is directly 
epistemically accessible. That notion of extension carried with it some constrictions on behaviour 
attributed to separation. Quantum theories deny that constricting role of separation. Our case-study 
explanatory constructs are challenged to give an account of what replaces it.  
When we construct explanations we come to rely on more than on what can be predicted, we 
retrodict to an account that makes sense, that unifies a particular experimental experience (which is, 
crucially, more than just an observation of the local state of material existents upon completion of 
the experiment) with the core elements of the conceptual scheme. The constructive approaches that 
deny the Humean Mosaic can, at least notionally, achieve this by showing the phenomena to be a 
product of extended objects and specific (classically unheard of) causal laws, the latter giving rise to 
the changes in material ontology that cannot be accounted for solely from its local powers. It 
remains to be seen what the price for this ‘achievement’ is.  
Fundamental ontology and the acceptance of the universal-law-Bohmian worldview  
The constructive approaches overcome all these obstacles, when they venture beyond the limits of 
direct epistemic accessibility, but we must address the question whether the ontological (potentially 
non-separable) features can be distinguished from the epistemological features of the explanation 
they provide. The aim is to guarantee the isomorphism between the gross structure of directly 
experienced reality, as the prerequisite of the transcendental strategy, and the fundamental 
structure postulated by contemporary quantum theory.  Maudlin (Completeness, supervenience and 
ontology, 2007) seems to suggest that we can, as Bohmian Mechanics marries the “local beables” 
(entities characterised by the primitive constrictions of extension, including related spatial 
separation) and the non-local, but also non-material wavefunction. So, from the perspective of 
section 1. 4 we seem to be on safe ground: our experience is connected to our projections about 
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fundamental ontology through an enduring stability of the essential function of the spatial extension 
(this can be enhanced to have a temporal element in the relativistic sense, as well) as given by the 
theoretical fundamental entities, the spatially located material particles with finite extension, 
separated by finitely extended spatial regions, in a word: the local beables. We say to the anti-realist 
that although tables and chairs are not the fundamental elements of our ontology, we can 
reconstruct them out of the fundamental elements that have an irreducible property of spatial 
extension. We can reconstruct them out of essentially similar components.  
Yet, the extended objects we were expecting to provide a conceptual foundation on which to unify 
the scientific and the everyday accounts, seem to harbour a threat for our transcendental strategy. 
Though we cannot consciously and willingly subject them to unpalatable changes, we must accept 
that they can in the end undergo just such changes.  If the phenomena elucidated by the theory 
involve an abandonment of locally specifiable intrinsic ‘thisness’111 of objects, such as seems to be 
the case with teleportation on a constructive approach interpretation, then we seem to lose the 
desired connection to the common-sense conceptual scheme. And the latter we required to get the 
transcendental strategy off the ground. Though maintaining some aspect of the explanatory 
conceptual framework as primitive and fundamental prevents us from a rapid slide into anti-realism 
of the world-making type (cf. (Devitt, 2006); (Devitt, 1997)), there is still a worry that if the concepts 
of properties we use (all of them) have a mere dispositional basis in the real world and no direct 
structural correspondence with the realistic interpretations of contemporary science the common-
sense realism will not have a sufficient conceptual foundation (in the ‘geometrical’ structural 
isomorphism alone). The problematic dispositional basis lies in the proscription of the ‘thisness’-
bearing properties by the universal law, effectively calling for their reduction to the law. This is, in a 
sense, saying that fundamentally there is just a law, but that expectation is difficult to connect with 
the starting point we need to diffuse the world-making challenge. Especially, as we also have to 
                                                             
111
 Again, as a reminder, this is an arm-waving intuitive thisness, not the technical terms of R. M. Adams and 
others.  
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admit the universal law is in-principle unknowable. This is where taking quantum theory (at least in 
the case-study instances considered here) seriously exposes constructive scientific explanations to 
difficulties similar to those in the more ontologically economical principle approaches, and threatens 
the tenability of the ‘transcendental’ argument of section 1. 4. Now, the crucial thing in the 
fundamental status of some properties for the realist explanation, was the constriction 
(independent of humans) on what could be said about the world. This was the realism’s upper hand 
over unrestricted world-making, as the latter could not account at all for why some 
conceptualisations work better than others. But, unlike the case of unrestricted world-making (cf. for 
example (Putnam, 1981), (Pettit, 1991)), in the case of fundamental laws we do once again have 
constrictions imposed by the real world: constrictions on what experiences can be expected of the 
phenomena.  
In applying the transcendental strategy we accept that there are two ways in which our concepts of 
dispositional (or secondary quality) properties are restricted: by how they depend on us and how 
they depend on the real world. The later provides a structure-characterised base for the 
transcendental strategy; our conceptual frameworks already contain concepts that can be identified 
as this base. Explanations of the phenomena can then be built through account of causes (which are 
often elucidated through the explanations of the mechanistic style) of the activation of our 
disposition to judge the situation as characterised by a particular secondary quality. Thus we explain 
away the illusion. But this causal dependence can be relied on only if it is open to empirical 
investigations of the constraints it imposes on our thinking and concept formation. And traditionally, 
again, here we employ the connection of theorising with material reality and eventually the 
everyday material objects (the starting point of the transcendental strategy). And those, in the end, 
rely on a transcendental strategy of accepting that some of the concepts essentially associated with 
them are those ‘natures’ of those objects and as such are not dependent on our judgement. The 
question we now face is whether the law alone can provide the required natures.  
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But first, it might be objected that the law we want to rely on, the potential fundamental law of 
temporal evolution, is in-principle unknowable. So we seem to be saying that, unlike the world-
makers, we can know how it is that some conceptual categorisations are better suited to explaining 
experiences than others, and this knowledge relies on the in-principle unknowable ontological 
element: the universal law. Let us pause to carefully unravel this conundrum. To start with, the 
universal law is not entirely unknowable, as we have useful ‘effective’ glimpses of it through the 
effective wave-functions of the quantum formalism. It is, on the other hand, unknowable in 
sufficient detail to make the formalised ‘glimpses’ any more than epistemic prediction tools. But to 
argue from that that it is entirely ‘unreal’ is to commit to an ‘epistemic fallacy’ (Bhaskar, 1978), to 
expect the ontological claims to be confined to the same limits as the epistemic ones (in our case the 
limits of knowability). There is no urgency to accept this limit (which is essentially Bub’s ‘deep 
methodological principle’) if there is hope of providing a deeper explanation of the experienced 
phenomena than the principle approaches can hope for.  We can direct our explanations to answer 
ontological questions without having to transpose them into epistemological terms first. We can 
accept Bhaskar’s claim that causal laws are ontologically distinct from patters of events that are 
epistemically accessible to us. This would allow our transcendental realist of section 1. 4 to argue 
that given that we have the science we have (i.e. a functioning quantum formalism) the independent 
reality must exist and be of a certain type. But a further problem to resolve is how this type can be 
unified with a common-sense conceptual scheme so as to avoid the charge of world-making.  
The problematic task is then to show how constructive approach explanations can be united with 
the common conceptual scheme, in the way that that unification is easily achieved when the 
questions are reduced to the epistemological realm. We must also show what further benefits an 
ontological speculation can provide, other than chiding well with the structure of the depth of 
explanation. It is, perhaps, important at this stage to include one final step towards the connection 
with the ‘troublesome’ phenomenon of teleportation. We have already seen its greatest mystery lies 
in supposedly infinite availability of information to the distant experimenter, which has in the end 
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dissolved as a characteristic of a global not a local set-up. In other words, that experimenter needn’t 
worry that his account of the phenomena generated locally will be factually incorrect concerning the 
local features, only that it can be improved by updates from a special person – the holder of the 
other half of the entangled pair. Again, the no-signalling prohibition (enshrined in the structure of 
the formalism already), an epistemic consequence of the quantum equilibrium postulate, guarantees 
that with respect to local predictions (and even subsequent explanations) the distant experimenter 
Bob will not be able to tell whether anything metaphysically significant has happened to the object 
in his possession. However, once he takes Alice’s manipulations into account, he will come to know 
that the object in his possession has indeed undergone important changes to its ‘thisness’. Here is 
where we tread a fine line separating this account from utter ontological holism. Though individual 
experimenters working locally cannot gather enough information to be certain that they can 
successfully re-identify objects they are working with, the full-blown world-making is still restricted 
by the supposed existence of a generative mechanism that allows certain changes to the local 
object, and only those. The worry to address is whether this is sufficient to allow the transcendental 
strategy to get off the ground.  
Namely, if in the teleportation process the particles, the local beables, do actually instantaneously 
traverse the required distance (effectively instantaneously swap places across any distance) and 
carry with them all the interactions with the universal law then our simple strategy of reducing 
composite objects with intrinsic ‘thisness’ to equally primitive constituent local beables fails. This is 
because the identity of the constituent beables can be changed at will from any location in the 
universe (provided some special operations in the past light cone, potentially very deep into the 
past), and the occurrence of change is not open to objective investigation. Some experimenters 
(Alice) have an unique epistemic position in the universe concerning the relevant beables. Given 
such a situation we have no guarantee of locally detectable endurance of the fundamental objects, 
against which to construct deeper explanatory accounts.  
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If on the other hand the beables themselves do not traverse the distance, but merely serve as 
placeholder for different property ascription by the universal law, then we may wonder as to their 
utility in the first place. And here the greatest weakness of the realist project on the constructive 
account is exposed. Detailed analysis of it would take us too far away from the limited project of 
comparison of the explanatory potential of the case-study instances, so only a brief sketch will have 
to do. On one hand it seems that we could replace the constructive account as given above by one 
that removes the very bare place-holder particles and converts the informationally rich universal law 
into the only existential primitive, either as a holistic single field in geometrical space or even as s 
more complex object in higher dimensional spaces. This is a return to the Humean Mosiac viewed in 
its entirety as the variations in structure produced by the ontologically holistic wavefunction, all of 
which structures are non-separable in a metaphysical sense. We could, as a sketchy illustration, 
imagine this as a sea (that maybe consists of individual ‘water-particles’ and maybe doesn’t) where 
all the structures interesting from the perspective of the starting point of the transcendental 
strategy are further structures created by the sea such as waves, and whose identity is not 
necessarily tied to individual component ‘water-particles’.  A realist might immediately object that 
this illustration also commits us to belief in space and in which both the water-particles and the 
emergent wave-structures reside and endure through changes, which might again give some 
explanatory primacy of individuation to the water-particles occupying specific positions in space. But 
less sketch structures of this kind can be devised, perhaps along the lines of super-substantivalism 
(cf. (Sider, 2001), (Schaffer, 2007)) which reduces all emergent structures to property ascription to 
space alone.  
Yet we might worry that generation of common-sense concepts along those lines mimics that of 
anti-realist constructivism that effectively leaves the account of how concepts depend on the real 
world unexplainable and empirically untestable, making the explanations offered a mere empty 
facade of how constrictions on our thinking and concept generation. Following this route is helped 
by the non-separability inherent in all aspects of the universal wavefunction, with no conceptual 
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reliance on the characteristics of concepts from the framework that rely on the inherently separable 
elements of the world. Even with the (principally given and unexplainable) no-signalling constriction 
on prediction, in explanatory retrodiction we admit of possibility of dispositional responses that 
generate object-concepts to be systematically thwarted so even those concepts become inherently 
vague.112 Effectively this in the end makes all our concepts inherently vague, barring further 
explanatory account, which should in principle be empirically testable at least in part, of how the 
concepts of common-sense depend on the real world. “Reality may be indeterminate, and the 
cognition of reality may be subject-involving, in certain surprising ways.” (Pettit, 1991, p. 623) In the 
ascription of the independent reality to the bare particle-objects in constructive approach above we 
tried to cling to the notion that something at least can be pointed to as the real constraint on our 
judgements as to the character of the independently existing material reality. In a realistic account 
with some aspects understood as essential the constraints were provided by the typings of objects 
that are not dependent on us to explain the conceptual frameworks they provided. “A little bit of 
world-making is alright against a background of a world that we did not make and that influences 
our little effort.” (Devitt, 1997, p. 255) What we have to bear in mind is that the universal 
wavefunction in this materialised form is still in-principle unknowable, so we are short of 
constrictions for the explanatory account of the difference in Alice’s and Bob’s local accounts of the, 
for example, teleportation phenomenon.  
But if the above sketch is a convincing exposition of the slide into anti-realism, such as the 
transcendental strategy tries to avoid and that the explanatory accounts of the ‘troublesome 
                                                             
112 An intuition behind this is the classical consideration of the Ship of Theseus, all of whose parts (boards, 
beams, masts etc.) get replaced with time by the new wooden elements of the same shape (new boards, 
beams etc.). Though relying on the form alone we can say that it is still Theseus’ ship, particularly as we can 
account for the history of changes of its elements, if the ‘another’ ship is reconstructed again from the original 
boards and beams (say they have been cleaned and the rotting has been stopped), when the two ships are 
compared side by side we are still tempted to call the reconstructed one the real Theseus’ ship. In this re-
identification the actual history (from being a part of the ship to being taken out and cleaned) of the particular 
constructive elements (the boards and beams) plays an intuitively important role. This is not to say that 
replacement of constructive elements automatically destroys the identity of objects, nor that individual 
humans become new people when their cells are replaced, but that the account of the history of these 
materially fundamental elements is somehow important in the common-sense accounts of individuation.  
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phenomena’ of the constructive approaches aim to outdo, it is one could argue that the view 
advocated by Bohmian Mechanics above cannot avoid collapsing into them. Even on that view the 
distant experimenter Bob cannot ever come to know the important changes that occur to the 
objects in his region of space, until Alice broadcasts the true account of her actions on her particle, 
even though his local object has really changed under the influence of the universal law. We don’t 
need anything to travel between the distant locations, but the important changes to his objects are 
at some instant prior to his investigations hidden from him and anyone else, but not from the other 
experimenter Alice, until she announces the results of her local actions. Now this is not to say that 
the stability of all objects is forever thrown into doubt, for Bob has a reason to be careful of what he 
assigns to his local object given that it is one half of the original entangled pair (and not just some 
object picked at random), but however hard he tries he will never come to know fully what its local 
state is. Though this needn’t immediately put the possibility of constructing the transcendental 
strategy into jeopardy, it does place a great onus of what we importantly need to know about the 
world onto the epistemically inaccessible law. Effectively, without knowing what the law proscribes, 
for Bob there has never been any teleportation at all, and yet the explanation of the phenomenon 
requires that the local object has been altered in a dramatic fashion (which is just short of saying 
that it has been entirely replaced by a different object).  
The minimal realist constriction provided by the constructive approach as given in the previous 
chapter, relied on the separability and durability of the material existents, the spatially located 
particles. However, that may not be enough to allow for the explanations of the troublesome 
phenomena that respect the transcendental strategy. For the strategy itself is considerably 
weakened the more of its starting concepts we take to be dispositional (or response-dependent in 
the sense of (Pettit, 1991)). In simplest of terms, the bare durability of the extended stuff in space 
may not be sufficient to explain all the appearances readily found in the common-sense conceptual 
scheme. That is why the most comprehensive, blunt, forms of the transcendental strategy, as 
renewed in for today’s purposes outside considerations of quantum theory, take more of the 
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elements of common-sense framework as directly related to the nature of things in the real world, 
minimising the world-making as much as possible (cf. (Luntley, 1995, pp. 118-119; 235 note 6)). This 
is abandonment of our strategy above to select from the conceptual framework in which we present 
the immediate experience that which is directly related to nature of things in the real world, and 
using it to explain that which is illusory. Through the considerations of the ‘troublesome 
phenomena’ as presented in Chapter 3 we have come to leave only the barest of spatial position as 
directly characteristic of objects of the common-sense framework, and reduced all other aspects to 
the ‘illusion’ structurally dependent on the universal law.  
As these considerations take us further away from the investigation of the explanatory ontologies of 
the actual case-study instances we shall stop short here with a few remarks. Explanation features 
strongly in our strategy, and it requires a conceptual unification of the diversity of phenomena 
through primitive concepts. Traditionally (cf. illustrations from Descartes in Chapter 1), extension is 
one of those primitive concepts and it has strongly features in the traditional versions of the 
transcendental strategy. The more blunt of those versions as suggested by Luntley’s later remarks 
(1995, p. 235) are “contentious and still poorly understood”. This is not to say that they are wrong, 
but only that they require further deeper investigation as to how they differ significantly from the 
anti-realist world-making accounts (cf. just for illustration (Rorty, 1980), (Putnam, 1981), (Pettit, 
1991)). In the end our explanations will require reliance on structures that restrict the world-making, 
however liberating acceptance of some world-making might be. The holistic material structure does 
not provide enough of those restrictions as the typification it provides for the generation of concepts 
is fuzzy due to effective dependence on our judgments to interpret the structure emergent from the 
holistic ontological substratum as such.  
4. 5. Playing the constructive game, retypifying common sense  
This seems to be the precarious situation we are in. To discourage anti-realist criticism we had to 
show the possibility and explanatory utility of the transcendental strategy from the basic structures 
of the common-sense conceptual framework to the fundamental ontology of all phenomena 
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experienced in an interaction with the material world.  Those phenomena included some 
‘troublesome’ instances generated in the domain covered by quantum theory. Those instances 
appeared troublesome for they seemed to provide an experiential basis for the denial of the realist-
style validity of the elements of the common-sense conceptual scheme we take as the starting point. 
The latter is most notable as an individual ‘thisness’, given by the constrictions of extension taken as 
primitive and isomporphic in both the fundamental ontology and the objects of common sense 
experience, including the role of spatial separation in the conceptualisation of identity (‘thisness’). 
So as not to block the possibility of the unified explanation of the everyday experience and the 
‘troublesome’ phenomena in terms of fundamental ontology we had to add further non-separable 
elements to it. Yet that very element, the universal non-separable law seems to be more 
problematic  than expected as it is outright characterised by ontological holism and potentially more 
important for the desired explanation than the extended material ontology taken to be the 
fundamental connector between the ‘troublesome’ and the non-‘troublesome’ in phenomena.  
This is the lesson for explanatory accounts to take from the struggles of constructive approaches to 
provide deeper explanations than principle approaches can (though, for the time being, there is still 
no verdict whether in fact they can achieve that): neither the bare surface structure of the 
phenomena nor the human constructs imposed on the interpretation of them are sufficient for 
deeper explanation. A deep explanation that can still serve the transcendental strategy is concerned 
with the structural constraints which endure despite not being directly epistemically accessible. That 
is, in the above account the phenomenon is not given by the bare fact of the appearance of the 
correlations between distant measurements, it is given by the whole account of the experimenters’ 
production of the correlations with manipulations of macroscopic equipment as objects in space and 
time. This seems to require also that our transcendental account starts not only with the conceptual 
framework of objects with certain essential structure (in our simple case, the geometrical structure 
of spatial extension) but with a wider framework of the interactions and changes those objects can 
endure (and still be re-identified as the same objects) and the effects we as human agents (and not 
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pure observers) can have on them. This is asking for a slightly higher price for our transcendental 
strategy, but not a price that must be unacceptable to the antirealist critic. After all, our experience 
of interaction with objects is as much as part of our everyday conceptual scheme as is the bare 
experience of perceiving those objects. If so much is admitted we can add to the essential 
requirements of isomorphism not just the durability of extended objects but also a notion of 
regularities of the changes they undergo.  
That is, it seems that we have to be careful not to presuppose in the starting point of the 
transcendental strategy that at any instance a total description of the situation is embodied in the 
purely empirical descriptive concepts employed. Those concepts are ones of objects not bare 
geometrical structure, and the former include an implicit understanding of the causal/lawful 
properties as well as the spatial ones. These properties must also be understood as primitive, and 
not dispositional. The essential structure is given by the objects’ shape and the existent laws that can 
act on it in the right circumstances. These laws are not observable to us in the same way as 
individual material entities, but are inferentially no less real than material structure, and cannot be 
reduced-away in terms of locally (i.e. not a total description) specifiable concurrence of events 
(though, this is how we ate first come to speculate about their existence, to form the required 
metaphysical projections).  
The price, in terms of conceptualisation, of the constructive depth of explanation  
The constructive approach of Bohmian mechanics, outlined in the previous chapter, denies 
metaphysical separability, whilst nonetheless trying to avoid the threat of ultimate full and complete 
ontological holism. The latter would provide a non-starter for our defence from antirealist criticism 
from section 1. 4. as we take it to invite response-dependency for all concepts of the common-sense 
conceptual framework. In the light of the previous section, the constructive approach argues that in 
the retrodictive explanation of phenomena we must contend with the violation of separability as we 
come to know that the physical processes in some spatio-temporal region are not wholly 
supervenient on assignment of qualitative and quantitative physical properties at the points of the 
214 
 
said region and their arbitrarily small neighbourhood (cf. (Healey, 2004)). Yet, our limits of 
knowability, enshrined in the no-signalling theorem, assure us that even if we could know of the 
non-separable change of properties, the physical laws we can empirically deduce for our region 
would not have been different. There are non-separable changes taking place, but they (due to no-
signalling prohibition) do not crucially affect the limited predictions we can make about the 
behaviour of objects in the said region, do not affect the possibility of performing manipulative 
science from which to derive the truth-conditions for the relevant object manipulation on the 
extended material ontology in the local region. In other words, though our explanatory conceptual 
framework must not contain total separability, we can still do science; to the extent that we do in 
experimental and descriptive employment of the quantum formalism.  
The problem is that once we come to put things this way we can legitimately ask whether we really 
have a deeper realist explanation of the phenomena, than we have been offered on our principle 
approaches with an instrumentalist slant. Pause just for a moment: the fact that the change of 
properties in the separated region is governed by a well structured law prevents us from having to 
fear the ultimate ontological holism, taking the entire material universe to be definable only as an 
indivisible whole with all partial definitions together summing up to insufficient global 
understanding. Our constructive approach in fact assures us that in any given region we can 
formulate the laws of physics and reconstruct experience of the material world on the basis of the 
properties of local objects (as they are formalised in the bare quantum formalism) and infer the 
existence of empirically inaccessible universal law governing their behaviour (in which all the non-
separable effects are codified). So there is no need for metaphysical holism couched in the non-
separable connection of properties of objects, the apparent violation of separability is achieved 
through the dictates of the universal law, which is itself immaterial. The central character of the role 
of extension in our conceptualisation of the real ‘mechanisms’ behind the phenomena does not lose 
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its ontological significance: small things still add up to the big everyday things, and only these local 
small things add up to this here local big thing.113  
Well, knowing the universal law then would allow us to regain the strong separability in the sense of 
Healey (2004). But, and here is the snag, the limits of knowabililty prevent us from ever knowing the 
exact details of proscriptions of the law for our given region, though they make them stable enough 
to allow correct probabilistic predictions of the future phenomena, and law-abiding accounts of the 
past ones. But predictions are not explanations. And our explanation explicitly involves action at a 
distance: in the ‘troublesome’ phenomena (we come to know once we take a more global view) a 
change in the intrinsic properties of one system induces a change in the intrinsic properties of a 
distant system without there being any process that carries the influence contiguously in space and 
time (Berkovitz, 2007).  
This seems to be the consequence for a conceptual scheme to be employed in explanations of the 
troublesome phenomena and the construction of the transcendental strategy. As the universal law is 
in in-principle epistemically inaccessible, save for some details, to fend off the slide into excessive 
dispositionalism (where everything is reduced to the dispositions of the law, but those are 
unknowable) we must employ the tried and tested technique of relying on the ‘geometrical’ 
isomorphism between then common-sense conceptual scheme of re-identifiable objects and the 
fundamental ontology of spatially situated particles (the local beables). Yet to justify the existence of 
an external criterion of correctness of explanatory conceptualisations of this reduction of the 
empirically accessible to the empirically inaccessible, especially with respect to the ‘troublesome’ 
phenomena, we must postulate the existence of the non-local universal law that affects the 
conditions of re-identification of the fundamental ontology. In that, as we struggle to conceptualise 
the details of a causal connections between separated elements of the fundamental ontology, we 
                                                             
113 But, and this is crucial, our phenomena do not consist only of what is added there but also of what the 
things added are expected to do and to know what that is we can’t simply summarise all the properties and 
propensities of the small things making up the big one. 
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must make the universal law primitive and modify the starting conceptualisation of the empirically 
accessible in phenomena to include both the spatial extension of objects and their subscription to 
(unknown) law. Our starting point in the transcendental strategy must also include the objective 
nomological structure of the world.  
Otherwise we face the problem of not being able to account for the external constraints on our 
explanatory conceptualisation, we are again threatened by the excessive dispositionalism charge 
which we cannot dispel as our transcendental strategy cannot get off the ground. This is because the 
intial conceptualisation of the separate re-identifiable objects in space is just an illusion imposed by 
us onto the essentially holistic fundamental ontology of forever inaccessible world-stuff. Our 
typification, our carving of the world-stuff into manageable concepts is just an illusion, and any such 
carving is as good as another: a game of freely constructing the facade before the noumenal world. 
But on such account all explanations are equally vacuous, as there is no matter of fact as to what 
explain what. The price to pay for this (in the absence of a satisfyingly primitive account of 
causation) is to view the world from the outset (the very simplest starting point of the conceptual 
scheme employed in everyday conduct) as characterised not just by momentary spatial relations, 
but also by the mind-independent (primitively characterised) nomological structure. This mysterious 
guiding-hand-behind-events requirement may be too much of a price to pay on some worldviews. 
Especially as the theory itself demands that the universal law behind quantum phenomena (and 
fundamentally behind most physical phenomena) remains in-principle epistemically inaccessible. 
Furthermore, the role of the law at times becomes so fundamental as to affect the very 
individuation of the materially fundamental ontology, the particles, inviting a question whether 
those are again illusory projections included to save appearances, most notable the starting point of 
the transcendental strategy.  
What this leaves us with is a road to modification of the starting point conceptual scheme, but not a 
modification that is outright unacceptable. We start from arguing for the necessary minimal 
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typification of experience into that of enduring objects. This is an uncontroversial route the starting 
point of which is forged by Devitt ( (1997); and as presented in Chapters 1 and 3 above). To produce 
any explanations of the experience, and particularly deeper explanations of experience it is desirable 
to have some account as to how the real world affects our formation of concepts (rather than 
leaving us to freely dream up conceptual schemes of our choosing, even permitting they have 
internal consistency). In the latter case all our conceptual connections depend on our judgements 
(or even unwilling dispositions) that something is the case or that a set of concepts is in some way 
interrelated. But we cannot call upon the external world to account for a causal influence on how 
these judgements come to be formed, and why some of them might be more appropriate accounts 
of our experience than others (this may be appropriate to a particular purpose, even fulfilment of a 
pragmatic aim like acquiring more experiences significantly like some given experience).  
As we cannot take an external position and view the world as it is, it is prudent to start from a 
shared ground, that of the common conceptual framework. As noted by Devitt, above, anti-realist 
interpretations of the experience as presented through the common-sense conceptual framework 
(or any similar conceptual framework, for that matter) cannot explain our experience. Even simple 
realism of the most basic kind has the tools to start producing explanations of the experiences given 
the common sense conceptual framework. The idea is that the basic germs of the realist accounts, 
which may grow to be extremely complex in the case of explication of formal contemporary 
theories, are already present in the said conceptual framework. We can then construct increasingly 
deeper explanations of an increasingly wider range of phenomena. But for the explanations to be 
possible in the first place, we need a transcendental step: a necessary condition for breaking the 
anti-realist explanatory impasse. Again (cf. Chapter 1), this is not a strict necessity of the form 
usually employed in the transcendental strategy, but an explication of the sensible conceptual 
commitment the possibility of explanation of experience as encoded in the common sense 
conceptual framework.  
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From here we rapidly proceed from accepting that we all have thoughts about material objects to 
‘necessitation’ of the commitment to the conceptual scheme that sees the objects as existing 
independently of us in an objective framework of space and time. This commitment can further be 
distinguished from a sensorily similar commitment that there appear to be objects existing 
independently of us by further investigation of how the notion of those objects participates in our 
objective accounts of the world, including the intersubjective communication. The said 
commonsense conceptual scheme with the prior commitment sees the material objects (which are 
also in space and time, in some way that needn’t be precisely specified at this stage) ontologically 
basic. In this way the persons engaged in the communication can identify and re-identify the 
particulars that are being spoken about. Other than demonstrative pointing to the objects, they can 
also be identified (given a ‘thisness’ as suggested in Chapter 1) provision of description which, in the 
given circumstances, applies uniquely to the particular elements of reality concerned. Being 
ontologically basic within the common sense conceptual scheme, material objects do not need 
further reference to particulars of a different sort (Strawson, 1959).  
As we investigate the nature of material reality in greater depth we come to uncover a number of 
illusions inherent in the above conceptual scheme, which must be removed from the scheme of the 
ontologically basic. Many of the identifying properties of material objects are dispensed with, but 
the germ of structure immediately evident and independent of our judgment remains, that of the 
necessary primary quality of extension in space. The identity of objects remains founded in the 
combination of identities of smaller objects that make them up, all related to each other through 
definite relations in space. Though our explanations no longer take the material objects as we 
perceive them as fundamental, they tell us how the appearance of the objects arises out of their 
fundamental structure, and the typifcation that does not slip away long this route is the extended 
structure of objects as constructed out their constituents. When the structure is subject to change, 
the details of the change can be tracked along the change of positions and shape in space. The germ 
of the connection between the Manifest and the Scientific images (Sellars, 1963) is given in the 
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shared nature of extension in both the account of fundamental physical ontology and the directly 
perceivable material objects. Of course, there are other fundamental properties as well, but those 
can be added as attachments to the objects identified through their extended structure.  
Yet, this kind of image might still lead us down the wrong path, and in some cases it seems to have 
done so for centuries. For sometimes it appears as if we have not taken on board the lessons 
required for a starting point for our transcendental strategy above. Namely, though we have argued 
for the conceptual primacy of the common-sense conceptual framework and the search for the 
realist metaphysics out of its ontological commitments, the commitments have strayed to one side 
only. With excessive focus on the spatial (geometric) structure, we have again allowed too great a 
reduction of the elements of what were supposed to be ontologically basic concepts. The focus on 
spatial structure alone allows for a return of the anti-realist suspicions through the back door. For 
the macroscopic spatial structures are again nothing but an illusion, and though there is an account 
of how the common-sense conceptualisation of experience arises and the required germ of 
connection is in place, we can allow for judgements that reduce the supposed ontologically basic 
concepts to products of an illusion. The world may exist independently and be made of the 
fundamentally extended things, but the structures that we see as arising from those things are 
nothing but castles in the sky. The generalised thing, the supposed fundamental unit of a realist 
ontology is an illusion, a human projection onto the real external world in the same way that a 
visible image is a projection onto a structure of pixels. When quantum theories threaten to deny the 
individuating characteristics to supposed fundamental elements, our entire house of cards threatens 
to collapse. If the spatial arrangements of the fundamental elements are not stable, then the 
structures we see as arising from them are not stable either. The anti-realist says once more that the 
transcendental step cannot be legitimately made, that by committing to the illusory structures we 
are not thereby committing to any further beliefs about the origin of the shared experience. If the 
directly re-identifiable material objects are nothing but provisional spatial (and even the significance 
of that condition can now be questioned) arrangements of the even in-principle non-individuatable 
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fundamental elements, then we cannot explain our experiences as they are given even in the 
common sense conceptual scheme. That is, we cannot explain them in a better way than the anti-
realist accounts can describe the same experience. It is important to note that this further difficulty 
arises only when we accept that the fundamental elements of the realist structure do not have an 
individuating identity, even in principle, regardless of their position in the overall spatial (or 
geometrical) structure.  
And as Harre ( (1996), and elaborated in Chapter 3 above) reminds us, the fundamental unit of the 
realist ontology is not the totality of the directly perceptible situation (the instantaneous state of the 
extended structure), but a generalised thing. “Things and other invariants through change are 
ineliminable fundamental elements of experience” (Harre, 1996, p. 312). The common sense 
conceptualisation of experience relies on more than the geometric structure and relation between 
illusory constructions, it includes at every step the notion of invariance through change. And the 
generalised objects, those fundamental referents for re-identification, are not a conjunction of 
structure statements, but something more. The further element can be provided by the notion of 
primitive laws governing the changes that the said objects can undergo. The laws account for the 
external limitations of the changes that the objects can undergo, thus participating in the very 
notion of the definition of an object (though, admittedly, not in the same way as the geometric 
structure or some other materially fundamental element might). They also provide limitations that 
provide for deeper explanations given as conceptual connections between the experienced 
phenomenon featuring the said object and the counterfactual situations it can be conceptually 
envisaged in. The same notion of laws allows us to account for the changes that the fundamental 
elements of extended ontology undergo at the ‘ontologically deeper’ level, providing explanations 
even for the ‘troublesome’ phenomena that arise in the domain of quantum theory. So, even in the 
cases where it seems that the individuating ‘thisness’ cannot be attributed to the particulars of 
fundamental ontology, the universal law governing their behaviour allows for their individuation and 
re-identification when required. Joining those phenomena to the common-sense conceptual 
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framework does not them commit us to the ontological holism, that would eventually invalidate the 
possibility of identification and individuation of material objects within the common-sense 
conceptual scheme. In summary we are philosophically permitted a commitment to the conceptual 
individuation of material objects within a commonsense conceptual scheme, and further ontological 
commitments as required by the simple transcendental strategy.  
As Worall  (1989) notes, realism in general has been pronounced dead before, but has successfully 
resurfaced. What the above discussion teaches us is that the worth of realism in explanation should 
not be easily abandoned, even at the price of modifying what is considered primitive and constituent 
of the common-sense conceptual scheme. That is not to say that we can and should go changing the 
basics of the everyday conceptualisation of the world as we please every time a slightly troublesome 
physical theory needs to be accommodated. But it does permit that we look hard at the elements of 
the conceptual scheme and reason about possibilities of seeing them in a different light so as to 
accept new primitives which we were previously hoping to reduce to some others. In our case 
universal laws of temporal evolution have to be admitted as primitive and recognised as such in the 
common-sense conceptual framework. There is no apriori reason why good-natured anti-realists 
would not accept this move, provided that appearances of the phenomena are saved as they are, 
and that we can still talk of those phenomena in the way that we ordinarily do. Accepting laws as 
primitive, along the lines that Harre and Bhaskar suggest, seems to allow for all this. There is, 
nonetheless, a high price to pay in admitting that there are foundational elements that we must 
accept as epistemically inaccessible and open only to inferential guesstimates that do not show signs 
of empirical improvement as yet. If that is the price, so be it, say those intent on commitment to 
realism of some sort. There are of course those for whom this may be a step too far to make, but in 
abandoning ship at this stage they must go back over the ground covered from those first tentative 
steps of the transcendental strategy. They must ponder the potential for explanations of the 
phenomena, including the troublesome ones, and the general worth of explanations. They must also 
be prepared to address additional problems that plague our principle approaches, which initially 
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wanted to avoid any tinkering with the common-sense conceptual scheme, but then struggle to 
connect their account of the phenomena with even the most basic elements of the realist outlook 
(that there are material objects behind the troublesome phenomena in the first place). The only 
other alternative is to embrace the ontological holism and search for some kind of reconstruction of 
experience along those lines. Though they are not impossible, the above argument aims to suggest 
that they cannot follow the route of the simple transcendental strategy traversed above, but must 
start from scratch in accounting for the conceptualisation of experience as an error arising from 
historical misconception or sensory deception. Whilst this is by no means an impossible route to 
take its struggles with the anti-realist criticisms along the lines of dispositionalism seem much 
greater than those attempted here.  
Perhaps ‘rejecting the grammar which tries to force itself on us’ (Wittgenstein, 1967) is to accept 
that ordinary, everyday concepts of objects in spatial framework and temporal duration and 
interaction presuppose inclusion of lawful, entirely externally conditioned, behaviour of those 
objects over and above the external limitations of their structure as identified through space and 
time. A chair is then more than certain spatial structure before us, it is a durable object whose 
temporal structure is, just as the spatial one, limited by what primitive laws of nature allow its 
material constituents to do and suffer. What the direct comparison of our approaches teaches us is 
that perhaps we looked in the wrong place from the start. Given the empirical equivalence of the 
two approaches perhaps the secret of their differentiation is not in which can axiomatically 
construct a better explanation of the world that contains the ‘troublesome’ phenomena, but what 
our expectations of the understanding of the world must be in the light of the troublesome 
phenomena. Both our approaches would agree that we can’t get to the nature of the fundamental 
entities in a direct empirical way, that we cannot distinguish between them empirically (which just is 
to restate the empirical equivalence). To break the equivalence we must look into the starting 
position of the search to see how the equivalence has arisen in the first place and how the 
‘troublesome’ phenomena have come to be seen as troublesome. The idea is that saying that we 
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must start with objects that can be successfully reidentified is not problematic in itself, but simply 
relegates the problematic aspects to another domain as yet to be addressed. Whether it is the new 
ontology of abstract information-entities or the more classical one of local beables, the interesting 
question is how the phenomena that display the non-local connections between separated directly 
empirically accessible (macroscopic) objects can be generated.  
And for that we need a different conceptual starting point. What our transcendental requirement 
must recognise is that the starting point cannot be the conceptualisation of individual objects solely 
on their intrinsic properties reducible to extension. Instead, we must conceptualise the objects as 
elements of generative mechanisms that contain both their spatial location and the universal laws 
that contribute to their local changes, but are themselves not bound by the requirement of locality 
or separability. The idea is not to identify things by the stability of their spatial position but by the 
stability of the role they play in the generation of processes. One may wonder whether this is not 
just making the processes ultimately fundamental, with the object-entities as their more or less 
enduringly recognisable features. This is certainly one avenue to explore, but it is not of necessity 
the only route left to take. For one thing it would make the construction of the transcendental 
strategy difficult, as we would have to not just modify, but fully replace its starting point, one of the 
world characterised in part by the concepts of macroscopic objects. To alleviate that difficulty we 
can hold on to the concept of objects but claim that the concept is not completely adequate when 
understood in terms of primary qualities alone.  
The objects are not just what exists in terms of certain permanence of extension. The objects exist in 
a sense that they can be re-identified through the changes of a certain type. The key to the type in 
question is that there is a recognisable natural law governing the change, rather than a combination 
of such laws or a haphazard string of changes that cannot be understood as a law. It is the role of the 
law in interaction with objects that has to be better understood and investigated, and it is the 
recognition of conceptual foundation rooted in both laws and objects that distinguishes the principle 
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and constructive approaches above. For the former turn to be inadequate in providing an 
explanation, primarily a conceptual connection between knowing that a phenomenon occurs and 
understanding why and how it does, for they lack any tool for identification of relevant (and then 
eventually shown to be conceptually fundamental) objects. The latter play up to this requirement, 
but must provide extra work in showing how this is not just a trick to fit the ready-made mould of 
the explanatory model. To do that they must look into ways to break the limits of knowability, 
finding ways to suggest how this might be done. Alternatively, we could try to rebuild explanatory 
ontology in terms of the structure emergent from the fundamental holistic entity, following the 
empiricist line (including the Humean Mosaic of the momentary state matter) and avoiding search 
for deeper causal mechanisms. Even when ignoring the attendant technical difficulties (such as the 
preferred choice of the formal basis for the decoherence that makes the emergence of the dsired 
structures possible) such explanatory constructions cannot rely on our simple transcendental 
strategy as they lack the ‘germ of the solution’ for the connection of thedirectly observable 
experience and the fundamental physical ontology. There are other possible emergent and stable 
structures that are not in correspondence with our conceptual framework, but might be in good 
correspondence with some other possible such framework (making the existing one contingent in 
the fundamental structure, not just details). As the transcendental strategy starts with the 
preference for the essential features of the existing conceptual framework, explanatory ontology 
along the lines of the emergent structure would struggle to fend off the worldmaking charges and 
ontological relativity.  
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Conclusion  
The primary issue addressed in this thesis was the comparison of the two case-study instances of 
methodological and explanatory approaches to ‘troublesome’ phenomena in the domain of 
quantum physics. In the light of anti-realist criticism, which claimed that beyond a limited network of 
concepts related to direct experience objective competition of explanatory narratives is not possible, 
that different explanations are as good as each other, we aimed to investigate different strengths 
and weaknesses of two explanatory approaches: the principle and constructive one. The anti-realist 
criticism is potent not only from a purely philosophical perspective, but also for a wider-reaching 
conclusion that contemporary science in general cannot offer convincing explanations, sometimes 
that it is not even in the business of doing so, beyond the limited perspective of direct experience. If 
in fact we require that the directly experienced phenomena be seen as part of a unified whole of 
material reality then even in this sturdy everyday domain we lack objective explanations due to 
explanatory deficiencies in its foundational ontology, in the hypothesized primary constituents of all 
things material.  
The two methodological approaches have initially been chosen for their clear opposition in 
conceptualisation of the problem. The principle approaches were expected to overcome the said 
explanatory deficiencies of the hypothesised primary constituents by relying on the concepts 
familiar from the everyday discourse and explaining the phenomena in the framework of generalised 
constrictions on natural processes, without reference to the ontological elements inaccessible to 
direct experience (i.e. concepts outside the scope of the common-sense conceptual framework). 
Though at first glance this might seem a strained strategy, it has been shown to work in well-known 
instances in the history of physics, such as thermodynamics and special theory of relativity. The 
explicit advantages expected were the unification of the phenomena that would otherwise require 
separate explanations and stronger explanatory potency by elimination of brute coincidences 
between competing explanatory narratives. The explanatory model such approaches were expected 
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to fit in was one of unification, covering a wide range of phenomena within a strictly delineated 
conceptual framework. The constructive approaches, on the other hand, opted to openly rely on the 
hypothetical elements inaccessible to direct experience, focusing on elimination of the supposed 
deficiencies or their rebuttal. Their general explanatory model was a widely popular one of causal-
mechanical interaction, explanation of phenomena as causal processes arising from the physically 
deducible (though not always directly perceptible) interaction of the fundamental ontological 
elements, interaction characteristic of the said elements’ properties and propensities.  Through the 
evaluation of the way these general models dealt with the specific issues arising in the domain of 
quantum theory we aimed to distil conclusions for a generalised explanatory strategy concerning 
material reality.  
In addressing these issues the thesis opens with the survey of the role and nature of explanations in 
modern and contemporary physical science. It proceeds to argue for the importance of explanation 
in scientific discourse, rather than the separation of the two as has repeatedly been suggested 
throughout the history of modern physics, and commitment of ‘pure’ science to descriptions useful 
for prediction and technological development. Moreover the opening chapter argues that although 
explanatory narratives are essentially epistemological constructions, they require a general 
metaphysical backing through the explainer’s and explainee’s commitments to take the concepts 
and higher structures composed of them as directly referential. Part of the success of the 
explanatory constructions examined in this thesis will be evaluated on the acceptability of the 
commitments that stand behind (as a ‘backing’) of the concepts we employ in everyday 
communication, the ontological characteristics from the title.   
Thus the opening chapter outlines the ‘transcendental strategy’ to be employed in comparing the 
ontological worth of the opposing explanatory strategies. Though a partial misnomer, the said 
strategy requires of all speakers of a given language, in our case any natural language used to 
provide the required explanations supplemented by the minimum necessary formalism of quantum 
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theory, to accept that limitations to our acting and thinking rationally commit us to a conceptual 
framework that contains objects existing independently of us in objective space and time. It is then a 
further task for our explanatory approaches to try to fit in the explanatory narratives constructed to 
provide understanding of the troublesome phenomena with this general strategy. A historical 
overview outlines how this was achieved through the development of physics from early modern 
times to the occurrence of ‘troublesome’ phenomena with the rise of quantum theory in early 20th 
century. To permit the increase in knowledge through detailed empirical investigations the 
transcendental strategy is forced to select between the more and less fundamental elements of the 
conceptual scheme. The latter are then subjected to change under increased empirical investigation 
and the former provide a permanent and stable connection between the old and the new, between 
the directly experienced and the hypothetically explanatory. Historically, physical spatial extension 
and the geometric properties provided this desired connection.  
When quantum theory appears on the scene it introduces some phenomena that require a careful 
selection of the agreed upon set of characteristics used to construct explanations that respect the 
essential elements of the common-sense conceptual framework. By violating separability these 
phenomena seem to call for explanations that do not share the widely accepted minimal conceptual 
framework of objects in space and time. For the latter requires that these objects can claim an 
existence independent of one another insofar as they occupy different parts of space. The objects 
may be in discernible interaction, but they ought to have separate intrinsic states that can be altered 
through such interaction. Moreover, composite objects should acquire all their properties from the 
constituents’ intrinsic states and locally intrinsic interactions.  
If the phenomena in the domain of quantum theory violate separability the transcendental strategy 
for realism is threatened by denial of the possibility of spatio-temporal separation as the primary 
objective criterion of individuation of the elements of foundational ontology, elements which play a 
foundational role in the most universal conceptual scheme. In other words, they form the core 
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element of every conceptual scheme as they are particulars that can be identified and re-identified 
without reference to the particulars of a different sort. The ‘troublesome’ phenomena from the 
domain of quantum theory seem to invite a holism that denies the possibility of the application of a 
transcendental strategy, and thus pose a challenge for the conceptual connection between 
explanatory narratives suited to quantum theory and the simple and sturdy common-sense 
conceptual scheme, a starting point of the transcendental strategy.  
It is further outlined in Chapter 1 how the ‘troublesome’ phenomena such as the EPR correlations 
and the more novel ‘teleportation’ raise questions about the continuous existence of individual 
particulars in a systematic way predicted and confirmed by the theory. We conclude Chapter 1 with 
the acknowledgement of the general preference in literature for causal-mechanical type (our 
constructive approaches) of explanations over those of the unificatory type (principle approaches). 
The following two chapters are devoted to examination of the strengths and weakness of the case-
study instances of the two approaches in the light of the general problems each of the explanation 
types encounters in the specific situations, most notably the requirements of contrastive 
explanations which cannot be easily cast into the causal-mechanical mould.  
The second chapter surveys the epistemological position of one of the founding fathers of quantum 
theory, Niels H. Bohr, as an introduction to the principle approaches, presented as neo-Bohrian in 
methodology. They accept the necessary limits to epistemic accessibility and adopt an overall 
agnosticism about the structure of material reality out of which the perceived phenomena arise. 
They focus on the general limitations to knowledge gathering and information transmission between 
conscious subjects as sufficiently clear foundations upon which to build the explanations of the 
troublesome phenomena, without having to connect them to concepts of individual material objects 
(of any particular size or type) that are threatened by the non-separable aspects of the phenomena. 
In other words the Fuchs and the CBH methodological programmes call for a change of perspective 
229 
 
that would eliminate the need for the jeopardised connection between the ‘troublesome’ 
phenomena and the common sense conceptual framework.  
Following a classification of Bohr’s philosophical position as principle theory (shying away from even 
the possibility of mechanical conceptualisation of matter of ‘microscopic’ size) with a Kantian twist 
(the necessity of classical concepts for objective description of the physical realm), Fuchs’ 
programme sees the supposed quantum descriptions of matter as codified epistemic guesses about 
the future macroscopic outcomes of measurement. Yet to avoid the pitfalls of instrumentalism Fuchs 
ventures into constructive domain, but on a weak footing of ‘inherent sensitivity’ of reality to all 
empirical observation. The CBH programme (named after R. Clifton, J. Bub and H. Halvorson), 
explored in much greater detail on account of methodology, metaphysics and explanatory potential, 
aims to reconstruct the theory within a suitable mathematical framework with minimal ontological 
commitments (the epistemic ‘black boxes’). They propose to see the macroscopic objects in physical 
interaction as mere displays of output and input states from the perspective of ‘information 
transmission’, with no epistemic access to their material structure (nor any need for such access). 
Unlike Fuchs, the proponents of the CBH programme claim that the they do not show that the 
theory deals with the epistemological concerns of the observers nor that the basic stuff of the world 
is informational, but that the principle-style explanatory account is the best that can be achieved 
about the ‘troublesome’ phenomena.  
However, the explanations so constructed struggle to provide sufficient features for the 
transcendental strategy to remove the criticism of a vacuous narrative. Though such explanations 
satisfy key segments of the unification-type explanations in general, they leave a gaping hole in the 
connection between the conceptual parts of the universal constraining principles they rely on and 
the successful connection they achieve between knowing that a phenomenon occurs and why it 
occurs. As in the case of thermodynamics, this can be an extremely useful predictive tool and even 
goes some way to providing an explanation, but when deeper explanations appear as contenders it 
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is left wanting. The principle explanatory strategy, though nominally respecting the existence of 
material objects and their necessary separability, in the very provision of explanation does not 
respect that we conceptualise the situations in terms of re-identifiable objects. Though elaborately 
avoiding the separability-violating threats to the transcendental strategy, the principle approaches 
must commit at least to some novel ontology of their own. The latter, on the other hand is, though 
taken to be the first stage of its development, difficult to connect with the common-sense 
conceptual framework which was the starting point of the transcendental strategy.  
The third chapter outlines the history of one particular type of the constructive approaches, the one 
following the work of D. Bohm and well suited to the particulars of the constructive strategy through 
insistence on the point particle as the fundamental ontological element. Such particle nominally 
satisfies the requirements of a re-identifiable object in space and time, though the accompanying 
element of the quantum field or potential (required to reproduce the specifically quantum 
‘troublesome’ phenomena) is presented as marred with explanatory inadequacies, especially in the 
light of the novel phenomenon of ‘teleportation’.  Even without teleportation, the ‘particles plus the 
real field’ view struggles to maintain sufficient ‘intrinsic thisness’ of the particles in certain situations, 
and thus to prevent the slide into a fundamentally field-based holistically non-separable ontology.  
Following further introductory presentations of the philosophical notions of causes, properties and 
deterministic realism, an ontology of equally real (but ontologically of distinct type) particles and 
universal laws governing their behaviour is presented. Such ontology accepts non-separability 
through abandonment of the Humean mosaic that sees only momentary arrangements of material 
objects as really existing at any given time (and thus making the laws governing their changes a mere 
human projection onto the real state of affairs). The non-separable aspect of the phenomena is 
relegated to the universal law though, and thus not attributed to the material constituents. A 
summary of the technical arguments connecting quantum theory with such worldview is presented 
and the ‘troublesome’ phenomena are recast in the new light. A new problem arises though, for the 
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said explanatory construction requires not only an abandonment of the Humean mosaic as the 
foundational conceptual commitment, but also an acceptance of the epistemic barrier to access to 
the said universal law due to an axiomatically attributed state the whole of the universe is in. Thus 
the ontological elements are all named, but a barrier to their direct empirical investigation is once 
again raised.  
Chapter 3 concludes with a survey of satisfaction of the criteria for explanation set out in Chapter 1 
by the final constructive approach based on the point particles and the universal (though 
epistemically obscured) law. We show that the constructive approaches fare better in satisfaction of 
the Lipton criteria of explanation, and as is to be expected of the ontological, causal-mechanical 
explanations they show potential for providing deeper explanations (something that is discussed in 
greater depth in the subsequent chapter) than the principle, unification-style explanations can. This 
allows the transcendental strategy to be given through reliance on the concepts of enduring objects 
and non-local universal laws.  
Yet this seems to require that in the transcendental strategy we change the starting point from 
objects being defined in terms of primary qualities alone into objects conceptualised as enduring 
individuals subjects to the universal law. The nature is now ‘cut at the joints’ not along the lines of 
instantaneous structure in space, but through the selection of structure across law-permitted 
changes in space and time. But a final caveat opens here, especially in the light of the ‘troublesome’ 
phenomena introduced above: how can we justify the fundamental role given to material ontology, 
the point particles, if so much of their contribution to the overall structure is dispositional on the 
proscriptions of the universal law and is not intrinsic to the given ontological elements themselves? 
Such questions open up the validity of adherence to the transcendental strategy at all, given the 
conceptual obstacles raised by contemporary quantum theory.  
The final Chapter turns to presentation of the general characteristics of deeper explanations. It is 
shown that deeper explanations do require some notion of laws as conceptual background against 
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which the permissible alternatives to the experienced phenomena are evaluated. Furthermore, 
deeper explanations focus on the explanatory narrative that has an object, a system undergoing a 
regulated change, at its centre. This object has to be re-identifiable in its own right, not just as a 
structural feature of the phenomenon to be explained. On such account of the depth of explanation, 
especially when metaphysical projections beyond, but related to, the constraining principles are 
sought after, the principle approaches are found wanting. As they generally shy away from any 
specification of the metaphysics of the elements of reality responsible for the experience of the 
phenomena it becomes unclear how what is supposed to be explanatory on their account can 
actually be so. Furthermore, even the transcendental strategy that the sturdy and non-specific 
principle approaches were expected to connect well to, becomes problematic when they aim to 
clearly separate from straightforward instrumentalism. Both the Fuchs and the final Bub 
(representing CBH) approaches display inclinations toward a metaphysically fundamentally 
indeterministic universe (in the present, not just the future sense), one that cannot be 
isomorphically related to the common-sense conceptual framework. The structures available on 
such a view then struggle to give rise to re-identifiable objects that endure through change.  
Finally, we aim to combine the lessons from the principle and the constructive approaches in 
diffusing the threat of separability violations for the very core of the foundational conceptual 
scheme, the isomorphic connection between the physically fundamental ontology and the objects of 
everyday experience through the primary qualities of material existents. We rely on the observed 
regularities in the separability violations themselves, and show how they affect the predictive and 
explanatory aspects of the interpretations of quantum formalism respectively. As the separability 
violations can never be used for supraluminal signalling, epistemic and metaphysical restrictions can 
be combined to allow for the construction of the explanatory models which respect the formal 
requirements of the theory and the realism-supporting aims of the transcendental strategy.  
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They do have to lean on neo-Bohrianism to some extent though, in admitting explicit limitations to 
our epistemic access, but dare venture beyond it in asking for metaphysical projections that can 
account for the core features of the basic conceptual scheme and suggest areas of investigations 
where the said limitations might be experimentally removed (cf. the breaking of the quantum 
equilibrium). The constructive approaches suggest respecting the structurally important role that 
point particles play in connection between the common-sense conceptual framework and the 
vagaries of contemporary physics (by playing the role of local be-ables, however flimsical), and the 
non-material nature of the universal law of temporal evolution not subjected to limitations of 
separability. But this brings forth consequences for the starting point of the transcendental strategy, 
the core conceptual scheme. It requires that that very scheme admits as the fundamental 
ontological unit not the totality of the directly perceptible situation (the instantaneous state of the 
extended structure including fields), but a generalised thing.  
The common sense conceptualisation of experience must rely on more than the geometric structure 
and relation between illusory constructions, it must include at ever step the notion of an object 
enduring through regulated change. As metaphysical limiters of the changes the objects can 
undergo, the universal (and ontologically non-material) laws participate in the very definition of an 
object (though admittedly not in the same way as the geometric structure or some other directly 
observable feature). Thus the ‘troublesome’ nature of some phenomena in quantum physics need 
not just draw consequences for the axiomatic structure of the explanatory conceptualisations 
specifically constructed for them, but can influence what our expectations of the understanding of 
the world that contains the troublesome phenomena ought to be like. A transcendental strategy of 
arguing for realism must start not wit the conceptualisation of individual objects solely on their 
intrinsic properties reducible to extension, but use also the generative mechanisms that contain 
both their spatial location and the universal laws that contribute to their local changes across time. 
These laws themselves are not, though, bound by the requirements of locality and separability. The 
idea is to identify things by the stability of the role they play in the generation of processes. Simply 
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put, to understand a ‘chair’ we must see it as capable of smashing a window as well as having four 
legs and a backrest.  
An avenue for further research opens up in connection between the above discussion and the so-
called Everettian conceptual approach to contemporary physics. The latter makes the spatially 
extended, but holistically conceived structure as absolutely primary, though conceptually 
disassociated from the everyday objects of experience. Though this might be a natural route to take 
in response to the impermanence of the intrinsic properties of the point particles in some 
experimental situations (crucially involving precise position as well) it is metaphysically demanding 
(through calling for parallelly existing but unperceivable universe-duplicates) and difficult to connect 
to the starting point of our transcendental strategy for realism.  
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Summary  
The starting position of the this thesis is that scientific knowledge is incomplete without 
explanations, whereupon with the development of new theories our knowledge both broadens and 
deepens (as fundamental theories explain more and become more general). Historically, it has been 
quantum theory (early 20th century), or initially quantum mechanics, that finally undermined the 
supposed runaway success of reductionist mechanistic philosophy (modulo Maxwellian updating), 
re-opening the door for scepticism about the explanatory aims of science. However, recent years 
have seen a revival of the belief in some version of quantum theory, either as part of a fundamental 
complete theory or as reinvented in terms of constraints on information gathering about the 
underlying unobservable ontology of the physical world.  
We begin by surveying the historical positions in different attempts to understand the material 
world since the rise of modern science, with specific focus on the role of Cartesian primary qualities 
in explanatory conceptualisation. Moreover the opening chapter argues that although explanatory 
narratives are essentially epistemological constructions, they require a general metaphysical backing 
through the explainer’s and explainee’s commitments to take the concepts and higher structures 
composed of them as directly referential. Two methodological perspectives on theory construction, 
Einstein’s division into principle and constructive theories, are then delineated along the lines of 
their metaphysical and explanatory potential, and presented as the research instrument with which 
to approach the specific-case-study instances of quantum theory reconstruction. A specific strategy 
of arguing for scientific realism (‘the simple transcendental strategy’) is then presented and 
connected to the challenges that the phenomena (EPR correlations and ‘teleportation’) from the 
domain of contemporary quantum theory pose for it. The opening chapter concludes with a survey 
of the general models of explanation and their position with respect to the principle-constructive 
dichotomy introduced above.  
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The second chapter presents the principle approaches, starting with the survey of Bohr’s 
philosophical approach to quantum theory and its specifics mirrored in the contemporary principle 
approaches. Novel perspectives from the quantum information theory, which the neo-Bohrian 
approaches lean on, are then presented. The first of the principle approaches, Fuchs’ principle 
programme of epistemic guesstimates is outlined, followed by a more mathematically rigorous 
derivation of the constraining principles of information gathering and transmission in a world 
respectful of quantum theory by Clifton, Bub and Halvorson (the CBH programme). These are taken 
to be instances of the unification-type of explanation, rooted in simple empirical generalizations and 
familiar macroscopic concepts. Problems and objections to this specific explanatory conception are 
then considered in greater detail, culminating in a presentation of the problems such approaches 
might face in comparison with the more popular causal-mechanical explanations characteristic of 
the constructive methodology.  
The third chapter presents the historical development of one such version of a constructive 
approach, popularly known as the Bohmain mechanics. Its most notable characteristic is the staunch 
metaphysical reliance on the re-construction of phenomena in terms of point-particles moving in 
space, with additional metaphysical elements such as the all-pervading quantum ‘field’ or ‘potential’. 
Standard objections to such models are presented, along with those stemming from the novelties of 
the phenomenon of ‘teleportation’. Finally, a view upon which the additional element is not 
interpreted as an extended material-like entity, but a universal law is presented. Further 
considerations concerning laws as part of fundamental explanatory ontology are then surveyed as 
strengths and weaknesses of this instance of constructive approach.  
The final chapter presents the general theory of the structure of deeper explanations and finds 
principle approaches comparatively weaker than the constructive ones along those lines. Further 
lessons from the principle approaches’ strengths and the general considerations of constrained 
acceptance of the violations of separability (a problem inherent in the phenomena specific to the 
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domain of quantum theory) are then applied to the ‘particles plus universal law’ view. Finally, some 
general consequences for the common sense conceptual framework as the starting point of the 
realist strategy, that explanatory approaches are expected to connect to, are drawn. These call for 
the abandonment of the instantaneous state of the extended material structure as the fundamental 
unit of the realist ontology, and its replacement with ‘generalised things’ as re-identifiable invariants 
through change. Additional research is proposed to assess the explanatory worth of this model 
against one that makes the spatially extended, but holistically conceived, structure as absolutely 
primary (the so-called Everettian view), though conceptually disassociated from the everyday 
objects of experience. In conclusion, it is recommended that ‘a chair’ be understood at any instance 
as capable of smashing a window as well as consisting of four legs.  
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Sažetak  
Početna je pozicija ovoga rada da je znanstveno znanje nepotpuno bez objašnjenja, gdje se razvojem 
novih teorija to znanje proširuje i produbljuje (tako što temeljne teorije objašnjavaju širi spektar 
pojava i postaju opdenitije primjenjive). Povijesno gledano, kvantna je teorija (početkom 20. st.), ili 
inicijalno 'kvantna mehanika', konačno potkopala navodni neograničeni uspjeh redukcionističke 
mehanistične eksplanatorne filozofije (uzevši u obzir i konceptualni dodatak koji čini Maxwellova 
konceptualizacija polja). Tako je ponovo otvoren put skepticizmu prema eksplanatornim ciljevima 
znanosti. Međutim, u posljednje vrijeme ponovo se budi i vjerovanje u temeljnu ulogu kvantne 
teorije, bilo kao dio fundamentalne potpune teorije ili iznova osmišljenu u okvirima ograničenja na 
prikupljanje informacija o osjetilno nedostupnoj ontologiji fizikalnog svijeta.  
Izlaganje počinje pregledom povijesnih stajališta u različitim pokušajima razumijevanja materijalnog 
svijeta od uspona novovjekovne znanosti, sa posebnim naglaskom na ulogu kartezijanskih primarnih 
kvaliteta na eksplanatornu konceptualizaciju. Naglašava se i da iako su eksplanatorni narativi u 
osnovi epistemološke konstrukcije, oni zahtijevaju metafizičku podlogu kroz prihvadanje 
referencijalnosti pojmova od kojih se sastoje. Nadalje se predstavljaju dvije metodološke perspektive 
na konstrukciju znanstvenih teorija, slijededi Einsteinovu podjelu na principne i konstruktivne teorije. 
One su prikazane i obzirom na njihove metafizičke i eksplanatorne karakteristike i oblikovane u 
istraživački instrument kroz koji se razmatraju pojedine 'studije slučaja' eksplanatorne rekonstrukcije 
kvantne teorije. Specifična strategija zagovaranja znanstvenog realizma (nazvana 'jednostavnom 
transcendentalnom strategijom') se izlaže i povezuje s izazovima koje određene pojave (EPR 
korelacije i 'teleportacija') iz domene suvremene kvantne teorije postavljaju pred nju. Prvo se 
poglavlje zaključuje pregledom opdih modela objašnjenja i njihovom pozicioniranjem u odnosu na 
gore spomenutu dihotomiju principno-konstruktivno.  
Drugo poglavlje predstavlja principne pristupe, počevši s pregledom Bohrovog filozofskog pristupa 
kvantnoj teoriji i njegovim pojedinostima odraženim u suvremenim principnim pristupima (koji se 
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sami karakteriziraju kao novo-Bohrijanski). Zatim se prikazuju novouvedeni pojmovi iz kvantne 
informacijske teorije, na koje se oslanjaju novo-Bohrijanski pristupi. Prikazuje se prvi od tih 
principnih pristupa, Fuchsov principni program epistemičkih racionalnih 'nagađanja', a slijedi ga 
matematički rigoroznija derivacija ograničavajudih načela prikupljanja i prijenosa infirmacija u zbilji 
podložnoj zakonitostima kvantne teorije, a koji razvijaju Clifton, Bub i Halvorson (CBH program). Njih 
se prikazuje kao inačice unifikacijskog tipa objašnjenja, ukorijenjenih u jednostavnim empirijskim 
generalizacijama i poznatim makroskopskim pojmovima. Slijedi razmatranje problema i prigovora 
detaljima ovakve eksplanatorne konceptualizacije, što kulminira prezentacijom problema na koje bi 
ovi pristupi opdenito mogli naidi u usporedbi s opdenito popularnijim kauzalno-mehanističnim tipom 
objašnjenja karakterističnim za konstruktivnu metodologiju.  
Trede poglavlje prikazuje povijesni razvoj jedne inačice konstruktivnog pristupa (izabrane za ovu 
'studiju slučaja'), popularno nazvane Bohmova mehanika. Njezina je najizraženija karakteristika 
izrazito metafizičko oslanjanje na re-konstrukciju pojava kroz pojmovni okvir čestica koje se kredu u 
prostoru, uz dodatne ontološke elemente kao što je sveprisutno kvantno 'polje' ili 'potencijal'. Zatim 
se izlažu standardni problemi ovoga fizikalnog modela, uz one koje donosi i nova eksperimentalna 
pojava 'teleportacije'. U konačnici se predstavlja i model u kojem dodatni ontološki element nije 
protegnuti entitet sličan materiji ved sveobuhvatni prirodni zakon. Daje se u pregled dodatnih 
filozofskih problema vezanih uz postavljanje zakona kao dijela temeljne eksplanatorne ontologije, te 
se predstavljaju mogude prednosti i slabosti takvog konstruktivnog pristupa.  
Završno poglavlje počinje uvodom u opde filozofijske karakteristike dubljih objašnjenja, te upuduje 
na komparativni nedostatak principnih objašnjenja u odnosu na konstruktivna u pogledu dubine 
objašnjenja. Zatim se pouke iz teoretskih prednosti principnih objašnjenja kao i opdih razmatranja 
vezanih uz prihvadanje kršenja odvojivosti (što je problem inherentan u pojavama specifičnim za 
kvantnu teoriju) primjenjuju na model 'čestice plus sveobuhvatni zakon'. U konačnici se izvode i 
posljedice ovakvog tumačenja formalizma kvantne teorije za 'svakodnevni pojmovni okvir' koji je 
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polazna točka strategije zagovaranja realizma iz prvog poglavlja. Ukazuje se na važnost mogudnosti 
povezivanja s ovom strategijom za sve studije slučaja razmatrane u ovoj radnji. Spomenute 
posljedice ponajprije pozivaju na napuštanje trenutnog stanja protegnute materijalne strukture kao 
temeljne jedinice ontologije realizma, i njegove zamjene 'poopdenim predmetima' kao invarijantima 
re-identifikacije u procesu promjena. Predlaže se i dodatna usporedba, u mogudem bududem 
istraživanu, eksplanatornih potencijala ovdje izdvojenog konstruktivnog pristupa s modelima koji 
ontološki primarnim postavljaju prostorno protegnutu, ali holistički shvadenu, strukturu koja je 
konceptualno razlučena od predmeta svakodnevnog iskustva (tzv. Everettovo tumačenje 
formalizma). Zaključno, laičkim rječnikom, zagovaranje studije slučaja koja sadrži temljni univerzalni 
zakon upuduje da razumijevanje pojma 'stolica' u svakom trenutku uključuje mogudnost razbijanja 
prozora jednako kao i četiri noge.   
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